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Accounting and control - that is mainly what is needed for
the 'smooth working', for the proper functioning, of the
first phase of communist society.
V.I. Lenin (1917) The State and Revolution, Ch 5.4
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ABSTRACT
There has been considerable academic interest in the recent public sector changes in New
Zealand, as they were seen as characterising an international reform trend. This thesis
employs a critical theoretical model to evaluate the development and impact of accounting-led
reform in the New Zealand public sector. By combining an analysis of the reform initiatives
in health and education, and longitudinal-case studies of schools and GP practices, this study
examines the question of how teachers and doctors managed new forms of financial control
and visibility. The critical theoretical model used here was derived from the Laughlin and
Broadbent research on the accounting-led reform within the UK. The generalisability of their
UK research was evaluated by applying their theory and methodology to the New Zealand
context.
Although New Zealand now constitutes an important site for academic research, much of the
existing literature has focused on the policy proposals for the reform of health and education.
There have been few evaluations of the impact of changes in accounting practices and forms
of accountability. Based on the Laughlin-Broadbent theoretical model it was expected that the
reforms would be perceived by GPs and teachers as a threat to their autonomy and would
consequently be 'absorbed', protecting the core values and real work of the organisations in
which they practised.
The findings suggest that the theoretical framework as developed by Laughlin-Broadbent
needed general modification. Their conclusion that small groups absorb change was found to
be too simple and was extended in the study to recognise that change can also be absorbed at
the institutional level. The concept of institutional absorbing structures is an important
theoretical contribution of this study and also provides a link between the organisational focus
of the Laughlin and Broadbent studies and broader social theory concerns. The case studies
also revealed that while the financial and administrative reforms were absorbed, changes in the
core work structures and practices could not be absorbed, indicating that the nature of the
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There have been a number of calls for evaluations of the public sector reforms which
have been implemented in many countries. Of particular interest is the role of
accounting in the reform process (Hopwood, 1984; Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992;
Hood, 1995b). However, an effective evaluation requires studies of the reform
process in its contextually specific national setting. This thesis takes one step along
this path by presenting an empirical study of the impact of accounting-led reform in
the New Zealand public sector, focusing particularly on schools and GP practices.
The objective of this investigation is to evaluate the utility of the Laughlin-Broadbent
theoretical model in the case of the New Zealand public sector. A number of themes
emerged from the Laughlin-Broadbent studies of the UK health and education
reforms. Among these were the impact of professionals on reform implementation,
the importance of lifeworld values and resistance to externally imposed change. We
would expect that the New Zealand health and education reforms would also involve
successive attempts by the State to colonise health and education, as had been the
case in the UK. Laughlin-Broadbent indicate that in such a setting there is the
potential that professional staff such as doctors and teachers will resist the
implementation of the State initiatives, particularly when they clash with core
lifeworld values.
The next section introduces the New Zealand context and describes the core lifeworld
values associated with the institutions of health and education in New Zealand. This
is particularly important as many of these lifeworld values were subsequently
challenged as part of the reform process.
1.2 THE NEW ZEALAND REFORMS
During the 1980s and 1990s New Zealand was subject to dramatic social and
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economic restructuring. Holland and Boston (1990, p. 1) described this period as
"perestroika, albeit with a particular New Zealand flavour". This perestroika involved
transforming the economy from one of the most protected to the example of an
entrepreneurial, free market economy (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p. 330). The
operation of the public sector was also substantially restructured, with many of the
State trading activities being privatised and the remaining core being subject to private
sector management practices and performance measures. Reform of the education
and health systems occurred in the context of these wider structural and economic
changes.
Since the 1870s the New Zealand education system has been under the control of the
State. The key argument for centralisation was to obtain uniformity of provision
throughout the country, and over time, the ideal of equality of opportunity to all
children, regardless of where they lived, became the central value of the system. The
Department of Education sought to ensure that "wherever people lived they would
have access to a school offering the same range of opportunities as any other school"
(Gordon, 1996). Because the Department of Education tended to be staffed by
teachers or ex-teachers (they were often seconded from their positions in schools), the
Department reinforced the 'educational values' that were considered important within
schools, particularly concepts of equality within and between schools, and excellence
in teaching (Gordon, 1992b).
Following the recommendations of the Picot taskforce (1988) the Government dis¬
established the Department of Education and devolved management responsibilities to
the schools. Each school was to be managed by parents elected as trustees. This
restructure challenged the previously central principle of equality of opportunity.
Equality of opportunity was also disturbed because the schools in the wealthier
neighbourhoods could secure local funding while the schools in poorer
neighbourhoods found this difficult. The other key value that was challenged was one
of professional autonomy. While teaching staff were used to being subject to review
by the Department of Education, this process was conducted by teachers and was not
seen as a threat to professional autonomy. However, with the restructure, direct
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monitoring and control were replaced with a series of indirect control mechanisms,
which were no longer under the control of the teaching profession. The devolution of
management responsibility to school trustees placed teaching staff under the direct
control of parents. This posed a clear threat to teacher autonomy.
The basis of the existing health system was established in 1938. The core value that
all citizens would have access to free health care on the basis of need was enshrined in
the 1938 system. However, the concept of free access was also coupled with the
notion that GPs would have the right to practice without a direct accountability to the
Government. The development and operation of this system is explained in the first
part of Chapter Seven. The taskforces appointed to review the health care system
(The Health Benefits Review1 in 1986 and The Report of the Task Force on Hospital
and Related Services2 in 1988) proposed a number of changes (see Chapter Seven)
that challenged the principle of free public access to healthcare and made GPs directly
accountable to the State. Based on Laughlin et al. (1994b) it was expected that GPs
would resist this direct accountability. This expectation was also supported by Lipsky
(1980) and Gorz (1989) who argued that groups such as GPs would be inclined to
resist initiative that threatened their autonomy (see Chapter Two).
As with the reforms to education, the reforms to health care were seen by those
affected as a threat to their autonomy. Because the teachers and the GPs were
responsible for implementing the reforms it was quite possible that they would seek to
change them in ways which would protect their autonomy and mitigate the impact of
the reforms which impinged on their domain.
1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Chapter Three describes the theoretical framework used in this thesis and analyses
Scott C., Fougere G. and Marwick J. (1986).
Gibbs A., Fraser D. and Scott J. (1988).
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how Laughlin and Broadbent used it in their evaluation of the reforms in UK schools
and GP practices. However, because this was a middle range theory (Laughlin, 1995)
it was not static but evolving. As they conducted their empirical evaluations of the
accounting-led reforms in the UK, Laughlin and Broadbent came to focus increasingly
on the role of small groups of people within organisations, which they found were
important in absorbing change in the schools and the GP practices studied.
The reason for selecting the Laughlin-Broadbent theoretical model was that it enabled
the comparison between their UK findings and a study of the New Zealand reforms.
At the time of the commencement of the thesis, their work was one of the few
empirical evaluations of the public sector reforms that had been published. It was
therefore a rational choice for a theoretical basis. The application of the
Laughlin/Broadbent model was also informed by what Yin (1994, p. 39) called the
multiple-case research design. Laughlin and Broadbent developed their theoretical
model from case studies of the UK public reforms. It was unclear whether these
models were generalisable to other settings. This thesis offered the opportunity to
explore the external validity of the Laughlin-Broadbent findings by applying their
theoretical framework to accounting-led reforms in a different country. Under the
middle-range methodology (Laughlin, 1995) the objective was not to test this
theoretical framework but to develop and extend it through the New Zealand
empirical evidence.
1.4 KEY RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
This thesis has produced a number of important research contributions.3 The first
contribution was the empirical study of the impact of the accounting-led reforms on
the schools and GP practices. Previously there was little research on how these
significant reforms were implemented. This thesis has extended the existing
knowledge in this area.
Published papers from the project are listed in Appendix 1.
4
The second key contribution was extending the generalisability of the
Laughlin/Broadbent finding to the New Zealand context. Although the New Zealand
reforms were different to those studied in the UK, and the schools and GP practices
had different histories and structures, the UK findings were very similar to the findings
from the New Zealand studies. The concept of small work groups closely related to
how the reforms were managed within the schools. However, the small group model
did not fit the GP practices. This difference led to a modification of the theoretical
model with the concept of an institutional absorbing mechanism. Although the
Laughlin/Broadbent material adopted a social theoretical basis, most of the analysis
was firmly anchored at the organisational level. This thesis found that change was not
just absorbed within organisations but that, as in the case of the GPs studied, new
institutional structures could be created to buffer organisations from change. Within
the GP practices many of the contractual and administrative responsibilities were
absorbed by an independent organisation, known as the Pegasus Independent Practice
Association (IPA). By raising the analysis above the organisational level to consider
the role of institutional absorbing structures, this thesis has made an important
contribution to understanding the process of institutional development and by
providing a link between the organisational analysis of Laughlin and Broadbent and
broader social theory concerns.
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This thesis comprises of an introduction chapter, three sections, and a conclusion
chapter. The first section encompasses the background and rationale (Chapter Two)
the theoretical framework (Chapter Three) and the research methods (Chapter Four).
The objective of this section is to focus on the 'why' and 'how' issues associated with
the research project.
The second section concerns the reforms to New Zealand schools and the empirical
study of the response. It includes Chapter Five and Six: Chapter Five describes the
historical development of the New Zealand education system and the reform changes
while Chapter Six links to this by presenting an empirical study of four schools.
Chapter Five is necessary for two reasons: first, it aids an understanding of the nature
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of the reforms before any interpretation of the responses to those changes and second,
many of the reforms were not well documented in the secondary literature. Much of
the content of Chapter Five was the product of the studies conducted in the schools,
material drawn from unpublished documents and, personal interviews with informants
in government agencies.
The third section of the thesis concerns the New Zealand health reforms and the
subsequent impact on the GP practices studied. It includes Chapter Seven and Eight
which respectively describe the reforms to the New Zealand health care system and
the empirical study of five GP practices. Because of the paucity of secondary sources
the contents of Chapter Seven also draws heavily on original work.
Chapter Nine concludes the thesis by summarising the findings contained in the earlier
chapters and drawing together the multiple-case study focus on health and education.





Since the 1970s many of the OECD countries have reformed their public sector
structures and practices: activities owned and controlled by government have been
sold into private hands and social welfare structures have been down-sized in an
attempt to obtain more services for less money. While these changes have been
described as "... one of the most striking international trends in public administration"
(Hood, 1991, p. 3), few economists and policy theorists predicted the changes, seeing
instead the growth of public bureaucracy as a certain long-term trend (Hood, 1995a).
Fundamental to the change in public administration has been a new role for
accounting in the public sector. Previously the focus of accounting within the public
bureaucracy had been on issues of probity and compliance. However, as the structure
and nature of public sector organisations started to change, so too did the role of
accounting. Accounting, or as Laughlin (1992) called it 'accounting logic', expanded
its role to become the archetype of economic rationalism (Pusey, 1991),
managerialism (Hood, 1990) and a key feature of public sector reform in many
countries.
Authors such as Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) have called for an international
evaluation of the public sector reform process and of the emerging role of accounting
technology in the public sector. This thesis seeks to answer their call by providing a
case study of the health and education reforms implemented in New Zealand between
1993 and 1995 and the role of accounting in the health and education context.
The systems of health care and education in New Zealand have been subject to
substantial reform, built on models of accounting control and economic rationality and
involved the introduction of new accounting practices into public sector organisations.
This thesis presents a study of how the reforms have been implemented and how those
affected responded to the financial freedoms and the accounting controls that have
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been introduced. The empirical research involved the description and analysis of how
four schools and five primary health practices have responded to the reforms of the
New Zealand education and health systems. The theoretical framework was based on
the models developed by Laughlin and Broadbent (see chapter three for an extensive
discussion of this material) for the evaluation of the role of 'accounting logic' in the
UK health and education reforms.
Three key research choices were made in this thesis: first to focus on public sector
reform, second, to focus on New Zealand and third to focus on GP practices and
schools. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to describing the motivation and
context of the thesis and explaining the rationale behind the key research choices. The
next section describes the nature of the public sector reform trend while the third
section describes the role of accounting in the reform process. This provides a
rationale for why an accounting thesis should be concerned with public sector reform.
The fourth section discusses the nature of the reform trend in New Zealand and makes
a case for the significance of New Zealand as a research site. The fifth section
presents the argument that professional groups have the power and the motivation to
subvert policy initiatives that are seen as a threat to their autonomy or values. This
analysis provides a justification for the focus on GPs and teachers as professionals that
have considerable discretion in their work and therefore have the ability to modify
policies as they are implemented. Based on existing literature both of these groups
are seen as having opportunity and motivation to modify and perhaps subvert a threat
to their autonomy.
2.2 A REFORM TREND
There seems little doubt that the last decade will be seen as a period of public sector
reform on an international scale (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992). This section
describes the nature of the reform process and highlights international public sector
reform as an important research area.
While there has been a consensus on the need for reform, two trends have emerged in
the kind of reforms undertaken (Holmes, 1992, p. 473). For low-income countries
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the emphasis has been on modernisation, as the role of government has changed from
regulatory and systems maintenance, to national planning and development
administration. In developed and middle-income countries there has been a greater
emphasis on economy, value-for money and improving general public sector
performance (Holmes, 1992, p. 473). While both of these reform trends are
interesting, most of the research has been concerned with the public sector reforms
initiated during the 1980s and 1990s in the 'developed' countries. Many of the
OECD countries have undertaken public sector reforms (Hood, 1991). Examples of
this kind of change have been the 'Next Steps' and the 'Financial Management'
initiatives, which have radically altered the structure and operation of much of the
civil service in the UK. In Australia there have been important financial management
reforms and changes in the operation of federal, state and local government. In the
USA the Clinton Administration has made the quest for government that 'works
better and costs less' (Office of the Vice President, 1993) one of its top priorities.
Hood (1991, p. 4) argued that rather than just an increased emphasis on improving
public sector performance, a whole new model of public administration has emerged
which he called New Public Management (NPM). This involved a move away from a
rule-based public service that was clearly differentiated from the private sector and a
move towards private sector models of funding, management and control.
2.3 THE REFORMS AND ACCOUNTING
The study of public sector reform and the emergence of NPM would seem to be an
issue for political science and public policy rather than for accounting research.
However, it has become clear that accounting is a central part of the language and
practice of change. Hopwood (1984) was one of the first accounting researchers to
comment on the growing emphasis upon accounting technology and accounting
measurement in the management of the public sector. He argued that a changing view
of the role of the State had led to a requirement for agencies of the State to account
for their aims, actions and achievements in new ways. The basis of this change was a
focus on cost, efficiency and 'value for money'. The growing emphasis on accounting
was seen by Hopwood (1984) as a response to a period of economic difficulty,
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particularly to the accusations of waste, maladministration and inefficiency in the
existing public services. He also suggested that the introduction of accounting
technology in the public sector would (among other things) function to make the local
'visible' to the centre and therefore make monitoring by the centre and imposition of
central standards and requirements easier (Hopwood, 1984, p. 182).
Initially public policy theorists paid little attention to the growing importance of
accounting as a part of the NPM process (see Aucion 1990; Hood, 1990). However,
as researchers attempted to describe a reform trend, it became evident that accounting
was playing an increasingly important role in public sector organisations. In 1991
Hood catalogued what he called the 'seven doctrinal components' of the NPM
approach: (1) hands-on professional management, (2) explicit standards and measures
of performance, (3) greater emphasis on output controls, (4) a shift to disaggregation
of units in the public sector, (5) a shift to greater competition in public sector, (6)
stress on private sector styles of management practice, and (7) greater stress on
discipline and parsimony in resource usage. Although it was not explicitly stated, it
can be argued that all of Hood's (1991) 'seven doctrinal components' were based on
accounting technologies, highlighting the growing importance of accounting as a
reform device. In 1995 Hood (1995b) recognised the accounting implications
inherent in his NPM model and placed a more explicit emphasis on accounting as an
important aspect of the overall public sector reform trend. He suggested that the
changes in public sector accounting were central to the rise of NPM and that
"accounting changes formed an important part of the assault on the progressive-era
models of public accountability" (Hood, 1995, p. 93).
In 1995 Humphrey, Miller and Scapens analysed the growing emphasis on the role of
accounting in public sector reform. They located 'accountable management' as central
to the reforms of the UK public sector. They suggested that accounting practices had
come to challenge and restructure the role of previously powerful professional groups
within the public sector, such as head teachers, civil servants, social workers,
university lecturers and general practitioners. These groups are "now required to
assume more financially orientated modes of behaviour and to become budget holders
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and entrepreneurs" (Humphrey, Miller and Scapens, 1995, p. 16). There seems little
doubt that accounting and related practices have come to play an important, and
maybe a 'taken for granted' role in the public sector of many countries (Humphrey,
Miller and Scapens, 1995, p. 15).
2.4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW ZEALAND REFORMS
While researchers such as Hood (1991, 1995b) have argued that public sector reform
is an international trend, most of the studies to date have been focused on the UK
(Humphrey, Miller and Scapens, 1995) the USA (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) and
Australia (Guthrie and Parker, 1996). At the commencement of this thesis, relatively
few accounting orientated papers had addressed how the reforms were implemented
in countries such as New Zealand.
Although New Zealand is a small1 and geographically isolated country, there has been
considerable interest and comment on the dramatic reform of the public administration
enacted during the 1980s and the 1990s. In their influential and widely read work -
Reinventing Government, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) cite New Zealand as a leading
example of how to transform a public sector from a semi-socialist economy to a
reinvented market economy. They describe New Zealand as "furthest along the
entrepreneurial path" (p. 330) and comment favourably on changes such as the
development of a "mission driven and results orientated budget for their entire
national government" (p. 165), full accrual accounting (p. 244), subjecting State
owned organisations to competition (p. 82) and the elimination of direct and indirect
subsidies (p. 217). Holmes (1992, p. 473) presented the New Zealand reforms as a
dramatic example of systemic change while Hood (1991, p. 6) saw the reform
proposals of the New Zealand Treasury as the 'closest thing to a coherent NPM
manifesto'. Such is the interest in the public sector reforms in New Zealand that some
1
Population approximately 3.5 million.
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commentators now refer to a 'New Zealand model' of public administration (Boston
et al., 1996). Many government agencies have sent officials to New Zealand to obtain
a first hand view of the reforms and to assess their possible relevance to their own
national contexts (Boston et al., 1996, p. 3). Detailed reports on the reforms in New
Zealand have also been commissioned by various agencies and governmental
organisations (e.g. Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 1995; Scott, 1996) and
there has been a steady stream of invitations to senior public servants and academics
from New Zealand to explain the reforms at international conferences, in scholarly
journals and before legislative enquiries into public sector reform (see, for example
Treasury and Civil Services Committee, 1994, pp. xlix-li).
Following the change of Government in 1984 the newly elected Labour faced what
was described as an economic crisis (see Scott, 1996, p. 6). The first step in
addressing this crisis was a radical restructure of the economic policies: the exchange
rate was floated, most of the producer subsidies were eliminated and the various
import barriers were phased out. The economic reforms were followed by a number
of dramatic structural changes to the New Zealand public sector. Many of the
commercial activities associated with the public sector were restructured as business
enterprises (corporatised) and subsequently sold to overseas investors (privatised).
The remaining core public sector was subject to two central pieces of legislation; the
State Sector Act (1988) and the Public Finance Act (1989). The State Sector Act
(1989) had two main aims; the first was to redefine the relationship between ministers
and permanent heads of departments. Departmental heads lost their permanent
tenure, were appointed on contracts and became known as chief executives. The
State Sector Act (1988) made it easier for Ministers to hold departmental chief
executives accountable for departmental performance. The second key objective of
the State Sector Act (1988) was to apply private sector labour-market regulations to
the public sector. The Public Finance Act (1989) altered the Government
appropriation process to focus on outputs rather than inputs and required that
government agencies prepare regular performance reports and full financial statements
in accordance with private sector accounting standards (Scott et al., 1990).
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Most of the changes in the New Zealand public sector have been in broad conformity
with the 'managerialist' or NPM trend and have shared common features with the
reforms in Australia and the UK. However, the New Zealand reforms also had some
particular characteristics, which were not so evident in other countries. The most
striking feature of the New Zealand changes was their cohesive or holistic nature.
While the public sector reforms in the UK and Australia were typical of the new-right
concerns for less interventionist government, the actual changes were ad hoc and
represented relatively separate responses to perceived problems in different areas of
the public sector (Hood, 1991, p. 6). However, the New Zealand reforms were
different because they were part of a carefully crafted, integrated and mutually
reinforcing reform agenda (Boston et al., 1996, p. 3). This was due to the conceptual
rigour and intellectual coherence that underpinned the reform process (Hood, 1991)
and the dominant part in the process played by the New Zealand Treasury. The
Treasury were responsible for advocating a reform model based around institutional
economics theory (agency theory, public choice theory and transaction-cost
economics) and for translating that model into specific policy proposals (Boston et al.,
1996, p. 16). Although a reform agenda was never outlined in an official government
paper the central features were contained in the Treasury's post election briefing
papers Economic Management published in 1984 and Government Management
published in late 1987.
The key components of the New Zealand reform proposals and the Treasury's
theoretical model have been outlined by those from within the Treasury (see Scott and
Gorringe, 1989; Scott et al., 1990; and Ball, 1990) and by academic commentators
(e.g. Boston et al., 1991, 1996; Wistrich, 1992). Their papers describe the changes
and explain the logic behind the reforms and some also actively debate the merits (or
flaws) of the reform proposals. However, little serious attention has been paid to how
the reform proposals were implemented. This was an important omission as policies
often change as they are implemented.
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2.5 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND THE PROFESSIONAL
The focus of this thesis is on how the New Zealand public sector reforms were
implemented. Within New Zealand it was evident that the proposed reforms were in
transition and were modified significantly as they were implemented (see Chapter
Four and Chapter Six). This was particularly true of health and education where it
may be anticipated that Treasury proposals for market competition and private
provision would be modified because of practical implementation problems and
resistance from professional staff. Because of this the health and education reforms
provided a particularly interesting site and the decision was made to study how these
reforms were being implemented, focusing on the experiences of specific schools and
GP practices. Education and health consume high levels of State resources and are
very sensitive areas of public concern, making a study of change in these areas highly
relevant.
The rest of this section utilises some theories on policy implementation in
professionalised domains to provide a basis for the focus on implementation and on
the particular role of professionals (such as teachers and doctors) in that process.
Two important points are made: first, policy as proposed is not necessarily the same
as policy as implemented and second, professionals such as teachers and GPs are
likely to resist changes that they perceive as a threat to their autonomy, values,
income or status.
The lack of a comprehensive evaluation of the actual effects of the public sector
reforms in New Zealand is curious because of the scale and cost of the changes. It is
also well recognised that policies change as they are implemented (Ham and Hill,
1993, p. 97). Within the public policy literature one of the most influential studies
was the work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). They found that organisations tend
to transform policy and that the goals of the original policy makers were often
subverted when policies were actually implemented. Later authors (see Barrett and
Fudge, 1981) arrived at similar conclusions, suggesting that 'lower level actors' took
decisions which effectively pre-empted top decision making or altered policies. This
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is particularly interesting in the New Zealand context as many of those that have
promoted the 'New Zealand Model' to an international audience have only discussed
the proposed changes, rather than what was actually implemented.
One of the most influential studies of the role of 'lower level actors' in the policy
process was the work of Lipsky (1980). He argued that most people do not
'experience government' through elected politicians but through those who deliver
the services such as teachers, police, social workers, judges and health workers2.
Because these workers have discretion in determining the nature, amount and quality
of benefits and sanctions provided by government agencies, they effectively make the
policy (Lipsky 1980, p. 13). Lipsky (1980, p. 25) concluded that students of policy
and policy implementation should consider the capacity of 'policy deliverers' to
influence the process and to resist changes.
While Lipsky (1980) argued that 'policy deliverers' have the power to subvert 'top-
down' policies, Gorz (1989) has suggested a motive for why they might choose to
resist policy directives in certain situations. Gorz (1989) presented a discussion of the
place of work and economic reason in a contemporary capitalist society and argued
that attempts to subject certain activities to economic rationality will be dysfunctional
and will lead to unfavourable consequences. He called one category of these kinds of
activities 'care' or 'assistance' and offered medical practice and education as practical
examples. By way of illustration Gorz (1989) argued that incentives for doctors to
maximise their productivity (that is the number of patients treated per hour) would
undermine the doctor-patient relationship. As such the 'caring' and 'assistance'
professionals should:
2
Lipsky (1980) referred to these people as street-level bureaucrats. I have avoided using the term because it has
connotations about a bureaucratic nature and orientation that are not always appropriate.
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... perform their work out of a sense of vocation, that is an unconditional
desire to help other people. Receiving remuneration for the help she or he
gives should not be the doctor's basic motivation; such a motivation is in
competition with a strictly professional motivation, which could or indeed
must take precedence in case of need (Gorz, 1989, p. 144).
Gorz (1989) argued that because they are not primarily concerned with financial
reward but with an unconditional desire to help other people that the 'caring' or
'assistance' professionals were resistant to the process of economic rationalisation.
Economic rationality and the process of economic rationalisation (according to Gorz,
1989) involved reflecting life in terms of calculation and counting, and formalising
experience as procedures. Accounting and other forms of control can be represented
as characteristic of Gorz's (1989) notion of economic rationality (see Power, 1992).
Based on Gorz's (1989) view on economic rationality in general and accounting
specifically, it is reasonable to expect that doctors and teachers will resist the intrusion
of accounting controls into their work. Therefore, the New Zealand health and
education reforms offer an interesting opportunity to study how two different social
institutions and professional groups located within those institutions respond to the
reform changes where there was potential conflict between their motivations and
values and the provisions contained in centrally imposed policy changes.
However, it is clear that a number of different groups (and individuals) might have
been inclined to resist the reforms. Why then should GPs and teachers be singled out
for research attention? One answer to this question is that a number of
implementation studies had been conducted in the UK focusing on GP practices and
schools (Broadbent, Laughlin & Read, 1991; Laughlin, Broadbent & Shearn, 1992;
and Laughlin, Broadbent, Shearn & Willig-Atherton, 1994a). By studying schools
and GPs in New Zealand it would be possible to make some comparisons with the UK
material (see Chapters Six, Eight and Nine).
In regard to the New Zealand context, both the education and the health care systems
were changed considerably as part of the New Zealand reform process. While there
were distinct differences between the health and the education reforms (see Chapter
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Four and Six), both involved the introduction of accounting technologies. While
other professional groups also had discretion in their work; they did not experience
the same level of change, the same accounting controls or have the same opportunities
to influence the implementation of the reforms as GPs and teachers.
2.6 SUMMARY
Of the many countries that have undertaken public sector reform, New Zealand has
received particular attention. As well as being seen as a conspicuous example of
public sector reform, the New Zealand changes have been notable for their conceptual
rigour and intellectual coherence. While there has been some discussion of the
concepts and the reform proposals there has been little evaluation of the
implementation and impact of the changes, particularly the impact of new forms of
accounting control and visibility. The application of the work of Lipsky (1980) and
Gorz (1989) would suggest that the New Zealand reforms, underpinned by
accounting, are very likely to conflict with the values of groups such as teachers and
GPs. While this is clearly an interesting possibility, this expectation needs to be
explored in a specific empirical context. For these reasons the subject of this research
was the implementation and impacts of the health and education reforms in New
Zealand.
The next chapter analyses the philosophical nature of research choice and describes
those fundamental research choices that form the basis of this thesis. A theoretical
model for this thesis is developed based on a literature summary of public sector





Empirical research is still a relatively recent phenomena in accounting and it was only
in the 1970s that the emphasis shifted away from normative theorising (Mattessich,
1980) to encompass examinations of practice. Much of the subsequent empirical
research has viewed accounting as a technical practice and has been based on research
methodologies derived from the natural sciences. However, during the late 1970s
researchers such as Hopwood (1978) began to criticise accounting research for failing
to consider wider contextual issues. The interest in a contextually informed approach
to accounting research (Burchell et al., 1980) has since resulted in the application of
research methods and theoretical insights derived from social sciences such as
sociology, politics and history to accounting research (Laughlin, 1995). In this
context of growing diversity in method, but more importantly methodology, it is
necessary for a researcher to make a number of clear and deliberate choices about the
nature of their research and how they view the subject being researched (Laughlin,
1995, p. 65).
Fundamental questions about the nature of reality and the role of the researcher are
particularly problematic as they are based on the worldview or understanding held by
the researcher. The best a researcher can do is argue that he/r choices are consistent
and are grounded in a coherent research philosophy. Laughlin (1995) has suggested
that all researchers (including accounting researchers) are faced with three general
areas of choice in conducting research: "theory", "methodology" and "change".
Theory choices involve making assumptions concerning the 'nature and reality' of the
social world (ontology), what constitutes knowledge and how that knowledge relates
to the current investigation (epistemology) (Laughlin, 1995, p. 66). Laughlin (1995)
argued that it is necessary for accounting researchers to decide on the level of prior
theorisation that can legitimately be brought to the empirical investigation. Laughlin
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(1995) argued that high levels of prior theorisation are indicative of an assumed
material world (which exists prior to the observer's projections and bias) which,
despite empirical variety, has high levels of generality and order and has been well
researched in previous studies (p. 66). Laughlin (1995) defined methodology as the
researcher's position on the nature and role of the observer in the discovery process
(what was described by Burrell and Morgan (1979) as the 'human nature
assumption') and the level of theoretical formality in defining the nature of the
discovery method (Burrell and Morgan's 'methodology'). The third choice dimension
in the Laughlin (1995) framework was the 'change' dimension. This referred to the
attitude of the researcher towards maintaining the status quo; in other words, should
researchers be a change agent or an independent observer? Laughlin (1995)
categorised a number of alternative approaches to research on the basis of their
position within the three choice dimensions of his framework. He described those
that adopted a medium position as middle-range research. This analysis is shown in
Figure 3.1.



























Change choice: level of emphasis given to critique of status quo
and need for change, (high/medium/low).
Source: Laughlin (1995, p. 70)
The author's position on the nature and reality of the social world and role as an
observer is based in the image of the researcher as a craft worker. Watson (1994)
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used the image of craft to describe intellectual working - drawing on the observation
from C Wright Mills that 'social science is the practice of a craft'. A hand-made chair
is the product of a craft worker, and as such is a reflection of their creativity and skill.
However, the nature and shape of the chair is also influenced by the material used and
by the demands of the person who is going to sit on it. While not adopting a totally
relativist position Watson (1994) nevertheless maintains that the 'reality' of the
research is mediated or interpreted by the researcher, s/he is implicated in the research
s/he does and bias the research by he/r perspectives and through the choices s/he
makes. This does not imply that there is no reality external to the researcher's
interpretations, but that these 'realities' are interpreted and rationalised as they are
experienced. The perceptions of the researcher, and those of any audience, are
influenced by their backgrounds, experiences and by the process of communication
itself. Watson (1994, p. S79) described the process of research as follows:
I am not simply describing or reporting on what happened. I cannot be
objective in that way. But I am not making up what I am writing.
Management researchers select, interpret, colour, emphasise [and] shape their
findings.
Because the values and background of a researcher are likely to influence the
research, it is necessary to describe them. In relation to the subject matter of this
dissertation, I have never been a school-teacher, a doctor or a policy analyst, although
I have had contact with and discussed my research with people from these groups. I
am principally an academic although I do have a background as an accountant and
have spent time working as an auditor. Part of the time as auditor was spent in public
sector organisations - which explains some of my interest in the public sector. Again,
my education (New Zealand State school system) will inform my perspectives as does
my sex, class and religion (male, middle class, European New Zealander, Christian).
The level of theorisation applied is also essentially a value choice by any researcher.
Researchers who bring low levels of theorisation to their work would argue that one
should approach their empirical work with no assumptions, theories or models and
only derive their theories from the empirics (or indeed that empirics do not require
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theory at all). The position adopted here is that theory cannot be drawn ex nihilo'
from experience as no researcher comes to a project without any prior assumptions or
theories, whereas an explicit theoretical framework makes the assumptions of a
researcher visible and therefore contestable. Those at the high end of Laughlin's
(1995) theory continuum (see figure 3.1) tend to argue that theory is pre-existent and
can be proven (or disproved) by a researcher. If one accepts this position and seeks
to prove or disprove a theory then there are a number of implications. First, one
privileges the theory over the empirics. Second, one draws an arbitrary distinction
between the theoretical and the empirical. Third, one assumes that it is possible to
prove or reject a theoretical proposition (see Sheppard and Johnston, 1975, pp. 9-10
for a discussion of some of these issues).
Laughlin (1995) also maintained that the research methods utilised imply certain
assumptions about the role of human agents in the research process. When there is a
high theoretical definition then there is an implicit assumption that the observer is
largely irrelevant to the process and that he/r subjectivity (which may be assumed not
to exist) plays no part in the process. At the low end, the individual observer is
involved in the observation process without regulations or theoretical rules on how
that observation should be conducted.
Rather than seeking to prove or disprove theory, the research method utilised in this
thesis is based on the concept of discourse (see Broadbent and Laughlin, 1995).
Compared to other research methods discourse has a relatively low level of theoretical
formality and fits with what Laughlin (1995, p. 81) called the middle-range approach,
that is:
. . . (it) takes aspects of both approaches on theory and methodology, while
taking a less dismissive perspective on critique and change. It recognises a
material reality distinct from interpretations while at the same time does not
dismiss the inevitable perceptive bias in models of understanding. It also
recognises that generalisations about reality are possible, even though not
1 Ex nihilo nihil fit - nothing is created from nothing.
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guaranteed to exist, yet maintains that these will always be "skeletal" requiring
empirical detail to make them meaningful.
Within the middle range approach empirical detail has a vital importance. It
complements and completes the 'skeletal' theory. It can also challenge and lead to
change in the theory since it is from the empirical investigation that the 'skeletal
theory' is derived. I would argue that this is a realistic approach given the social
nature of accounting systems.
3.2 PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
Despite the emergence of empirical accounting research, there was remarkably little
interest in research in the public sector which was generally seen to constitute the
domain of economists and political scientists (Perrin, 1981). However, this
perception changed and by the early 1980s there was a significant level of interest in
public sector issues among accounting academics, particularly costing and budgeting
in the NHS (see respective British Accounting Review Research Registers). While it
is difficult to identify a reason for this shift, there are two factors that appear to have
been influential. First, the management and administration of public sector
organisations had become a major political issue as many countries began to
restructure their public services. These reforms challenged many historical
administrative practices and opened new opportunities for both accounting practices
and accountants within previously resistant public institutions. The second factor was
that during the 1970s and early 1980s a small number of academics actively promoted
the development of public sector accounting research. One of these was John Perrin
who, in 1981, published a paper on the State of accounting research in the UK public
sector. He observed that public sector institutions had received relatively little in the
way of research attention during the decade of the 1970s (Perrin, 1981, p. 297) and
argued that there was an urgent need for further research, because of the "many
distinctive accounting problems" and the sheer scale of the public sector. Of
particular concern was the fact that in the public services "... many of the 'managers'
were also 'professionals' first and foremost and that their role as professionals (with
obligations to clients, services, standards etc.) conflicted with the conventional role of
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the manager in accepting hierarchical discipline over matters such as restriction of
services and economising resources" (p. 310). This observation established a theme
that was to become increasingly important in later research, the tension between the
'manager' and the 'professional'. To summarise, Perrin's (1981) paper was a call for
further research and its major contribution was to highlight the need for public sector
accounting research.
In 1988 Lapsley extended Perrin's (1981) work, reviewing research published in the
UK, Australia and from the USA. He found that that by the late 1980s there had been
some improvement as accounting academics had identified the public sector as an
interesting and valid research setting. However, Lapsley (1988) also observed that
many of the most significant issues remained unexplored. Financial accounting and
accountability had received some attention in the UK and broader performance
measurement, cash flow accounting and efficiency audits were studied by some
authors. However, Lapsley (1988) argued that research activity was limited because
of the lack of a theoretical model of public sector accounting, although some authors
had tried unsuccessfully to develop such a framework (see Anthony, 1978).
Lapsley (1988) found that the most significant developments in public sector
accounting related to management accounting, particularly the use of investment
appraisal techniques and management controls in the public sector. Of particular
interest was Perrin et al.'s (1978) study of financial planning and control in the UK
NHS. Perrin et al. (1978) found that there were problems with budgetary controls in
the NHS and potential conflicts between clinicians and the providers of financial
information. The issue of budgetary control and value conflict became an important
theme that was identified and extended in later studies (see Bourn and Ezzamel,
1986a, 1986b) and by the mid 1980s health care organisations in general (and the
NHS in particular) had become important sites for accounting research.
Lapsley (1991) focused specifically on research in the UK NHS. While he mentioned
a number of the same papers as the 1988 paper, the major contribution of the paper
was to outline an agenda for future NHS research. Lapsley (1991) classified the
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research opportunities into six areas: (1) the internal market in health care, (2)
General Practice budgets, (3) capital asset accounting and charging system, (4)
resource management systems (5) audit and (6) self-governing trusts. While there had
been research done in some of these areas, Lapsley (1991) felt that they all needed
further work.
In 1992 Broadbent and Guthrie presented another review of public sector accounting
research. The Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) article differs from the earlier work by
Perrin (1981) and Lapsley (1988) in that they attempted to define what the public
sector was and they sought to focus on 'alternative' literature rather than public
sector accounting research in general. Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) noted that the
idea of what constituted the public sector was changing and that the role of
accounting within public sector organisations was also changing. Public sector
organisations were shifting away from a traditional administrative approach to control
and towards new mechanisms such as enforced competitive tendering, internal
markets and the separation of purchaser and provider roles (p. 4). Because of the
changes in its nature and structure, the identification of what constituted the public
sector had become somewhat problematic. Previously, the public sector comprised
only two areas: one funded by grants from government and the other the monopolies
which supplied the services and utilities which were seen as part of the wider
infrastructure of society (p. 7). An important common feature of both of these areas
was that the organisations were not owned by shareholders but by the public in
general. However, programmes of privatisation moved many of the monopoly
structures out of the public sector and into the hands of private shareholders.
Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) called these organisations Public Business Enterprises
and noted that, while they were not always under public ownership, many had
retained important residual accountabilities that linked the organisations to
government. Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) also identified a second group of
organisations, such as health and education providers, which they called Public
Institutional Systems. These institutions have complex and varying links to both
central and local government structures. An example of this is that in the UK
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education system which is the primary responsibility of local government agencies,
although central government also fund, and seek to control the process. In New
Zealand, education had been seen almost completely as a central government issue
and local government has had minimal influence.
Rather than providing a simple distinction between 'alternative' and 'traditional'
research, Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) described three different categories of
research: technical research; that concerned with technologies in context; and that
concerned with accounting's impacts on organisations as whole entities. The basis of
their distinction was the perception of the importance of organisational context and
the assumption about the power of accounting to lead to change in the public sector.
The technical accounting approach assumes that accounting can lead to significant
changes in the public sector but pays little attention to the issue of organisational
context. Both technical contextual accounting and contextually technical accounting
pay attention to the organisational context while increasingly questioning the role of
accounting as a change agent.
Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) characterised traditional public sector accounting
research as a call for 'technical rules' and 'conceptual frameworks'. Their summary
of this research was brief and critical, arguing that it had failed to consider issues of
value, power and the various influences and pressures both inside and outside an
organisation. Important examples of research that had adopted 'contextually
informed' approaches were Bourn and Ezzamel's (1986a, 1986b) studies of the
construction of costing information and the role of culture in change in the NHS.
Broadbent et al. (1991) also provided a macro study of the NHS changes, looking at
the relationship between the NHS and the central government. An important theme
that emerged from these studies was the relationship between accounting practices,
organisational culture/values/lifeworld and change. Accounting was seen as having a
significant influence on the values and perceptions of organisational members.
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Broadbent et al., (1992b, 1993)2 also adopted a contextually informed research model
to study the implementation and effect of financial devolution on UK schools and
Humphrey (1991) studied the application of the Financial Management Initiative
(FMI) on the probation services in England and Wales. While he found that the new
technology did have enabling potential, he also highlighted that accounting could lead
to unintended dysfunctional consequences.
Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) suggested that there was a need for more public sector
accounting research that recognised the social aspects of organisations rather than just
simply market structures and accountability patterns. Broadbent and Guthrie (1992)
also claimed that there was a need to study how the new accounting systems gave
visibility to activities within the organisations, particularly where there was potential
for conflict of values. The urgent need was for a critical, contextually sensitive
evaluation of how the reforms were being implemented.
There is little published work which is attempting to evaluate the changes
critically ... there would seem to be a great need for extending our
understanding by undertaking further study. Post hoc evaluation of the
changes is therefore imperative (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992, pp. 23-24).
In outlining a basis for a critical evaluation of public sector accounting research
Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) made a number of important points:
• Because of the international nature of the changes taking place, there was a need
for international comparisons and collaborations (p. 24).
• Future work must be of a contextual nature and be based in individual sectors or
governmental institutions (p. 24).
• In order to understand the nature and role of accounting within the public sector it
may be necessary to go beyond conventional accounting research and seek out
understandings available from research in other disciplines. They suggested that
2 Broadbent and Guthrie referenced a 1990 working paper, which was published in 1993.
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this might take accounting away from the organisational level and lead to a more
societal type of analysis (p. 25).
• Key questions that needed to be addressed were why the 'new' accounting had
developed, how the new accounting was maintained and how its influence was
enhanced, how the new accounting was linked to other management technologies
in the public sector and the observable consequences of the changes (p. 25).
By the commencement of this dissertation a number of researchers had began to
evaluate aspects of the UK public sector reforms. In 1992 Glynn et al. presented an
evaluation of the financial risks and rewards of the UK GP practice budgets. They
argued that practice budgets (or budgetholding as it came to be called) represented a
major departure from the original philosophy of the NHS.
In 1993 the King's Fund Institute published a review of the UK NHS reforms
(Robinson and Le Grand, 1993). While they failed to provide a critical evaluation of
the UK NHS reforms, Robinson and Le Grand (1993) did find that the new system
was costing more (p. 244) and that the importance of GP fundholding within the NHS
had grown. However, it was unclear whether the fundholding initiative had led to
quality improvements for patients and that there was some danger of equity problems
such as cream skimming (p. 259).
Another important evaluation project was the work of Laughlin and Broadbent. In
1992 Laughlin argued that 'accounting logic' was infiltrating the UK public sector.
Both health and education were highlighted as clear examples of the growing
importance of accounting logic. Laughlin (1992) concluded by outlining a research
programme studying the impact of accounting logic in GP practices and schools in the
UK. By 1993 Laughlin and Broadbent (and other collaborators) had published papers
discussing the UK NHS reforms (Broadbent et al., 1991; Laughlin et al., 1992;
Broadbent 1992) and the LMS (local management of schools) reform within English
schools (Broadbent et al., 1992a, 1992b, 1993). These papers were followed in the
next few years by others which also discussed the changes affecting GPs (Laughlin et
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al., 1994b, Broadbent, 1994) and UK schools (Laughlin et al., 1994a).
In recent years, concurrent with this project, other researchers have also published
evaluations of the role of accounting technologies in the UK health and education
reforms. In 1994 Robson, Edwards and Ezzamel undertook a CIMA funded study of
the LMS reform in England and Wales. During 1995 and 1996 they published the
initial results of their study. Edwards et al. (1995) found that the budgeting
requirements of LMS had remained 'uncoupled' from the 'productive' activities of the
organisation (p. 313) and suggested that techniques such as budgeting were often
related to external demands for legitimation rather than internal control. While
Edwards et al. (1995) found that the reforms had enhanced the authority and influence
of those responsible for administering them, the core activities of the schools were
only marginally affected by LMS (p.314).
Edwards et al. (1996a) focused specifically on how the LEAs (Local Education
Authorities) constructed and managed the school funding formula. They found that
despite the rhetoric of comprehensive budgeting, the emerging systems in the LEAs
were predominantly incremental (p. 27) and the formula was 'fabricated' to maintain
historical patterns of allocation. Their working paper Edwards et al. (1996b) focused
on the impact of the LMS reforms on individual schools, utilising a theoretical
framework drawn from neo-institutional theory. They were particularly interested in
how the LMS changes had served to introduce "new rhetorics, new debates, new
scopes for action and revivified old conflicts" (p. 47). Essentially, accounting had
focused attention on the budget surplus carried forward from one year to the next and
had revived the debate over the lower relative funding of primary schools compared
to secondary schools.
While Edwards et al. (1995, 1996a, 1996b) adopted a different evaluative basis, they
generally supported the findings of Laughlin and Broadbent. They found that the
LMS changes were managed by the senior staff within the school and had had little
direct impact on the teaching staff or the core activities of the school. However, these
new responsibilities were not without risk, as they altered the relationship between the
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'Senior Management Teams' and teachers and created new forms of visibility and
control.
Llewellyn and Grant (1996) presented an evaluation of the GP fundholding initiative
in Scotland. They argued that GP fundholding had emerged as a pivotal feature in the
UK purchaser/provider structure. Llewellyn and Grant's (1996) study was different
to Laughlin et al. (1994b) and Broadbent (1994) in that it focused on the fund-holding
initiative which was voluntary as opposed to the changes to the GP contract which
were imposed. However, Llewellyn and Grant (1996) found that the fundholding
initiative had led to changes in GP behaviour. Llewellyn (1997) went on to argue that
the purchasing power associated with the fundholding initiative enabled GPs to wage
a 'turf battle' with hospital consultants by renegotiating territorial claims through the
medium of contracting. The effect of the turf-battle was to re-establish the GP's
jurisdiction over money in the British NHS. Llewellyn (1997) suggested that this
experience illustrates the autonomy that agents have to mould the health reforms in
particular ways (p. 57).
3.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework or 'middle range theory' utilised in this dissertation is
derived from the work of Laughlin and Broadbent. While the choice of any
theoretical framework is contestable, there are several good reasons why this
particular framework was chosen. First, as it had already been used to evaluate the
implementation of the UK health and education reforms, it allowed comparisons to
the UK empirical results. This opened the opportunity to extend and possibly
challenge the generalisability of the Laughlin-Broadbent findings by exploring their
applicability in a different jurisdiction. Second, the model was compatible with the
methodological choices and philosophy of research adhered to by the author and
outlined in the first part of this chapter.
The following section analyses the origin and development of the Laughlin and
Broadbent theoretical framework. This is important because the framework forms the
theoretical basis for this dissertation. While not seeking to prove or disprove these
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theoretical propositions in a positivist sense, one major objective of the dissertation is
to explore the applicability of the Laughlin and Broadbent framework to the New
Zealand context. An analysis of the New Zealand context and experience may
illuminate the middle-range propositions of the framework, thus leading to some
possible re-working of the theoretical perspectives adopted.
3.3.1 Description
Laughlin (1987) made the case for applying a critical theory model to researching
accounting. He argued that it was necessary to move beyond frameworks of analysis
that restrict the nature of discovery to the technical and more tangible aspects of
accounting systems and venture into what he called 'social space'. This was
necessary as little was known about accounting's "social roots" or about the
"interconnection and interrelationship between the social and the technical" (p. 479).
Laughlin (1987) reviewed the work of a number of the critical theorists, and
concluded that it was the work of Habermas that had the "greatest potential both as a
methodological approach for understanding and changing accounting systems design
and for investigating social phenomena more widely" (p. 485).
It has been suggested that Habermas' work can be divided into two main phases
(Giddens, 1982). The first culminated in the publication of Knowledge and Human
Interests in 1968. In this work Habermas sought to advance a novel conception of
critical theory, on the basis of the constitution of knowledge through interests.
Habermas argued that technology and science were not objective, but served pre-
existent interests and took the role of substitute ideology in society (Habermas, 1986).
Science was not an abstract search for truth but was concerned with technical issues
of control and prediction. Of particular concern was what Habermas called the
'scientisation of politics' where social and political issues are turned into technical
ones. Thus questions of debate are removed from the public arena and become the
domain of experts.
The second phase of Habermas' writings represents a shift from the attempt to ground
a critical theory on epistemology to a focus on communication. This is most fully
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articulated in The Theory of Communicative Action, published in two volumes in
1981 in German with English translations in 1984 and 1987. It is this phase and these
books that provide the model of social development and evolution that Laughlin has
used to study accounting. In his books Habermas argued that all action is mediated
by language and language structures. He argued that communication is based on both
(a) an inherent rationality and (b) the ideal of free and open communication.
Habermas rejects the pure Marxist models of social evolution and offers a theory of
social evolution built around increasing discursive skills. Fundamental to this model
are the concepts of lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and system. The term lifeworld is used by
Habermas to refer to the:
. . . collectively shared background convictions, to the diffuse, unproblematic
horizon within which actors communicate with one another and seek to reach
an understanding. The life-world of a society or social group preserves and
transmits the interpretative work of preceding generations. It forms the
symbolic space, as it were, within which cultural traditions, social integration
and personal identity are sustained and reproduced (Thompson, 1983, p. 285).
Habermas argues that key values of the lifeworld become expressed in tangible form
as organisations (systems). Hence society can be conceived simultaneously as system
and lifeworld. The concepts of system and lifeworld, which roughly correspond to
the Marxist concept of base and superstructure, specify the key dimensions of
Habermas' theory of social evolution.
Figure 3.2 The Process of Social Evolution











(Source: Broadbent et al., 1991)
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The transition from clan societies through traditional State-organised societies to
modern forms of social organisations are seen by Habermas as a progressive
uncoupling of system and lifeworld as shown in Figure 3.2. This evolutionary process
represents a shift from a society based on the integrative norms of the lifeworld to an
increasing differentiation between the three objective worlds or domains (objective,
social, subjective). The greater the sophistication of the discourse, the greater the
lifeworld is differentiated (into the objective world of physical things, the social world
of rules and norms and the subjective world of inner experiences and mental states)
and the greater the resulting complexity and diversity of the organisational systems.
The resulting social structure is seen as more typical of modern societies. This is
because it is based upon progressive improvement in communication skills (Habermas,
1987, p. 145).
The problem with increasing social complexity and the separation between the
lifeworld and the systems is that as social systems develop they start to move away
from the lifeworld and develop their own values and norms, becoming increasingly
difficult to control. Therefore, the systems are subject to what Habermas, following
Parsons, called the 'steering media'. Steering media are intended to bridge the gap
between the systems and the lifeworld and ensure that the developmental logic of the
systems remains consistent with the values of the lifeworld.
Problems also emerge when the steering media move in directions that do not reflect
the lifeworld demands. This was described by Habermas as "internal colonisation of
the lifeworld" (Habermas, 1987, p. 332). The steering media transmit their values to
the systems under their control and, if successful, ultimately colonise the lifeworld.
Habermas (1987, p. 357) has illustrated the nature of internal colonisation by
exploring the development of the legal system. By tracing the development of
German law Habermas argues that it initially followed the dictates of the lifeworld,
but ended up expending and restricting the freedom of individuals it was meant to
protect.
An analysis of Laughlin (1991) and Broadbent et al. (1991) shows the twin streams of
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organisational theory and Habermas' social analysis that underpin the Laughlin and
Broadbent research model. Laughlin (1991) presented a unique blend of Habermas'
social theory and models of organisational change. He argued that Habermas' three-
part model of social development could be used to describe organisations and explain
how they respond to change. However, Laughlin (1991) did not use the Habermasian
terms (lifeworld, steering media and system) but derived a new set of terms from
organisational theory (interpretative schemes, design archetypes, and sub-systems),
particularly from the work of Hinings and Greenwood (1988). By adopting this
organisational terminology Laughlin (1991) shifted the theoretical focus to the
organisational level, however this was still strongly influenced by the Habermasian
concepts.
Table 3.1 A Comparison of Laughlin (1991) and Habermas.




Laughlin (1991) suggested that organisations are a combination of both tangible
physical elements and less tangible structures and values. Organisations are therefore
divided into three parts: Sub-systems, design archetypes and interpretative schemes.
1. The sub-systems represent the physical or tangible aspects of the organisation. The
physical existence of buildings, machinery, people and behaviours and nature of
these elements.
2. The design archetypes are the systems and practices of the organisation. The
management structure, the organisational rules and control systems are all
examples of design archetypes.
3. The interpretative schemes are the values, beliefs (Giddens, 1979) and ideology
(Brunsson, 1985) of an organisation.
The key objective of Laughlin's 1991 paper was to develop a model of how
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organisations respond to environmental change. Laughlin (1991) introduced to this
model the Habermasian concept of "internal colonisation of the lifeworld" (p. 218)
and argued that this also operated at an organisational level. Laughlin (1991, p. 220)
outlined four change models or pathways, three of which were progressive forms of
colonisation (rebuttal, reorientation, colonisation) and the fourth alternative was based
upon open discourse and the weight of the better argument (evolution).
The rebuttal pathway represented an externalisation and/or deflection of the change
disturbance so as to protect and maintain the organisation exactly as it was before the
disturbance. It is assumed that there will be some change, but this will be contained
within the design archetype and will have no lasting effect on the values or
interpretative schemes of the organisation. In a reorientation pathway the
environmental disturbance leads to change in the way things are done (design
archetypes) and the physical aspects of the organisation (sub-systems). However,
there is no real change in the values or direction of the organisation (the interpretative
schemes). Laughlin (1991) called rebuttal and reorientation first-order (Levy, 1986)
or morphostatic (Robb, 1990) change because the nature/values/interpretative
schemes of the organisation remain unchanged.
In the category of second order (Levy, 1986) or morphogenetic change (Robb, 1990)
Laughlin (1991) introduced the concept of a 'colonisation pathway' at the
organisational level. In this pathway the organisational practices (design archetypes)
and/or parts (sub-systems) change in response to the environmental disturbance and
then proceed to change the organisational interpretative schemes. Laughlin (1991)
argued, from a Habermasian perspective, that such change is regressive, unhealthy
and dysfunctional for an organisation. By contrast he presented the evolution
pathway, where there is a major change in the interpretative schemes of the
organisation, but this change is "chosen and accepted by all the organisational
participants freely without coercion" (Laughlin, 1991, p. 220). Here the notion of
free and open discourse closely matches the Habermasian ideal of communicatively
achieved consensus. The curious issue about the evolution model is that it shifts the
focus for the change away from an external change agent and onto agents within the
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organisation.
Laughlin (1991) represented a considerable advance in applying Habermasian
theoretical analysis to practical empirical research. He also advanced the novel insight
that Habermas' work could significantly contribute to our understanding of change
within organisations.
Broadbent et al. (1991) developed Habermas' model of societal development and
applied it to a study of financial and administrative changes in the NHS. Particular
attention was paid to the nature of steering media, their colonising potential and the
criteria for judging whether or not a particular steering media has 'colonising
potential' (Broadbent et al., 1991, p. 6). However, Habermas' model of social
development and colonisation was seen as being somewhat impractical in itself and
Broadbent et al. (1991) argue that it needs a number of refinements before it provides
a basis for empirical analysis. First, they advance the concept of organisational values
or the micro-lifeworld.
That societal steering media and systems . . . are themselves made up of a
wide range of institutions and organisations with their own micro lifeworld,
steering media and systems. As society grows in complexity both the steering
media and the systems become diverse and institutionalised (Broadbent et al.,
1991, p. 7).
To some extent this point was already argued in Laughlin (1991) however Broadbent
et al. (1991) took this a step further and suggested that 'societal systems' are
represented by a range of 'public, private and voluntary organisations'. Broadbent et
al. (1991, p. 7) presented government, professional and financial institutions as
examples of social steering media. This was a radical modification of Habermas'
earlier concept of steering media, which were money and power. However,
Habermas' (1992) more recent work on the theory of law (Fakizitat and Geltung)
shows an increasing institutional turn to the concept of steering media.
The second key adaptation of Habermas' model was the suggestion that while it is
impractical to study the societal steering processes as a totality (Broadbent et al.,
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1991) one can focus on specific practices or mechanisms. As such one could
determine the 'colonising potential' of a given mechanism by determining whether
they were "amenable to substantive justification" or could only be "legitimised
through procedure" (Habermas, 1987, p. 365). When a mechanism was
comprehensible to the average individual, and therefore reflected informed common
sense, it was consistent with the lifeworld. Where a mechanism was not intuitively
comprehensible and it needed to be justified by elites and official bodies (Broadbent et
al., 1991, p. 7), it had 'colonising potential'.
In order to make research practical Broadbent et al. (1991) proposed a third
modification: they suggested that as researchers they should focus on ". . . judging
constitutive or regulative characteristics (colonising potential) from the organisational
systems viewpoint" (Broadbent et al., 1991, p. 10). As such the characteristic of the
steering media were compared to the micro-lifeworld of the social system (proposed
in Laughlin, 1991) rather than a meta-lifeworld of society as a whole. While this
organisational (societal systems) focus makes statements on the global colonising
potential of a given mechanism suspect, Broadbent et al. (1991) clearly recognise this
and proceed to discuss the colonising potential of a particular set of initiatives (the
NHS reforms) for a given organisation / societal system (the NHS) rather than society
as a whole. The Department of Health (DoH) was presented as a societal steering
medium and the NHS as a societal system. While particular attention was paid to the
role of accounting; a number of investigations, reports and government initiatives
were also considered as examples of steering media. They argued that that
progressive changes showed "increasingly intensive efforts (on the part of the DoH)
to attempt colonisation" (Broadbent et al., 1991, p. 17) and that this colonisation
process involved bringing changes in the NHS steering media and systems. They
present the reforms as "increasingly constitutive" and as representing some underlying
and growing agenda (within the Department of Health) to restructure the fundamental
nature of the NHS.
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3.3.2 The empirical evaluations
According to Laughlin (1995) a middle-range theory cannot be static but must change
in response to empirical evidence. This is certainly true of the Laughlin and
Broadbent model. As they have published additional empirical work, Laughlin and
Broadbent have modified their research framework adding new refinements and more
strongly emphasising certain aspects of their original proposal. Since 1992 Broadbent
and Laughlin have published a number of papers evaluating different aspects of the
UK public sector reforms and have added a number of new elements to their
theoretical framework. In 1993 Laughlin and Broadbent focused on the process of
internal colonisation of the lifeworld, utilising Habermas' concept of juridification to
describe the UK public sector reforms. They argued that the legal regulations that
underpinned the UK health and education reforms were 'infiltrated by accounting
logic' as characterised by the Financial Management Initiative (FMI). In general the
legislative changes were seen as an attempt to constitute new forms of behaviour and
relationships in those institutions and represented a threat to the core values of public
sector institutions. The theoretical contribution of this paper was the strong emphasis
on the colonising potential of legislation and the strong link between legislation and
accounting logic.
The subsequent empirical evaluations of the schools and the GP practices indicated
that a key factor in determining the change pathway is the role of key individuals or
groups within the organisation. Broadbent et al. (1993) examined the implementation
of the UK local management of schools (LMS) reforms in four UK schools. They
found that the LMS responsibilities had not led to second-order change (colonisation
or evolution) but they had been retained or 'absorbed' by a small group of people,
which they called the LMS group. While the exact composition of the LMS group
depended upon each school, it comprised a small group of the senior staff aided by
some form of clerical assistance. The aim of the group was to manage the LMS
situation and to protect the values of the school from change.
Laughlin et al. (1994a) extended the earlier work of Broadbent et al. (1993) by
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studying 24 different schools. They also found that the LMS changes were absorbed
by a small group of actors (usually the headteacher and other key staff such as a
deputy head, a bursar or the chair of the board of governors) allowing the 'real work'
of the school to go unhindered.
Laughlin et al. (1994a) devoted a significant section of their paper to theorising the
nature and function of groups within organisations. They argued that in order to
manage an anticipated or an unanticipated change disturbance an organisation will
look at its arrangements (or design archetypes) and will assign a subgroup to manage
the change. When the change is perceived as a threat, the role of the group will be to
protect the core functions and values of the organisation. However, Laughlin et al.
(1994a) noted that the creation of a small group is not without some risk. The very
individuals intended to 'absorb' change could also become a force for change within
the organisation and by redefining the core values, lead to the process of colonisation
rather than reorientation.
In the schools studied by Laughlin et al. (1994a) it was found that the 'type' of
headteacher was the most important factor in understanding how each school
responded to the reforms and how the subgroup which managed the changes
operated. The concept of small absorbing/colonising groups provided the basis for
their analysis and they charted a range of 'types' based on the involvement of the
headteacher in the LMS process and upon whether they were 'task' or 'people'
orientated. Their Figure (3.3) is reproduced below.
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(Source: Laughlin et al., 1994a)
Each group of headteachers were characterised by a particular title (i.e. absorber
sinker soaker) and represented a number of the headteachers in their sample. Eight
different headteacher orientations were identified:
Absorber sinker-soaker
Laughlin et al. (1994a) found that while 'absorber' headteachers had a dominant
involvement with LMS, the absorber soaker-sinker took on most of the changes
themselves and did not find it easy to delegate the responsibilities to others. Because
these individuals were orientated to people rather than tasks, they saw it as their
responsibility to protect the students and staff from the changes. LMS had a high
personal cost for these head teachers and some decided to retire early because of the
stresses they had experienced.
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Absorber- info rmer- invo lver
The absorber-informer-involver type head teacher also sought to absorb the LMS
responsibilities and shield the staff from the intrusion of the LMS. However, they
were more enthusiastic about sharing the LMS responsibilities with other staff where
possible. In small schools and primary schools the delegation process was difficult, as
there were few colleagues with the capacity to assist the head teacher.
Absorber-autocrat
For the absorber-autocrat, the LMS responsibilities were really just another task to be
managed. These heads were used to considerable responsibility and autonomy and
dominated the new area just as they had other areas of school management and
operation. Laughlin et al. (1994a) said that these individuals did not seem to
experience particular stress from the LMS changes.
Absorber-wheeler-dealer
These heads also tended to dominate the small group that managed the LMS
responsibilities within the school. However, the new freedoms were not seen as a
threat or a chore but as an opportunity to exercise a latent marketing spirit. The
tendency of these heads was to use the LMS freedoms to 'wheel and deal' and
because of this they had the potential to become a threat to the other staff.
Managerial-entrepreneur
These head teachers had a strong task orientation. They were sharing the
responsibility to manage LMS with others but also engaged in a number of other
entrepreneurial activities, often with a strong financial bias. Laughlin et al. (1994a, p.
75) suggested that these head teachers had lost connection with the management of
the school and had become more concerned with the projects they had initiated.
While the managerial-entrepreneur was seen as an anomaly, they also highlight the
potential dangers of colonisation associated with the LMS reforms.
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Managerial education
While these head teachers retained a clear task orientation they tended to be less
directly involved in 'doing LMS', delegating many of the responsibilities to others
(particularly the Deputy Head). They often had a strong management concern and an
interest in developing appropriate management structures within the school. Laughlin
et al. (1994a, p. 77) suggested that many of these head teachers were already moving
along a management path prior to the LMS change.
Managerial pastoral
These head teachers tended to distance themselves from the LMS concerns,
delegating to others where possible so as to allow them to remain actively involved in
the care of the staff and children. Their financial and administrative responsibilities as
head teacher were not seen as important as maintaining a pastoral role within the
school and therefore they played little role in the LMS group within the school.
Informer-involver
The informer-involver played a dominant role within the LMS management group,
however they also managed to involve others in the management tasks. Because of
the combination of involvement and delegation, these head teachers were under less
pressure individually as their commitment was at a sustainable level, and yet the
school as a whole could be protected from the changes. Laughlin et al. (1994a, p. 79)
presented this approach as "a near optimal solution where 'doing LMS' was not
perceived as an opportunity but as a delicate balancing act with a lot of bureaucracy
and housekeeping involved."
The concern with the role of small groups in absorbing change was also evident in the
Laughlin and Broadbent studies of the implementation of the GP reforms in the UK.
Laughlin et al. (1992) focused on the changes to the UK NHS arising from the two
White Papers (Promoting Better Health, 1987; and Working for Patients, 1989) and
the National Health Service and Community Care Act of 1990. They argued that
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these changes were characterised by financial and accountability concerns and had the
potential to intrude on the professional autonomy of GPs. However, they found that
the GPs had discovered ways to absorb the changes and to protect their real work and
underlying values (p. 146). Laughlin et al. (1994b) explained more fully how the
absorption process operated. They found that the management of the changes,
particularly the responsibilities arising from the new GP contract, had been delegated
to the practice nurses and practice managers. Laughlin et al. (1994b, p. 99) suggested
that the hallmarks of the health reforms were a massive increase in bureaucracy and
the introduction of multiple clinics. The practice managers managed the increase in
bureaucracy and the practice nurses ran the clinics. So, in terms of the theoretical
framework, the implementation of the new contract in UK GP practices led to first-
order change or absorption, which protected the interpretative schemes of the
organisations by changing the steering media (role and behaviour of the practice
managers and nurses).
Having noted the importance of the absorbing group in both the schools and the GP
practices Laughlin and Broadbent (1995) sought to explore the nature and importance
of small groups. Following Bion (1968), they suggested that small groups arise in
each organisation which manage basic anxieties such as protecting the whole from
unwanted intrusions (fight/flight), provide needed leadership (dependency) and
provide continuity through the reproduction of core values, concerns and activities
(Laughlin and Broadbent, 1995, p. 7). The concept of the 'specialised work group'
provided the basis to revise the research model. Laughlin and Broadbent (1995)
suggested that these small groups were "a personification of the Habermasian steering
media and the key foundation stone of all design archetypes in all organisations" (p.
8). Because of this important function within the design archetype, the 'speciality
work groups' are critical in determining the change model or 'pathway' a disturbance
takes within an organisation.
For the rebuttal and reorientation pathways the specialist work group acts as a
defender exercising primarily the light/flight assumption role. In this case the
group becomes an absorber of the disturbances so that the core activities of
the organisation can go on unhindered. In relation to particularly the
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colonisation, but also the evolution pathway, the specialist work groups acts
as a proactive agent - in the colonisation case this is through force and in the
evolution alternative through discourse and gentle persuasion (Laughlin and
Broadbent, 1995, p. 9).
However, there are two dangers associated with specialist work groups. First, they
may adopt a colonising role and seek to change the core values of the organisation.
The second danger is that the actual disturbances will be such that it can not be
retained or absorbed by the specialist group and 'spills over' to the organisation as a
whole. Laughlin and Broadbent (1995, p. 10) were rather unclear about the
consequences of spill-over change, but argued that it considerably increases the
dangers of colonisation.
Although the Laughlin-Broadbent research has been conducted over a number of
years and has formed the basis for their papers on the UK health and education
reforms, there are remarkably few criticisms of the research model. However, one
example of critical comment has been the work of Roslender (1992, p. 147). He
argued that Laughlin failed to consider the potential of the other critical theorists for
understanding accounting in a contemporary society. Laughlin (1987) discusses the
work of each of four of the key critical theorists, Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and
Habermas. While each of these theorists could contribute to an understanding of
accounting, Laughlin (1987) argued that that it is Habermas' model that is most
relevant as a methodological approach for understanding and changing accounting
system design. Laughlin (1987, p. 485) presented three reasons for why he thought
that Habermas has the most potential: first, Habermas' methodological approach is
centred upon language and communication. Laughlin (1987) argued that accounting
and accounting systems are examples of language and communication, and therefore
are amenable to this kind of study. Second, Habermas, unlike the other critical
theorists, does not presume some kind of a-priori idea state, but suggests that any
ideal is discovered through the process of discussion or discourse. Laughlin (1987)
argued that this means that we do not have to start with an ideal design for accounting
systems but can discuss the nature of the systems and through this process discover
the necessary improvements. Third, Habermas indicates the processes that are
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necessary to generate understanding and change in a phenomenon, whereas most of
the other critical theorists do not give such guidance.
Laughlin's (1987) points do present a reasonably persuasive argument. However,
other arguments can be added. Within the German critical school, Habermas is a key
figure and has been described as the leading spokesman for the field (Held, 1980).
Habermas' work captures and analyses many of the concerns of earlier critical
theorists. However, Habermas has also developed a more extensive social-theoretical
analysis than almost any other theorist, a social analysis that has potential to provide a
broader and more contextually orientated understanding of the role of accounting in
society. While this does not preclude the application of theoretical insights from other
critical theorists to understanding accounting, Habermas clearly provides an excellent
point to start the process.
Roslender (1992) was also concerned with the use of a critical theory perspective for
carrying out micro-level case studies.
The general focus for critical theory has been on societal level issues as a
consequence of it being one of the forms in which Marxism, as a meta-theory,
has been developed in the twentieth century (Roslender 1992, p. 149).
Roslender (1992) raises an important point about the applicability of critical theory,
and associated suggestions of socialist revolution, however, he also suggests that
although difficult to operationalise, potentially rich and insightful material could be
generated from case-studies informed by critically theory perspectives. While
Habermas' does display a commitment to the concept of revolution, this is different to
the Marxist concept of socialist revolution (Held, 1980). Habermas' concept is much
more informed by the concept of free communication and the weight of the better
argument. The social-theoretical perspective is also increasingly welcome in the
context of accounting research as a number of authors have strongly argued that
accounting research should be informed by social theory. Both Broadbent and
Guthrie (1992) and Guthrie and Parker (1996) suggest that accounting practices
should not be studied in isolation, but regarded as a social phenomena embedded
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within their institutional and social settings.
Roslender's (1992) criticisms relate primarily to the Laughlin (1987) paper. Later
work (see Laughlin, 1991 and Broadbent, 1991) attempt to provide a link between
organisational theory and the work of Habermas. While the Habermasian concepts
still play an important role, the combination of the social and the organisational theory
is clearly more relevant to a micro-study of accounting changes.
While Roslender (1992) challenged Laughlin and Broadbent's use of Habermas, Gray
et al. (1995) challenged their use of organisation theory. Gray et al. (1995) used the
Laughlin-Broadbent theoretical model in their study of the role of environmental
accounting and environmental accounts in organisational change. However, they
were critical of Laughlin for 'assuming a too rigid, too defined concept of
organisation' (p. 217) and therefore incorporated Llewellyn's (1994) concept of
boundary management3 into their framework. As both Gray et al. (1995) and
Llewellyn (1994) were published after the commencement of this project, it was not
possible to utilise their insights as part of the theoretical framework. However, the
comments do not invalidate the Laughlin and Broadbent model and do highlight
organisational boundaries and structure as a contestable space. It is intended to
explore, as part of this thesis, the appropriateness of the Laughlin organisational
model and to consider whether other models, such as boundary theory, might be more
appropriate in the light of empirical evidence.
3.4 BUILDING A RESEARCH MODEL
The New Zealand health and education reforms provide an opportunity to apply the
theoretical and empirical insights developed by Laughlin and Broadbent to a different
social, organisational and jurisdictional context. This theoretical model was
3
Llewellyn (1994) argued that the boundaries between the organisation and the environment are not just relationships
to be managed, but are what constitutes an organisation. These boundaries can take many different forms; the
physical/productive, financial, psychological, legal and temporal. Llewellyn (1994, p. 4) suggested both management
and financial accounting plays an important role in creating and managing boundaries.
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developed from case-studies of the UK schools and GP practices and therefore is a
poor basis for generalising beyond the UK. However, accounting-led public sector
reform is an international trend and there is a need for international comparative work.
Yin (1994) argued that multiple case-study research designs were particularly for
comparative analysis and for improving external validity. Therefore, applying the
Laughlin-Broadbent theoretical framework to a study of health and education reform
in New Zealand had the potential to demonstrate the generalisability (or lack thereof)
of the Laughlin-Broadbent framework and to lay the foundation for future
comparative studies of accounting-led public sector reform.
The beauty of the New Zealand context is that it was both similar and different to the
UK. The countries are similar in that New Zealand shared historical, legal, linguistic
and cultural links with the UK. Many of the New Zealand reforms were broadly
similar4 to those implemented in the UK and there was a measure of cross-fertilisation
between the two countries. However, there are also differences. First, they are
different countries with different political and economic environments. Second, the
key institutions (in this case schools and GP practices) were structured differently, had
different histories and were facing different kinds of reform. It was the similarity that
made the two countries comparable, and the differences, which meant that the
generalisability of the Laughlin-Broadbent findings could be evaluated.
The other reason for selecting the Laughlin-Broadbent material as the theoretical basis
for this thesis was that it represented the most obvious choice at the point of
commencement. As clearly demonstrated earlier in this chapter, the Laughlin-
Broadbent material represented one of the few published evaluations of the impact of
accounting-led reform in health and education. Therefore, it was a reasonable choice
for a theoretical and analytical basis for this thesis.
As characteristic of a middle-range theoretical model, the Laughlin-Broadbent
4
Hood (1995) classed both the UK and New Zealand among the high NPM group.
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material provides a skeletal framework for an evaluation of the New Zealand public
sector reforms. Based on this framework the New Zealand schools and GP practices
are regarded as examples of societal systems designed to reflect certain lifeworld
values (see Chapters Five and Seven for a discussion of these values). Laughlin
(1991) provides a coherent model of organisation structure and suggests (as does
Broadbent et al., 1991) that there is a dynamic relationship between environmental
changes and internal responses to those changes. Broadbent et al. (1991) argued that
structural reforms can be seen as examples of steering media and are often created
with explicit colonising intentions.
It appears that the health and education reforms in New Zealand were a clear example
of accounting-led reform where accounting controls were intended to constitute new
forms of behaviour and relationships in schools and GP practices (Chapters Five and
Seven). These changes fit what Laughlin and Broadbent (1993) called juridiflcation
or internal colonisation of the lifeworld and it is reasonable to expect that they would
be seen as a threat to the values and to the autonomy of GPs and teaching
professionals.
Laughlin's (1991) model of change indicate the 'tracks' the reforms may take in the
schools and GP practices studied. It is questionable whether the teachers and GPs
will be able to rebut the changes implemented, however reorientation, colonisation
and evolution are real possibilities. Based on the empirical work conducted in UK
schools and GP practices particular attention will be paid to the role of specialist work
groups to 'managing' the change process in the organisations studied.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter Three addressed the issue of theory and research methodology and identified
Laughlin's middle range approach as the appropriate methodology for this project.
This chapter addresses the question of method or, as Watson (1994) put it, the
practical 'how' questions associated with research. However, methodology and
method are invariably linked as the choice of a particular research method depends
significantly upon the research methodology selected.
The first section of this chapter discusses how the school and GP sites studied were
selected and how access to those sites was negotiated. The second section of the
chapter describes how the research was conducted and the third section summarises
the notion of discourse, which formed the basis of the analytical methods applied.
4.2 SITE SELECTION AND ACCESS
In order to conduct a grounded empirical evaluation of the New Zealand public sector
reforms it was necessary to establish contact with a number of schools and GP
practices. In order to evaluate the implementation of the New Zealand reforms
longitudinal case study research was deemed necessary (see Yin (1994) for further
discussion). However, longitudinal case study research is intensive and time
consuming. It was necessary to limit the number of case study sites in order for one
researcher to conduct the work. So four schools and five GP practices were selected
from the Christchurch area. Of the four schools two were primary and two were
secondary. An academic colleague who was on the board of trustees assisted initial
contact with one of the secondary schools. However, the other schools were selected
from a Department of Education list of local schools. The principal of each school
was sent a letter inviting them to participate in the research.
Within this study the selection criteria matched the criteria used by Broadbent et al.
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(1993) and Laughlin et al. (1994a). However, this criteria also made theoretical and
practical sense in the New Zealand setting. Within a multiple case study design it is
not appropriate to talk about a sample (Yin, 1994, p. 45) therefore no attempt was
made to obtain a 'random' sample of sites. However, it is valid to apply replication
logic and to select sites which would provide contrasting examples. Two key
selection criteria were the school types (primary or secondary) and the socio¬
economic area (see Gordon et al., 1994). The distinction between the type of school
was important because prior to the reforms they had different levels of autonomy (see
Chapter Five). School type was also a surrogate for school size because primary
schools tended to be much smaller than secondary schools.
The socio-economic location of the school was also important because it illustrated
the principle of equality of opportunity. In the wealthy socio-economic areas schools
were more likely to be able to raise funds from their community and would be able to
provide more facilities to students. However, in the poorer areas schools would not
able to secure the same levels of funding and would be unable to provide the same
facilities.
One of the primary school principals contacted said that he was unwilling to
participate as he was going to retire soon. Therefore another primary school was
written to and the principal and board indicated that they were willing to participate.
The summary details of the selection criteria for schools are shown in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: School Selection Criteria.
Matai School
Primary School
In a poor central city with falling rolls
Arob.a College
Secondary School
In a poor suburb with falling rolls
Deans School
Primary School
In a wealthy suburb with growing rolls
Straven High
Secondary School
In a wealthy suburb with growing rolls
The identities of the schools participating in this study were disguised in order to
maintain confidentiality. This involved using pseudonyms and removing any
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references to special features of schools that would identify them.
The selection criteria for the GP practices were similar to that used for schools.
Although there were lists of registered GPs, these gave no indication of the practice
size or the population that they served. Initial contacts were established with one GP
practice and advice was sought from a university department of General Practice on
other practices that would provide some variety in both size and location (see the
discussion above elating to school selection criteria). A direct approach was made to
each practice and the author secured their agreement to become involved in the
research.
Table 4.2: GP Practice Selection Criteria
Location
Practice size
Poor area Mixed area Wealthy area
Small Practice 5 Practice 4 Practice 3
Large Practice 2 Practice 1
4.3 DOING RESEARCH
As any research text indicates, all researchers face specific choices about how they
will conduct their work. However, research methods are not some kind of
smorgasbord that you can freely choose from. Choice should be informed by the
nature of the questions asked and the theoretical model used (Watson, 1994). As this
project was specifically concerned with issues of change and response, a multiple case
study design was used. This approach was consistent with the Laughlin-Broadbent
theoretical approach. The research method was based on the work of Moustakas
/1 r> .41 .4 t li:„ 4 a cnnc\ —a : i a
yiyyyj), iSruuuDCiii anu i^augniiii yiyy /) anu iyuuiii anu rvuuni yiyyj) anu mvuivcu
open-ended interviews, discussions and personal observation. The process involved a
number of different individuals; in the schools these were the principal, teachers,
administrative staff and school trustees; and in the GP practices, GPs, practice nurses,
and practice support staff. Laughlin and Broadbent had found that these individuals
had performed significant roles in relation to the reform of the UK health (Laughlin et
al., 1994b) and education systems (Laughlin et al., 1994a). This empirical study was
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conducted over a twenty seven month period between August 1993 and December
1995, with regular visits to each research site every six months. The study was
conducted over an extended time-period to provide a richer understanding of the
research sites and to capture processes within the schools and GP practices over a
period of significant structural and social change.
The research process involved a range of different data collection methods. First an
effort was made to spend time in each research site, to observe the operation of the
organisation and to collect any background documentation available. In the GP
practices this included regular practice newsletters and in the schools; annual reports,
documents from trustee meetings charters and guidelines. However, the primary
source of information was the unstructured interviews initiated by the researcher. The
interviews and meetings were taped, transcribed by the interviewer and returned to
the participants for their comments and amendments. While this was a reasonably
simple process with a one-on-one interview, there were some problems associated
with meetings and group interviews, as it was not so clear who the appropriate
contact was. Over the course of the study the nature of the interviews changed.
Initially the interviews were relatively formal and the comments provided by
interviewees were somewhat guarded. However, as the study progressed, a measure
of trust developed and interviewees were much more willing to volunteer comments
and to engage in the process of discourse described in the next section of this chapter.
Generally one individual in each site took on the role of key informant and provided
most of the information. While this may have introduced an element of bias to the
study, the notion of key informant or conversational partners (Rubin and Rubin, 1995)
is well recognised in the qualitative research literature and is not inconsistent with a
middle-range methodology. Where there was a consistent perspective in the sites one
quote was used to illustrate the collective position. However, when there were
divergent views an effort was made to illustrate the different perspectives.
On a number of occasions it was possible to attend meetings in the practices and to
observe the interaction between individuals in this context. Within the schools the
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primary contact was with the school principal, although an effort was made to attend
trustee meetings and meet teaching staff in all cases.
4.4 DISCOURSE
The discourse research method is informed by the Habermas' concepts of discourse
and operationalised via the critical discursive models presented by Laughlin (1991)
and Laughlin (1995). Although Laughlin and Broadbent used a discourse method in
their studies of schools and GP practices in the UK, it was not published until 19971.
However, as it was the method associated with the theoretical framework used in this
thesis, it should also be the research method applied in this thesis. Therefore, the next
section describes the research methods applied by Broadbent and Laughlin and how
those methods were applied in this project.
Broadbent and Laughlin (1997) presented the discourse method as a three-stage
process. They called the first stage of the process 'formulation of critical theorems',
the second 'enlightenment' and the third the 'selection of strategies'. Stage one
involves the researchers in spending time within a specific research site in order to
understand how the organisation works. These 'understandings', which Broadbent
and Laughlin (1997) refer to as 'critical theorems', are then debated among the
researchers in order to 'test' them and come to some sort of shared understanding.
The second stage of the process (enlightenment) involves presenting, and in some
cases debating the understandings of the researchers with those in the research site.
According to Broadbent and Laughlin (1997) the purpose of this process is to
challenge and develop the research insights.
The third stage is the response of the researched to the 'enlightenment' process in the
selection of some kind of practical response to what they have learnt about themselves
and their organisation. Laughlin and Broadbent (1997) recognise that in their own
1
It has existed as a working paper since 1995.
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work this stage is clearly problematic as it is in the hands of the researched rather than
the researchers. While the researchers could act as 'sounding boards', their
involvement in change strategies involved them stepping outside of the research role
and into a management role, such as becoming part of the school governing bodies.
While Broadbent and Laughlin's (1997) three-stage model provided a useful
guideline, it was necessary to modify a number of its aspects to make it relevant to the
context of this study. The initial stage of familiarising oneself with the research
context and forming the 'critical theorems' was consistent with the method described
by Broadbent and Laughlin's (1997). However, because there was only one
researcher, it was not possible to discuss the research and develop shared
understandings with other researchers involved in the project. What was developed
was a process of self-discourse or reflection based on the interviews and discussions.
This concept of self-reflection as a research tool is expanded on in Moustakas (1990).
The other modification of the three-stage model was the development of external
discourse partners. In order to understand the nature and changes in education the
researcher established contact with individuals from the local education service centre,
College of Education, Ministry of Education and Education Review Office. In health,
the researcher met with staff from the Southern Regional Health Authority, Ministry
of Health, computer programmers, GP related agencies and public pressure groups.
Contacts were developed with GPs and teachers who were unconnected with the
research sites, and also with other academics that were interested in health and
education. Initially the role of these discourse-partners was to provide background
and to clarify issues that arose in the interviews. However, as the study progressed,
they critiqued the critical theorems developed by the researcher. The 'stage of
enlightenment' also involved discussing insights and understandings with those in the
research sites and with the external discourse-partners. These discussions resulted in
the development and modification of many of the ideas.
In practice, the third stage in the critical method (the selection of strategies) was
difficult to evaluate. Broadbent and Laughlin (1997) acknowledge that the third stage
depends upon the researched rather than the researcher. In this project the questions
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and suggestions raised by the researcher did engender discussion within the schools
and GP practices. However, it is difficult to determine whether there has been any
specific response to this research project. While researchers have a privileged
position seeing a number of different schools and practices it seems arrogant to argue
that their insights as an observer were superior to those of the participants. In this
case the process of enlightenment was a two-way rather than a one-way process, with
the researcher being changed at least as much as the researched.
To summarise, although the approach adopted was based on the concept of discourse,
in practice this had a number of variants. First, it was a process of discourse between
the researcher and the participants as the researched. Second there was a related
discourse between the researcher and the PhD supervisors in formulating and
directing the nature of the study. Third, a number of other people were 'enrolled' as
discourse-partners and commented on the research methods, contributed to the
background on the New Zealand public sector reforms and described the history and
nature of health and education in New Zealand. The contribution of both the research
participants and the external parties changed as the project developed from
informative to critique. Finally, as it was not possible to develop a discourse process
between the researchers involved on the project, a model of self-discourse or
reflection (based on Moustakas, 1990) was developed. Initially this was an internal
process, but as the project developed this changed into a dynamic relationship
between the writer and the text. While this can be seen as an extension of the process
of self-reflection, the researcher was forced by the process of write-up to attempt to
categorise his insights, to place in a linear form what was fragmented and to
summarise different and, in some cases, conflicting voices. The theoretical framework
described in Chapter Three provided the basis for this process and was the source of a
set of categories to work with.
The next chapter is the start of Section Two, which commences the empirical aspect
of this dissertation. As the theoretical and methodological basis of this work is the
middle-range model of Laughlin and Broadbent, considerable attention is devoted to
analysing the context of health and education in New Zealand. Indeed, Lodh and
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Gaffikin (1997) argued that the common feature of critical research is the belief that
accounting needs to be considered within a broader organisational and societal
context. Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) also saw contextuality as the defining
characteristic of 'alternative' accounting research. Therefore, as this thesis is within
the critical or alternative paradigm, it is necessary to explicate the social, historical
and institutional context of the New Zealand health and education reforms.
The importance of contextual detail is that it facilitates both analysis and comparison.
In terms of analysis, contextual material provides the basis for an understanding of the
existing institutions and the nature of the reforms. Contextual analysis also makes it
possible to develop an understanding of how individuals and institutions respond to
and modify the reform initiatives. Without contextual and historical background, the
responses may be opaque. Context also provides a basis for comparison. While there
were strong similarities between the institutions and the reform in New Zealand and
those in the UK, there were also important differences between the UK and New
Zealand. By providing a clear description of the New Zealand institutions and the
New Zealand reforms, this dissertation provides a firm basis for the international
comparative research called for by Broadbent and Guthrie (1992).
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CHAPTER FIVE
FORMING AND REFORMING THE EDUCATION SYSTEM
IN NEW ZEALAND
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter represents a shift of attention away from issues of theoretical basis and
research methodology and towards empirical concerns with the New Zealand
education system. Habermas argued that institutions such as schools are the product
of social evolution and reflect certain fundamental lifeworld values. However, as
these institutions grow in complexity they also develop their own internal lifeworld.
They also become subject to outside change forces. Some of these forces are a
feature of the environment but some are what Habermas called 'steering media'.
Following the work of Broadbent et al. (1991), the education reform initiatives are
seen as examples of steering media, with 'colonising potential' from the perspective of
the school.
The first section of this chapter provides a historical context to the New Zealand
education system and illuminates the key lifeworld values that were involved in the
establishment of the institution. It is important to describe the historical development
and the pre-reform context because changes are best understood in relation to the pre-
existent status-quo. The historical context is also critical in establishing certain key
lifeworld values that were challenged by the reform initiatives.
The second section of the chapter describes and analyses the reforms to the New
Zealand education system. In the narrative particular emphasis is placed on issues of
autonomy, authority, administration and control. In order to simplify discussion the
reforms were analysed in four categories. First, the structural changes, second the
funding, third the accountability and control arrangements and fourth the quasi-
market. The structural changes altered the existing system/steering media
arrangements, relocating responsibility for management at the school level. Funding
previously located at the centre was directly allocated to the school level, based on
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centrally determined funding formula. There were major changes in accountability
structures and monitoring arrangements between the schools and the State. New
institutions were created to monitor and control school performance. While
management responsibility was theoretically located at the school level, the new
steering institutions exercised considerable control over finances, procedures, teaching
content and teaching methods. The introduction of a quasi-market system was pre¬
figured in the earlier structural changes; however, it was not until 1991 that schools
were granted the power to select their students and therefore compete directly with
each other.
5.2 THE PRE-REFORM ERA
The purpose of this section is to illuminate the values and structures that characterised
the education system in New Zealand. Formal education in New Zealand is
predominantly funded and managed by the State. Access is free as of right (Education
Act, 1989, Sec. 3) to students and parents and attendance is compulsory up to the age
of 15. Individuals are free to 'opt out' of the State system and to attend 'private
schools' however, less than 4% of all students take this option.
The origin of a formal education system in New Zealand can be found in the initiatives
of the first missionaries, particularly the Anglicans, Methodists and the Roman
Catholics, to educate and convert the local Maori community (Cummings &
Cummings, 1978). With the arrival of the European settlers in the 1850s, the
provision of education was extended to include the children of settlers. Where the
church was not forthcoming, individuals took responsibility for the establishment and
running of local schools (Colquhoun, 1993). With the establishment of a
representative government in 1853, education became the duty of the provinces,
which established school committees and started to levy the local population to pay
for schooling. However, in the 1870s the central government sought to secure
control over education. The key argument for this process was that the regional
management of education had led to disparity in the quality of provision. By
centralising the control it was envisioned that the government would be able to ensure
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the uniformity of education provision throughout the colony. The Education Boards
Act 1876 and the Education Act 1877 saw the establishment of a Department of
Education, ten regional education boards and individual school committees. The
Department represented the central government concerns while the regional education
boards and the school committees were meant to provide a degree of local control.
However, in practice the system became highly centralised (Gordon, 1992b) and the
Department of Education effectively dominated the process, a result that was quite
intentional on the part of the legislators (Cummings and Cummings, 1978, p. 94).
This lead to a highly centralised and highly interventionist system of State education.
New Zealand's education system has been for many years one of the most
centralised in the world. Whilst Britain's system relied heavily on the
intermediary role of the Local Education Authorities, New Zealand had only a
minimal regional level of organisation mainly focusing on the primary schools
and playing a servicing rather than a policy role (Gordon, 1992b, p. 281).
Elementary schooling was the major form of educational provision throughout the
nineteenth century. Each school answered to the regional education board which
controlled a significant proportion of their funding. As secondary schools developed,
they were run by a board of governors. They were not accountable to the local
education board but dealt directly with the Department of Education. This structure
is shown in Figure 5.1 and is characteristic of the structure of education in New
Zealand from the 1890s until it was reformed in the late 1980s.






























Because they answered to different authorities (see Figure 5.1) there was a clear
distinction between the autonomy allowed to primary and to secondary schools in the
pre-reform era. In primary schools the school committee was responsible for the day-
to-day administrative functions. The committee was elected from (and by) the
residents in the area and was responsible for routine administrative matters such as the
buying of textbooks and library books, cleaning, heating and the maintenance of
buildings and grounds. They were also responsible for matters of religious instruction
and out-of-hours use of the school buildings. School committees participated, but did
not vote, in the appointment of the school principal and were advised on the
appointment of teaching staff although they had no formal authority in the matter.
Hiring, firing and discipline rested with the local education board and Department of
Education. The Department, through the Educational Services Committee (ECS),
negotiated teachers' salaries and employment conditions on a national basis with the
primary teachers' union (the NZEI - New Zealand Educational Institute). Within an
individual school, teachers progressed through each of three salary scales. This
progress depended on a regular assessment performed by the Department of
Education (who often worked out of the education board offices). Inspectors were
also responsible for checking that the school maintained national educational
standards.
Staffing levels were determined nationally but allocated to individual schools at the
discretion of the local education board. Salaries were paid to individual teaching staff
by the education boards who also handled all other government funding for primary
schools. Each board was allocated State funding on the basis of pupil numbers and
the types of school buildings in their district. The local education board then had the
discretion to allocate the money to individual schools. Once the schools received, or
were entitled to spend funds, they were subject to precise and detailed input controls.
Individual schools were not allowed to move funds from one area of spending to
another. School committees had little option but to accept what they were granted
and were unable to vary the spending guidelines established by the education board.
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The Education Department funded the purchase of grounds and the erection of school
buildings (which were owned by the Crown), while the local education boards were
responsible for maintenance. The boards were also responsible for purchasing and
providing equipment and teaching consumables for primary schools. The school itself
had little say in determining the nature or timing of maintenance contracts. Their only
avenue of complaint was to lobby their education board. All matters that required
expenditure were referred to the education board and then, if necessary, to the
Department of Education. Any reply to the school would be communicated through
the education board.
5.2.2 Secondary Schools
As secondary education developed in New Zealand the schools were administered by
a board of governors who were elected from parents with representation from
teaching staff, students and, in many cases, the local university. Because there were
so few secondary schools when the Education Act was drafted in 1877, they were not
subject to the education boards. Within the secondary schools the boards of
governors had considerable powers and responsibilities. They hired, fired, disciplined
teachers (including the principal) and controlled the use of school buildings, although
the ownership was vested in the State (Picot, 1988). Most boards had regular contact
with the Department of Education, which was responsible for all maintenance and
capital works. Boards sought advice from the Department on regulations, training
and curriculum and purchases of equipment. The Department also intervened as a
mediator in situations of school/school or school/community conflict.
The Department of Education maintained control over funding and teaching within
secondary schools. The funding was allocated to the schools along strict budget lines,
which gave schools little financial discretion. For example, funds available for
textbooks had to be spent on textbooks. If the schools required equipment such as
computers or photocopiers they had to raise money from the local community.
Teachers' salaries were negotiated annually between the teachers' union (PPTA - Post
Primary Teachers' Association) and the Education Services Committee. Individual
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teachers progressed along a basic salary scale and schools could promote a teacher to
a position of responsibility (PR), however, these positions were awarded to a school
by the Department of Education. Once awarded PRs were difficult, if not impossible,
to take away from an individual or from the post they filled. Promotions to senior
positions (senior teacher, deputy principal and principal) were advertised nationally by
the Department of Education although the actual appointment was made by the
school's board of governors.
In many areas secondary school councils were established. These councils acted as
accountants and secretaries for the board of governors of a number of secondary
schools. Although they held the funds for the school and paid most of the bills they
had no discretion over expenditure and could only spend the funds as they were
authorised by the school or the Department of Education.
The Department of Education maintained control over student access to secondary
education and over teaching standards. Most of the secondary schools were subject
to a zoning system that required that they accept all of the students from the area
specified by the Department as 'their zone'. Education Department inspectorate also
inspected secondary schools although there was no inspection of individual teachers
as in primary schools.
5.2.3 Lifeworld Implications
One source of values in New Zealand schools were the churches and religious
organisations that played an important role in the development of education in New
Zealand. It seemed natural that they would have some influence on the nature and
purpose of education in New Zealand. Both Laughlin (1984, 1988) and Booth (1991,
1993) argue that churches have a strong and coherent set of values (lileworld) and
maintained that accounting techniques were resisted when they conflicted with these
values. Laughlin (1988) suggested that the same coherent value set might also
characterise other organisations, particularly those such as schools with historical
links to the church.
61
However, the religious dominance of education provision was over a hundred years
ago and since then most primary and secondary schools have been controlled, directly
or indirectly, by the Department of Education. While the involvement of the
Department of Education would have altered the lifeworld of schools, the Department
tended to be staffed by teachers and educationalists and was generally seen as
supporting staff within the schools. The 'educational' orientation of the department
was reflected in the following statement:
The Department of Education is basically an educational institution. Its
interests as an educator colour the advice it gives to government. If the
government asks the department for advice on funding it is like asking a child
how much it wants for pocket money. When the government asks the
department to set standards for education it is actually asking the Department
to check up on itself (Lange, 1987, p. 28).
Between 1877 and 1988, the Department of Education can be seen as the primary
steering mechanism concerned with the operation of schools. The 1930s saw the
emergence of the social welfare structure in New Zealand, reflecting democratic and
egalitarian values. Education was based on the comprehensive ideal and promised
equality of opportunity to all children, regardless of where they lived. Within this
system the Department of Education became the guarantor of this equality and sought
to insure that "wherever people lived they would have access to a school offering the
same range of opportunities as any other school" (Gordon, 1996). The Department
reinforced the 'educational values' that were considered important within schools,
particularly concepts of equality within and between schools, and excellence in
teaching (Gordon, 1992). However, many of these values were challenged by the
reforms to the New Zealand education system.
5.3 THE EDUCATION REFORMS
The reform to the education system occurred in the context of substantial structural
reform in New Zealand. In 1987 the document Government Management clearly
indicated the intentions of The Treasury to introduce reforms to the education sector.
What was particularly notable was the fact that one volume of the two volume
briefing papers was entirely devoted to issues of education and was characterised by a
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new-right agenda (Lauder, 1987). A major reason for Treasury interest was the size
of the education sector. At $3 billion or NZ$1,000 per New Zealander, education
was one of the largest enterprises in the country and represented a significant
proportion of the annual government expenditure.
Table 5.1: Education Reform - Publication Timeline
1987 Government Management
July 1987 Taskforce to Review Educational Administration announced
April 1988 Report of the Taskforce (Picot Report)
August 1988 Tomorrow's Schools (Lange)
1989 Education Act
April 1990 Today's Schools (Lough Report) review of the education
reform
July 1991 Education Policy
1993 Three years on
The Treasury document, Government Management, raised a number of issues and
suggestions for change. Education was seen as a commodity rather than a public
good, and the Treasury argued that there was little justification for State funding, and
even less for State provision of education (Grace, 1990). The Treasury (1987, p.
293) claimed that the costs of specific State interventions in education could be
reduced and the benefits increased by following three steps. First, clearly identifying
the purpose of State involvement in education and minimising the involvement to
what was 'clearly justifiable and cost effective'. Second, the State should support
rather than replace the contract between the customer and the suppliers of education
by directing funding to individuals as purchasers rather than to institutions as
suppliers. Third, when the State must be involved, they should seek methods of
management and accountability that 'counter the problems' of their involvement such
as clear targets, incentives and sanctions and timely information on performance.
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Government Management represented an unprecedented attempt on the part of The
Treasury to influence education policy. Although they appeared to have no
immediate effect, Grace (1990) argued that The Treasury played an important part in
focusing public and political attention and creating a perceived crisis in the state of
education in New Zealand. The government's response to this 'crisis' was to
establish a number of taskforces to review various aspects of education. This resulted
in three published reports: Education to be More (1988) (Meade Report) on early
childhood education; Report of the Working Group on Post Compulsory Education
and Training (1988) (Hawke Report) on the tertiary sector and Administering for
Excellence (1988) (Picot Report) on primary and secondary schools.
As this thesis is primarily concerned with the changes to schools, the discussion is
restricted to the Picot Report. There is some evidence of Treasury influence on the
Picot findings as one of the committee members complained that the Treasury
attempted to hijack the process (Jesson, 1989, p. 123). However, the Picot
recommendations were also influenced by educational interest groups (Grace, 1990,
p. 184). As a result the report represented a complex mix between new-right
ideology and traditional educational values such as equity, equality and cultural
sensitivity.
The Picot Report was critical of the 'serious weaknesses' in the existing education
system: over-centralisation of decision making, complexity, lack of information and
choice, lack of effective management practices and general feelings of powerlessness.
Effective management practices are lacking and the information needed by
people in all parts of the system to make informed choices is seldom available.
The result is that almost everyone feels powerless to change things they see
needing change. To make progress radical change is now required (Picot,
1988, p. xi).
Three months after the publication of the Picot Report, Tomorrow's Schools was
released. This set out the policy position adopted by the Labour Government
following its consideration of the Picot recommendations. Grace (1990) argued that
the recommendations derived from Picot and the policy document, Tomorrow's
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Schools, were based on five principles:
1. The principle of parent and community empowerment,
2. The principle of efficient school site-management,
3. The principle of strong accountability,
4. The principle of alternative or contestable provision and
5. The principle of local determination of conditions of employment for principals and
teachers.
One problem with these principles was that they were internally contradictory. The
principle of local management and community/parental empowerment contradicted
the principle of strong accountability, particularly when the objective was to
strengthen the accountability to the centre. It is also reasonable to think that there
might be some resistance to these changes as devolved management and community
empowerment ran contra to the values of equality of access and equality of
opportunity which had characterised the New Zealand system since the 1880s.
Despite the concerns from the public and the teaching profession the principles in
Tomorrow's Schools were incorporated in a major revision of the Education Act (The
Education Act, 1989 and The Education Amendment Act, 1990) and led to significant
changes in the way schools operated. These changes can be grouped into three broad
categories: changes in structure of education delivery, changes in funding of schools
and changes in modes and requirements of accountability.
5.4 STRUCTURAL CHANGES
A key structural recommendation of the Picot Report and Tomorrow's Schools was
that local education boards be disbanded and that the Department of Education be
replaced by a 'policy only' Ministry of Education. This was implemented via the
Education Amendment Act 1990. The support functions of the education boards and
the Department of Education were turned into private and therefore contestable
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service providers and the new Ministry of Education was concerned only with
providing policy advice for the Minister of Education. Other functions of the
Department were separated into new 'stand alone' organisations (Parent Advocacy
Council, Early Childhood Development Unit, the Special Education Service, Quest
Rapuara (The Careers Service), the Education and Training Support Agency, The
Education Review Office (ERO) and the New Zealand Qualifications Authority
(NZQA). Grace (1990) argued that the elimination of the Department of Education
was essentially a political move rather than an educational one:
The replacement of a mediated relationship between the State and the school
by a direct relation raised large questions about exactly who had become
empowered as a result. A diffuse collection of boards of trustees and
community forums throughout New Zealand was unlikely to constitute a
significant power bloc, which Treasury would have to deal with in future
struggles over education policy (Grace, 1990, p. 181).
5.4.1 Trustees
In 1990 parents were invited to stand as trustees of primary and secondary schools.
The board of trustees also included the school principal, an elected staff member and
an elected student. The trustees were the key to the local management of schools in
New Zealand and were described in Tomorrow's Schools as "the basic building block
of education administration" (p. 1). The trustees were legally responsible under the
Education Act (1989, Sec. 64) for all of the aspects of the school performance. While
the trustees had the freedom to decide how to run the school, they were required to
respond to community educational needs and to comply with national guidelines for
education. The image of a school managed by the parents was reinforced by a
national advertising campaign, which suggested that if parents could manage their
child they could manage a school. Tomorrow's Schools identified three broad areas
of trustee responsibility: staff management, property and budgets. The introduction
of trustees represented a more significant change for primary schools than secondary
schools as they already had a measure of self-governance.
66
StaffManagement
Boards of trustees became the legal employer of teaching and support staff
(Education Act 1989, Sec. 65). With the restructuring of the Department of
Education and the wider public sector change brought about by the State Sector Act
1988 (see Boston et al., 1996, p. 204), the centralised staff management arrangements
were eliminated. Boards were required to appoint a principal, prepare job
descriptions, establish performance agreements and conduct annual performance
reviews. They were also responsible for the appointment and appraisal of teaching
and support staff, approval of leave, staff development, discipline and review. In
practice this work tended to be delegated to the principal. While national awards and
salary scales were maintained, trustees were required to advertise nationally for staff
and to observe equal-employment-opportunity principles.
The respective role of the principal and the trustees was the source of some confusion
and conflict. The Lough (1990) Report argued that this confusion was because their
roles were unclear. The report recommended that the board of trustees should be
held responsible for the governance of the school while the principal should be
responsible for its management.
Property Management
In most cases The Crown retained ownership of school property. However, the
responsibility for maintenance was split between the board of trustees and the
Ministry's property unit. The trustees were responsible for maintenance that could be
expected to occur within a ten year cycle while the Ministry of Education retained
responsibility for maintenance beyond that ten year time frame, capital works and
damage caused by major vandalism, fire, flood or earthquake.
Financial Management
Funding for State schools was calculated on the basis of nationally determined
formulae. Funding was made directly to schools as a bulk grant, with the exception of
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teachers' salaries, which continued to be administered by the Ministry of Education.1
Responsibility for managing the allocated funds and approving a budget prepared by
the principal and staff rested with the trustees. Although the trustees were not liable
for a 'loss in good faith' they could be personally liable for fraud or wrong-doing
(Education Act 1989, Sixth Schedule, Sec. 4). The board was also responsible for the
preparation and audit of the school's accounts.
5.4.2 Community Education Forum
Although the institution of locally elected Trustees was one step towards the objective
of community empowerment, the Picot Report also proposed that community
education forums be established. These were intended to provide an opportunity for
the views of the community to be brought together on matters of educational
importance. Picot (1988, p. 54) outlined five objectives of these forums. To:
• Identify and gather together the views, both professional and consumer, of all
educational sectors on issues of importance.
• Identity and gather views within sectors.
• Discuss and, if possible, settle local conflicts of interest.
• Discuss policy initiatives proposed by the Ministry and provide feedback on these
to the proposed Education Policy Council (later called the Parent Advocacy
Council).
• Initiate policy ideas to be considered by the Education Policy Council.
Most of Picot's ideas on community education forums were incorporated in
Tomorrow's Schools. The result was a strange mix between community
empowerment and central control. While the forums were to be set up by the
community, the appointment of a convenor was the responsibility of the Minister of




As suggested earlier, an important part of the initiative was the shift from indirect
funding through the Department of Education and the education boards to direct
funding of the schools. Under Tomorrow's Schools it was planned that all funding
would come to the schools as a bulk grant, but with two distinct components: one for
teacher's salaries and one for operational activities.2
The teaching salaries grant was calculated by the Ministry and was based on national
standards for staffing (with some recognition for a particular institution's needs).
Each school would have some leeway on the number of teachers and their levels of
experience (and therefore the rate they were paid) although a national award system
for salary levels and employment conditions was still maintained at this point. This
was negotiated between the State Services Commission and the teachers' unions3. It
was proposed that the funding associated with salaries would be passed directly to the
school as a 'bulk salaries grant'. However, this was strongly resisted by the teachers
and the teacher unions, who argued that the devolution of salary funding to schools
would constitute a first step in the breakdown of national salary agreements, and
would put pressure on schools to cut salaries or increase class sizes (Gordon, 1992b,
p. 285). Because of this resistance the payment of teaching staff salaries remained the
responsibility of the Ministry of Education (Education Act 1989, Sec. 89).
The operational grant covered administration, ancillary support, maintenance and non-
salary aspects of teaching. It was calculated on the basis of a nationally (Ministry)
determined formula. While direct funding was a new experience for primary schools,
the major change for the secondary schools was that the grant was not broken down
into specific categories of expenditure. Trustees and teaching staff within the school
These are discussed in more detail in Appendix 4.
3 New Zealand Educational Institute (NZEI) and Post Primary Teachers' Association (PPTA).
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were responsible for budgeting and managing the grant. Each institution was free to
establish its own priorities and to transfer funds from one area to another. The other
major change was that schools became allowed to 'purchase' services from whoever
they chose rather than being under compulsion to purchase from an education board
or from the Ministry.
Tomorrow's Schools suggested that the funding formula needed to be "sensitive to the
varying needs of different institutions in different areas, and weighing for equity
considerations and the particular costs of running rural schools" (Lange, 1988, p. 12).
Based on these concepts, the main formula components for the State schools were as
follows:
• Base funding - a 'fixed' funding component to help smaller schools who did not
have many students. This fixed component disappeared as student numbers
increased.
• Per pupil funding - this was allocated at four different rates to reflect the respective
costs of different class levels.
• Special education pupils - this was based on two different rates to reflect the
respective level of student need.
• Equity funding - where schools were located in low socio-economic status areas
they could apply for special 'equity' funding. In September 1994 the basis for the
equity grant changed. It was renamed targeted funding for educational
achievement (TFEA) and was allocated by the Ministry on the basis of a ranking of
socio-economic factors deemed by the Ministry to indicate social deprivation.
• Remoteness grant - based on the location of the school.
• Vandalism - allocated in five categories, low to extreme.
• Maori language factor - this was based on the Maori language courses offered in
the school. In 1994 this changed to the number of Maori students on the school
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roll.
• Maintenance - based on property measurement.
• Heat, light and water - based on average costs.
• Minor capital works - based on property measurements.
• Relief teacher funding - based on staff numbers.
• Other funding - to recognise attached units, transition, link or community
education programmes.
(Based on Ministry of Education circulars 1994/25 and 1994/26).
Although Tomorrow's Schools suggested that schools would be able to move funds
between the teaching and the operating grant this has not occurred. Schools are not
permitted to use their operational grant to employ additional staff without approval
from the Ministry (Education Act 1989, Sec. 80).
5.6 ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL
The 1989 educational reforms represented a major change in accountability structures
and relationships. Within the Picot Report and in the subsequent Tomorrow's Schools
policy document there was a clear concept of school accountability to the local
community in general and to parents specifically. While this did take the form of
locally elected trustees and community education forums, the focus actually shifted to
accountability to the State and to the new State institutions established in the wake of
the old Department of Education. The key element in the new accountability
relationship was the school charter.
5.6.1 School Charters
The preparation of a charter was the task of the boards of trustees (in collaboration
with the principal, the staff and the community and within the national guidelines).
The objective of a charter, as stated in both the Picot Report and Tomorrow's
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Schools, was to:
. .. define the purpose of the school and the intended outcomes for students.
It was also to define the ways in which the school's programmes would take
account of the particular needs of students and potential students, the special
skills and qualifications of staff, the resources of community and the particular
needs of community (Lange, 1988, p. 3).
This task proved to be both controversial and problematic. In the Picot Report and
Tomorrow's Schools, the charter represented both a partnership between the school
and State and between the school and the community. By the time the Education Act
1989 was passed through parliament the concept had changed to that of a contract:
. . . every charter has effect as an undertaking by the board (of trustees) to the
Minister (of Education) (Education Act 1989, Sec. 64).
The charter was reinterpreted as a contract for the supply of educational services
between education providers (schools) and education purchasers (Minister). Little
freedom was given to trustees in drafting the charter as over 80% of the content was
determined nationally. Gordon (1992a) argued that educational groups significantly
influence the implementation of the reforms through the national charter requirements,
much of which related to equity issues and effectively placed restrictions on
competition between schools.
Tomorrow's Schools required that the board of trustees report regularly to the
community on the objectives of the institution's charter and on how well the
objectives were being achieved. They were also expected to inform the community of
educational achievements of the schools as a whole. However, review of the
performance of the board and the school was not the responsibility of the community
but of a 'review and audit agency'.
5.6.2 Educational Audit
It was originally intended that the monitoring organisation would be called the Review
and Audit Agency but was renamed as the Education Review Office (ERO).
Although the ERO was a new organisation it adopted some of the responsibilities of
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the old 'school inspectorate' system that existed under the Department of Education,
particularly the performance monitoring and reporting role. Tomorrow's Schools, (p.
21) indicated that the role of the ERO was to:
. . . hold institutions accountable for the government funds that they spent and
for meeting the objectives set out in their charter.
Within an agency theory perspective, the ERO provided a monitoring mechanism to
ensure that schools fulfilled their charter (contractual) obligations. The ERO
answered directly to a Government Minister (the Minister responsible for the
Education Review Office) and reviewed both school and trustee performance. Each
school was subject to biannual audits (not so frequent now - about twice in five years)
from the ERO. The proposal for the formation of the ERO was another curious mix
of the managerial and the educational. The monitoring role of the ERO was clear and
explicit, however the ERO was also meant to help a board to meet their own
objectives and to assist the board to review their own performance.
Although it was initially unclear what form the ERO reviews would take, they
developed a review methodology with two distinct types of review: the assurance-
audit and the effectiveness-review (Education Review Office, 1995a). The assurance-
audit evaluated the compliance of schools and trustees with legislation, ministry
regulations and specific undertakings contained in the school charters. Schools were
required to respond to issues raised by an assurance-audit within 15 days of receiving
the report and to outline the actions they had taken or planned to take to correct the
unsatisfied requirements (Education Review Office, 1995b). Both the report and the
responses were sent to the Secretary for Education, the Minister of Education and
were released to the public.
The effectiveness-review attempted to identify what achievement and progress of
students is related to the activities of the school. It was based on the concept of
'value added' which attempted to measure what a student learned from the
programmes provided by the school. An effective school was one that can provide
'demonstrable evidence of the value of education to the child'. In order to provide
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this evidence teachers were required to explicitly measure and quantify many aspects
of student activity and to match the assessment to specific learning objectives
(Education Review Office, 1995c). This process illustrates the NPM ideals of (a)
explicit standards and measures of performance and (b) greater emphasis on output
controls.
5.6.3 National Guidelines for Education
The national guidelines provided an important mechanism for the State to specify
particular aspects of education and for translating central policy into local reality. In
many ways this was no different from the edicts that emerged from the pre-reform
Department of Education. Tomorrow's Schools (p. 26) described the national
guidelines as:
The means of setting, maintaining and developing national standards of
achievement in education, and will be an expression of matters of national
interest. The national guidelines will set the parameters within which each
individual institution will work.
The nature of the national guidelines is already evident in the discussion of the
formation of the school charters. However, guidelines were also issued covering
areas such as codes of conduct for trustees and principals, expressions of the principle
of equity as the underpinning of educational administration and details of national
curriculum objectives. The obligations within the national guidelines have equivalent
force to the obligations within a specific school charter. However, the most
significant of the guidelines have been the national curriculum requirements.
5.6.4 National Curriculum
Within Tomorrow's School the establishment of national curriculum objectives was
retained as a responsibility of the Ministry of Education. The actual development of
the curriculum tended to be 'contracted out' by the Ministry to teachers and
educationalists. They have produced (or are developing) "curriculum guidelines" for
the "seven essential learning areas" (languages, mathematics, science, technology, the
social sciences, the arts, health and physical well being). These guidelines standardise
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the curriculum taught in New Zealand schools and specify the achievement aims and
the objectives for learning. All schools are required to comply with the guidelines.
5.6.5 National Qualifications Framework
Together with the reform and standardisation of curriculum came the establishment of
a unified, national system of qualifications. The government policy document
Learning for Life (Ministry of Education, 1989) and the Education Amendment Act
(1990) saw the establishment of a single qualifications authority with responsibility for
all nationally recognised qualifications - the New Zealand Qualifications Authority
(NZQA). NZQA adopted the assessment and qualifications activities of the Ministry
of Education and other vocational, trade and academic qualification authorities.
NZQA have established a modular qualifications and curriculum structure known as
the 'national qualifications framework'. Unit standards were established by the
NZQA for a wide range of academic and vocational topics. Institutions were
accredited (or registered for private institutions) with the NZQA as suitable to
provide courses based on the requirements of the unit standards. Students could
study the courses provided by the accredited institutions and their results were
recorded on the NZQA national database. Once students received sufficient credits
(regardless of where they are taught) they were eligible for a national certificate or
diploma. This enabled a modular approach to education (courses provided in one
institution provide the basis for courses elsewhere), with complete transferability of all
qualifications under a standardised national qualification system. All unit standards
and qualifications were assigned a difficulty level. This was an eight-point scale that
ranged from secondary school training at grade 1 to post graduate university
qualifications and degrees at level 8.
Because the first four NZQA grades were taught within secondary schools NZQA had
a significant influence on schools. Schools had to gain accreditation from NZQA and
adjust their teaching curriculum to comply with the unit standards defined by NZQA.
Although the existing school qualifications were still in place, NZQA planned to phase
them out by 1997. To maintain their accreditation schools had to participate in a
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moderation system to ensure that the standards were being applied consistently and
that comparability was achieved with other providers. All accredited organisations
were also subject to review from the NZQA and needed to be re-accredited after a
period of 2 to 5 years.
New student performance measures were the product of both the curriculum changes
and the NZQA framework. As students could move between different institutions,
measures of individual performance become more formalised and more explicit. This
became necessary in order to develop the comparable 'building blocks' of the national
qualification framework. As schools were required to apply for accreditation from
NZQA, they were also required to comply with the measurement system.
5.6.6 Accounting Control and Performance Measurement
Many of the former education boards were restructured into private companies
known as 'education service centres' and a number received direct government
funding to assist in this transition. It was expected that the education service centres
would provide the schools with financial and property services, recreating the
administrative 'safety-net' previously provided by the Department and the education
boards. Broadly the education service centres compete for contacts from the schools.
Individual school boards could choose whether nor not to pay a service centre (or
anyone else they chose) to manage the accounting responsibilities and to provide
administrative and secretarial services to the trustee meetings.
Under the Education Act 1989 and the Public Finance Act 1989 each school is
required to prepare annual financial statements for the Crown. These financial
statements must include the standard private sector statements of accounting and the
public sector 'statement of service performance'. Under section 84 of the Education
Act 1989 the financial statements and the school financial management system are
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subject to audit by Audit New Zealand.4 The audit report comments on school
compliance with the Education Act 1989 and the Public Finance Act 1989 and
whether the statements fairly reflect the financial state of the school.
The changes proposed under Picot, accepted by the Government under Tomorrow's
Schools and legislated under the Education Act 1989 represented perhaps the most
significant change ever to the administration and delivery of education services in
New Zealand. The structure of education in New Zealand subsequent to these
changes is shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Post-Reform Education Structure in New Zealand
(Source: Picot 1988).
5.7 THE QUASI-MARKET
In 1990 there was a change in government from the Labour to the National Party.
Generally the National Government endorsed the earlier structural reforms of
education and most of the alterations made by the Labour Government remained. In
their 1991 budget document - Investing in People: Our Greatest Asset (Smith, 1991)
the new Education Minister commended the reforms, particularly the national
curriculum structure and the NZQA national qualification system. However, he did
4 Often this audit process was delegated to local accounting firms who contracted with Audit New Zealand to provide
this service. Audit New Zealand were also interested in receiving copies of the school accounts as they were
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signal his commitment to a new-right agenda by cutting the community empowerment
structures such as the parent advocacy and the community forums, which he
considered to be an 'unnecessary layer of bureaucracy'. The 1991 Budget also
reduced the funding to the new central agencies (ERO, Quest Rapuara, Special
Education Service and the Ministry) and indicated the political support for 'bulk
funding' of all teachers' salaries to the schools. The first step in the introduction of
'bulk funding' for all salaries was the devolution of the funding for relief (supply)
teachers to schools from 1991 and the funding for 'management' staff (principal and
deputy principal) salaries from 1993. The Ministry document "Three Years On: The
New Zealand Education Reforms 1989 to 1992" (Ministry of Education, 1993) and
the government discussion document Education for the 21s' Century (Smith, 1994)
did not represent a significant change in policy.
The most dramatic change following the election of the National Government in 1991
was the introduction of a quasi-market in education. Upon their election the National
Party made it clear that their aim was to "make schools more like businesses"
(Gordon, 1992a, p. 288). So while the Labour reformers were unwilling to take the
final steps towards competition and markets in education, those steps were taken by
the subsequent National Government. Gordon (1992b, p. 289) argued this very point,
suggesting that:
The Picot reforms in education set up a system amenable to neo-liberal market
education reforms: they provided, as it were, the necessary but not sufficient
conditions for a market education ... The National Government, over the past
18 months, has attempted to progressively remove all emphasis on equity in
education, and it put in its place a full market system.
Under the 1991 Education Amendment Act home zones were abolished and
enrolment schemes were only put in place when the school was at a serious risk of
overcrowding. Hughes et al. (1996, p. 4) describe how the zoning policy operated
and how the 1991 Education Amendment Act made so much difference. Before the
Tomorrow's Schools reforms, the Department of Education granted a geographical
consolidated into the National Accounts for New Zealand.
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zone to each State secondary school in New Zealand. All students who lived within
that zone had the right to attend their local school, and the number of out of zone
students was limited (McCulloch, 1990). Following Tomorrow's Schools a maximum
roll was set for each school. Local students (from the home zone) had priority;
however, out of zone applications could be accepted up to the maximum roll number.
Where there was excess, out of zone enrolments were decided by ballot. This
legislation was only in place for one year before it was replaced by the Education
Amendment Act 1991. In 1992 home zones were abolished and local students were
no longer guaranteed attendance at their local school. Schools that were at risk of
overcrowding could operate an enrolment scheme. These enrolment schemes set a
maximum number for the school (negotiated with the Ministry of Education) and
selection procedures were left to the discretion of the individual school. Therefore
popular schools could accept students from any part of the city (and therefore
maximise their funding and staff entitlement) and could select for academic
achievement (and maximise their perceived success). So the New Zealand education
system was transformed from norms of co-operation and consensus to models of
market and competition. Market and competition principles represented a
fundamental challenge to the core values of equity and equality which had
characterised the New Zealand education system.
The structural changes of the Labour Government eliminated the institutional power
of the Department of Education and diluted the educationalist voice in the policy
process. As indicated by Broadbent et al. (1991) steering media become embodied in
governmental and professional institutions. It seems clear that there was a strong
relationship between the values of the Department of Education and those fostered
and developed within New Zealand schools (Gordon, 1992a). This relationship was
clearly recognised by those that wanted to restructure the education system. Forms of
financial measurement and control came to replace many of the direct controls that
existed under the pre-reform Department of Education, transforming the
accountability arrangements in the schools from socializing to individualizing forms of
accountability (Roberts, 1991). These controls were reflected in the financial
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accounting reports each school had to prepare and submit to the Ministry of
Education. At a structural level, new forms of financial and administrative visibility
were contracted through the process of audit and review initiated by the Audit Office,
ERO and NZQA.
Within the quasi-market reforms of the National Government in 1991 the schools
were constructed as separate and competing education providers. The role of the
principal teacher was restructured as a 'Chief Executive' who must attract students in
similar or increased numbers year after year to retain government funding and existing
teaching staff. As New Zealand schools were granted more autonomy than virtually
any other country (OECD, 1994), the accounting control gained new significance in
monitoring the decentralised decision-making and the quasi-market. Schools were
given complete control over their budgets and funding (with the exception of teacher
salaries and some capital development). They could buy services from the private
sector, borrow money and fund capital development.
5.8 SUMMARY
This chapter has provided the contextual aspect of a middle range analysis of the New
Zealand education reforms. While there have been accounting and accountability
changes, these have not been abstracted from the changes in structure, in curriculum
and performance measurement. As such the schools did not experience the
accountability changes separately from the other reforms and their response to them
was influenced by their organisational and historical context.
Based on Laughlin and Broadbent (1993) the New Zealand education reforms had
colonising potential. As such they were an attempt to regulate behaviour within the
schools and challenged core lifeworld values of equality of access and co-operation.
Within the Laughlin (1991) pathways rebuttal was not a serious option as the change
was imposed via Government legislation. The individual schools lacked the political
influence to reverse government policy and the restructure of the Department of
Education into a Ministry meant that rebuttal would receive little support from that
direction. Clearly it was possible that the schools could adopt an evolutionary
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pathway. However, the reforms were not developed through a process of discourse
involving teaching staff but were imposed upon the schools.
Based on the empirical studies of UK education reform described in Chapter Three,
one could expect that the reforms would lead to the re-orientation pathway, as
schools altered their structural arrangements in order to protect core lifeworld values.
Broadbent et al. (1992a, 1993) and Laughlin et al. (1994a) found that this re¬
orientation process focused on the activities of a small group of actors who absorbed
the financial and administrative responsibilities of LMS and protected the 'real work'
of the schools. However, they also warned that a small group established to absorb
change could also become a change agent and shift the school from a re-orientation
pathway to a colonising one. This issue is explored in the next chapter in the context
of an empirical study of four New Zealand schools.
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CHAPTER SIX
AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF
CHANGE EFFECTS ON FOUR SCHOOLS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The school case studies presented in this chapter provide the empirical 'flesh' to the
'skeletal' Laughlin-Broadbent theoretical framework (Laughlin, 1995). Both
Broadbent et al. (1993) and Laughlin et al. (1994a) suggested that the orientation of
the head teacher to their new responsibilities was key in determining how the LMS
(local management of schools) reforms affected individual schools. However, it is
necessary to explore how the schools and the staff responded to the changes in a
particular organisational context. This chapter seeks to explore whether these
findings can also be 'fleshed out' in the context of the New Zealand schools studied.
There are three main sections within this chapter. The first sketches the
organisational context of four schools studied and the second analyses how the
schools were affected by the restructure of the New Zealand education system
outlined in the previous chapter. The third section of the chapter presents an analysis
of the case studies and reflects on whether the schools fitted the Laughlin-Broadbent
model of change pathways, absorbing groups and dominant head teachers.
The changes described in the previous chapter, particularly those directly affecting the
operation of the schools can be seen as a potential threat to the autonomy of teaching
staff and an intrusion to the organisational lifeworld. The new financial and
administrative responsibilities were a significant change to the way schools operated
and had evident colonising potential. Previously the education boards, the secondary
schools councils, or the Department of Education managed most of the financial
responsibilities. However, with the closure of most local support mechanisms or
steering media, the administrative and accounting tasks previously undertaken by the
State became the direct responsibility of the schools, particularly the management of
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property, finance and personnel. There were also new accountability requirements
associated with devolved local management, which introduced new steering media or
design archetypes into education institutions. Schools were expected to prepare
regular accounting and budgetary performance reports. Regular audits, both financial
and performance, were also initiated, placing a strong emphasis on system and
documentation and creating new levels of visibility for school activity.
When this study began in 1993, the schools had already started to adjust to the
changes; they had elected their second Board of Trustees, they were no longer exempt
from producing financial statements and the Education Review Office (ERO) had
started reviewing school performance. It was clear, from the newspapers and from
talking with parents, which schools were considered 'successful' and which were
'failing' in the quasi-market environment.
6.2 SCHOOL 1: MATAI
6.2.1 Profile of the school
Matai was a coeducational contributing state primary school, which was built in 1945.
It was located on the poorer side of Christchurch where much of the local housing
was developed in the late 1940s and early 1950s as state rentals. In the past forty
years the neighbourhood became increasingly industrial with the drift of people to the
suburbs although there are still a significant number of state and private tenants in the
area. Many of these tenants were solo parents and there was a higher than average
number of immigrants, Maori and Pacific Islanders. The area was one of the poorest
in New Zealand and had a high level of unemployment (12.5% compared to a 6%
national average). Many of the local families did not have a telephone or the private
transport that would be the norm in most New Zealand homes.
In 1993 Matai had a roll of 177 students and 15 teachers. The proportion of Maori
and Pacific Island students within the school was significantly above the average for
other schools in the city. Under the quasi-market arrangements Matai found it
difficult to attract and hold students and they experienced an unusually high student
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turnover (over 65% in one year). An unusual feature of the school was the special
unit, which serves the surrounding primary and intermediate schools.
The school facilities were a combination of pre-fabricated classrooms and 'old style'
wooden buildings. During 1994 there was a major redevelopment of the school
environment. A majority of the school buildings were relocated, new grassed areas
were established, a number of trees and shrubs were planted and a new adventure
playground was installed.
Many of the students in the school had social and learning difficulties. The teaching
staff suggested that 30% of the children had problems and 10% had acute problems,
compared to 4% internationally. The teachers argued that the main cause of these
problems was a lack of parenting skills:
A lot of the parents don't care about their children's education. Their
parenting is an example of the blind leading the blind. Many of them were
outcasts, they don't have the necessary skills and have no idea about how to
bring up kids (Teacher Matai, June 1994).
Interviews were conducted with teachers, trustees, the Principal and support staff
within the school between September 1993 and December 1995. The key contact and
informant within the school was the Principal.
6.2.2 Responses to the education reforms
When the Tomorrow's Schools changes were implemented the Principal at Matai was
nearing retirement. He suggested that the major effect of the reforms was to change
his role. Between 1991 and 1993 he had absorbed most of the administrative and
financial responsibilities that had been passed to the schools from the Education
Board and the Department of Education. He felt that because of his administrative
workload he could no longer provide effective pastoral and curriculum support:
The administration responsibilities now take up much of my time. Principals
should be responsible for the development and implementation of curriculum
and for looking after the welfare of students and teachers. Once I had the time
to get to know each of the kids personally, but now the administrative
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responsibilities take up 95% of my time. I only have 5% to devote to
curriculum and welfare issues (Principal Matai, October 1993).
The Principal retired at the end of 1993 and his successor was appointed at the
beginning of 1994. The new appointee recognised that the school had problems and
that he needed to change the way the school operated.
But I do enjoy the challenge of the position. It has been difficult because there
are existing systems and ways of doing things. But over time I will organise
things my way. I think that I have a more democratic style that the previous
principal (Principal Matai, April 1994).
The administrative workload was particularly acute during 1994 because of a major
redevelopment of the schools' physical environment.
As Principal most of what I do now has little directly to do with the school. I
have to deal with all sorts: today there was an engineer, an architect, an
electrician and a plumber (Principal, Matai, April 1994).
There were also problems with the election and the operation of the Board of
Trustees, which made delegation to individual trustees difficult. Few parents within
the school were willing to stand as trustees and those that were elected were
unreliable in their attendance. The Board secretary was nearly removed from her
position for missing three meetings in a row. Most of those who were elected as
trustees were unemployed or were on government benefits and did not have the
professional or managerial skills of parents from more middle-class areas.
Initially there was not a good relationship between the trustees and the teaching staff.
The trustees tended to be reticent in dealing with complaints and legal challenges to
the school and relied heavily on the Principal who carried much of the direct
responsibility for the finances and the property management. However, the Principal
encouraged the trustees to contribute what they could to the operation of the school.
Over the period of the study certain trustees responded to the encouragement from
the Principal and began to take an increasingly active role in the school, providing
secretarial/administrative support and working as teacher aids in the classroom.
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Turnover in trustees was significantly reduced and the constant contact between the
trustees, the teaching staff and the Principal meant that much of the Board work was
conducted on an informal basis.
We all know each other and we get on well. Our last Board meeting took 47
minutes. It is good. Mind you, I see X the chairperson every day. She comes
in here - so we actually pre-empt a lot of the business. We virtually made a
decision - not just her and I, as the other trustees are here too and we are
talking about it, so when we actually get to the meeting there is very little to
decide. Which is good. Also I see X every day we sit down and have [a talk].
I deal...with [X] the Chairperson and she contacts the others and it works
really good (Principal Matai, September 1995).
The Principal actively encouraged board members to take the responsibility for co¬
ordinating school fund-raising activities and actioning board decisions. All of the
trustees who were elected in 1993 stood for a second term at the 1995 election. An
additional trustee was elected to the Board who took some of the responsibility for
the school property.
The man who got on to the trustees, I am starting to feed him more of the
property issues - which is good. I am probably still over-viewing the area but
I am getting him to do more. Like saying "You go and find out what painting
needs doing and you go and ring up engineering firms and get quotes". It is
also helping him because he feels that he is doing something. We have just put
him in charge of the school alarm system and he is feeling really good about
his new responsibilities (Principal Matai, September 1995).
The Principal delegated some of the day-to-day financial responsibilities to the school
secretary. In addition to her existing responsibilities she collected money from the
students, banked all cash received, paid and coded the invoices. However, accounting
details were not entered on a school computer but were sent to an external accountant
for processing.
The teaching staff suggested that they were not directly affected by the new
administrative responsibilities. However, they did notice that the Principal was unable
to provide the same levels of curriculum, teaching and pastoral support.
Because of the administrative load we have effectively lost a teacher. We used
to get curriculum release time from the Principal to allow us to develop
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resources. That's gone now. There are 10 to 12 curriculum areas to deal
with. In a large school you can share that out but in a small school you have
to deal with more than one area (Teacher Matai, October 1994).
We also spend a lot of time doing social work. One girl's sister got raped a
few days before. You can't send them down to the Principal like you used to
- he is too busy with administration (Teacher Matai, October 1994).
The loss of the curriculum support provided by the Principal was an important issue
because of the changes to the national curriculum. Within the primary schools
teachers had to remain conversant with all of the changes rather than just one or two
specialist areas. In order to ease the burden on the teaching staff the Principal decided
that the school would focus on just one of the curriculum areas each year.
We are doing one every year. Last year maths and this year science. We are
doing the same as any other school. Some schools like to do two or three a
year but we are just doing one. Next year language is our main area. I have
planned it right through to the year 2000. Because this year science was the
main one, the staff had 24 science days. I sent the whole staff onto courses,
which cost the school heaps. I also gave the staff two days to do their
personal courses. Next year they will all go on language courses. Poor
schools can do planning just like big flash schools too you know (Principal
Matai, September 1995).
Throughout the first two years of the study, Matai was in a perpetual state of financial
crisis. The budget for the school was approximately $155,000. The Principal
described money as the biggest problem for him and for the school. In order to
'balance the budget' he had to lay-off two cleaning staff and two teacher aids.
However, the school still overspent their 1993 funding and expenses were carried
forward into the 1994 year. During 1994 a team from the Ministry of Education came
and investigated the school's financial deficit. They checked through the school
spending and found that the cuts that could be made had been made and there were no
more areas of spending that could be reduced. The Ministry of Education offered to
loan the school the difference but the trustees and staff were not happy with this
solution. They said:
They expect us to make a profit, but the school is not about making profits.
Money is seen as the real issue by the political powers. We want to offer the
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quality of education that they can offer in the richer parts of the city (Teacher
Matai, October 1994).
The major problem within the school was the lack of local funding. In other parts of
the city it was possible to raise a significant amount of money from the parents and
the local community. However, this was not a serious option for Matai because most
of the parents were quite poor.
We have 120 families in the school. The school donation was only $21 but
only 12 people paid. We set up a swimming programme. We couldn't afford
to keep the school pool. We were going to use the money saved to subsidise
professional lessons by 50%, which would cost parents $20 for 10 lessons.
Only 40 kids out of 170 went swimming. Other kids can go swimming but
ours can't. $60 for my three kids is not feasible on a benefit (Trustee Matai,
October 1994).
I don't know if you read in the paper yesterday about the school. It received a
glowing report from ERO and is doing everything well but because of a high
population of low income families they just can't get the money and now they
have got a deficit of $12,000. The community was too poor for fund raising
— they had even been doing their own lawn mowing and stuff. We are just
as poor like that too. We just get the basic amount of money. It's hard to get
more (from parents). Our school fees are only $15 and we got more this year
than we have ever had. We have only got 20-30 families who have actually
paid (Principal Matai, October 1994).
In 1994 the Ministry also threatened to cut the teaching resources in the school.
Historically the special unit had provided services to both private and state public
schools. However, the Ministry of Education chose to recognise only the state
enrolment for staff entitlement, effectively ignoring 25% of the load of the unit. On
this basis the staffing entitlement for the special unit dropped by two. The Principal
was forced to stop providing the service to private schools because of the way the
staffing entitlement was calculated.
The private schools had been coming here for a very long time, they were very
good clients. Last year we had nine hundred children using the attached unit
but two hundred and fifteen were from private schools. As far as the Ministry
were concerned they were ghost children. I had to tell them all to go, we felt
awful but we had no choice because they weren't being counted. Now we
have got more state students in (Principal Matai, September 1995).
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By the end of 1995 there was a general improvement in the situation facing the
school. There was an increase in staffing entitlement, the ERO report was positive
and the government funding was increased. First, the Ministerial Reference Group
(MRG) released their report Resource Entitlement for School Staffing which
recommended a complete restructure of existing staff entitlement ratios. While the
general teaching did not receive additional regular teachers the attached unit got two
more. Second, the Education Review Office (ERO) report on Matai said that the
school was making good progress towards meeting the Board's priorities for the
development of basic skills and commended the quality of the teaching and teaching
staff. The Principal saw the review as a positive statement on the school as a whole.
We actually got a good report. It said we were doing everything within our
power. It was a bit like the Ministry review - they realised our difficulties
because of our area. We are on the decile rate, from 1-10 we are 1, which is
really low. Under the problems we have got, we were doing well and ERO
went round and were very pleased with the teachers. Their only concern was
that there wasn't an overall review of the school but we have fixed it this year.
We have got school reviews going. So it was a good report - the teachers
were doing their job, the Board were doing their job and I seem to be doing
my job (Principal Matai, September 1995).
The third major improvement was in government funding. A number of schools
throughout the country were entitled to additional or special funding. The most
significant of these grants was called the equity-fund, which was available where
schools had a high proportion of students with 'cultural and social learning
disadvantages'. In 1994 the Ministry of Education reviewed the Equity Fund and
renamed it Targeted Funding for Educational Achievement (TFEA). Previously
schools had qualified for funding by writing to the Ministry and making a case for the
needs of their school. Staff at the Ministry argued that allocation of the TFEA funds
should be based on the needs of the area and not on the persuasiveness of the
Principal. The Ministry of Education selected a number of factors that they thought
related to poor socio-economic status and consequential lower educational
achievement. Schools were placed in one of ten different bands based on the socio¬
economic data for their local area. Funding grants were made to schools in the
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bottom three bands, staggered so those which were classified in the bottom band
received the highest grants.
Matai was assessed in the lowest banding and received the full TFEA funding, much
of which was used to subsidise activities such as drama, school trips and swimming
where many parents would be unable to pay even nominal charges such as $1 or $2
per child. The Ministry of Education was directly involved in setting spending
guidelines for Matai for the 1996 year. The Principal was hopeful that he would at
least 'break-even' and possibly put some money aside for maintenance.
We haven't been able to do maintenance, just to survive has been the goal.
But next year with a bit of careful planning and a bit more money from the
Government, we should be able to start putting some money aside, touch
wood, unless something major blows up and I have to spend it on that. Being
a Scotsman, I like to be able to put something aside, we haven't been able to
so far (Principal Matai, September 1995).
6.2.3 Summary
When interviews began, Matai was in a state of financial and administrative crisis.
The principal was trying to cope and saw the new responsibilities as a distraction from
his true role in pastoral and curriculum support. He had absorbed many of the
financial and administrative tasks and was typical of what Laughlin et al. (1994a)
called the absorber soaker-sinker type of headteacher. Laughlin et al. (1994a)
suggested that the absorber sinker-soaker type was placed under a lot of personal
pressure by the changes and sought to insulate the staff and the students from the
reforms. In summary this kind of approach was destructive for both the school and
for the individual as the individual tends to burn out and often left the education
system, while the school lost pastoral and curriculum leadership from the principal
who was forced to spend much of he/r time on administrative tasks.
The new principal intended to delegate more of the responsibility associated with the
implementation of the reforms. Initially this did not prove possible because of the
redevelopment project and because of the lack of professional and managerial
expertise within the Board of Trustees. He addressed this issue by developing a
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number of the more committed trustees into a support group. The interesting fact
about this support group was that while the trustees did assist with the administrative
and the fund-raising activities, they also became directly involved in the school as
teacher aids. This arrangement did not neatly fit any of the 'absorbing' models
described by Laughlin et al. (1994a) as the trustees were not carrying the financial or
administrative responsibilities or 'protecting' the school from change but were directly
involved in the education delivery.
Another interesting feature of Matai was the direct involvement of the Ministry of
Education. The financial crises within the school brought it to the attention of those
within the Ministry who monitored the school budgetary system and financial
arrangements. The direct involvement of the Ministry was welcomed within the
school as the financial situation was seen as a central rather than a local issue. The
transfer of financial responsibility back to the centre and the additional resources from
the centre was an important part of the recovery of the school.
6.3 SCHOOL 2: DEANS SCHOOL
6.3.1 Profile of the school
Deans was a coeducational contributing state primary school, situated in an exclusive
suburban area in the north of Christchurch. It was considered a wealthy suburb and
the property prices in the area were among the highest in the city (double the city-
wide average). Many of the residents were employed in professional and managerial
jobs (73% of the parents in the school) and a large percentage had degree
qualifications. The net family income was $10,000 p.a. higher than the national and
the city-wide average.
In 1993 Deans had a roll of 413 students. Very few of these students were from
Maori or Pacific Island families, although there was a significant Asian presence. The
students at Deans tended to be high achievers, as might be expected from an educated
middle-class area, and maintained academic and musical standards above the national
average. During the study the school had as many students as they could
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accommodate and considerable effort had been devoted to restricting additional
enrolments. In 1995 the school had 18 teaching staff which increased to 22 in 1996.
The first classrooms were built in the 1950s and additional teaching, library and
administrative facilities were built in the 1970s. In 1995 a number of new classrooms
were provided to meet the growing school roll and the administration block was
extended.
The key informant at Deans was the school principal. He was an important source of
information on the operation of the school and was crucial in obtaining access to the
school. Interviews were also conducted with teaching staff, administration staff and
trustees and the researcher observed a number of the Board of trustee meetings.
6.3.2 Response to the education reforms
When the study commenced in 1993, local parents saw Deans as a desirable school
and as one of the 'success' stories of the reforms. However, this very success was a
source of problems to the school. Because of the growing roll there was a serious
shortage of classroom space. The Board of Trustees attempted to restrict new
enrolments to the school. However, this was not sufficient to alleviate the growing
pressure on space and the growth in class sizes. The trustees made submissions to the
Ministry of Education, as there was concern over the school's ability to meet the
needs of students in its zone. Initially the Ministry suggested that the students should
be sent to other primary schools in the local area, which did not have such a shortage
of accommodation. Recognising the unwillingness of the Ministry to provide
additional classrooms, the trustees looked seriously at purchasing additional
classrooms themselves.
In February 1995 the Ministerial Reference Group (MRG) released their report
entitled Resource Entitlement for School Staffing. This altered the national staffing
entitlement ratios. Deans school was significantly favoured under this adjustment as
the staff entitlement changed from 17.9 in 1995 to 21.7 in 1996. Because of the
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increase in teaching positions the Ministry agreed to provide five additional
classrooms to the school.
Despite the shortage of space, those responsible for managing the school welcomed
the increased autonomy as they considered that the school could be more efficient
without the direct involvement of the local education board and the Department of
Education. On contacting the school, the researcher was offered a copy of the school
charter and policy documents. The researcher was not offered these documents by
any other school although they were meant to be foundational to school operation.
Because of the new responsibilities the Principal found that his role and
responsibilities altered significantly. In addition to the traditional professional and
educational leadership of the school, the Principal carried a number of new
management and personnel responsibilities. He explained his new role as follows:
Now I am basically running a business, I am the chief executive officer for the
Board of Trustees. The Board create the parameters and I manage within
these parameters. I love the new freedom; I can be entrepreneurial; I can have
a vision for the school and the Board will support me. I can also react to what
the community wants. One example is the holiday computer course we ran, it
served a community need and raised funds for the school (Principal Deans,
July 1994).
While enjoying the new freedoms, the Principal also noted that the reforms had
significantly increased his workload. His work hours increased from 40-45 hours per
week to 60-65 hours. During the first interview the Principal presented a list of
twenty-four new responsibilities that he had since the implementation of the education
reforms. This list is reproduced below:
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Table 6.1 New Responsibilities of School Principals
Charter development Extra curricular
music
Policy writing Staff appointments







































There was little in the way of training and support for these new roles. Although the
Principal attended a number of seminars he had to "learn the role as he went along".
This learning process was assisted by several of the trustees.
The Board of Trustees have also helped train me in some of the business skills
I have needed. I have learnt a lot off them (Principal Deans, July 1994).
Supported by the expertise of the trustees, the Principal adopted a private sector style
of management and implemented a number of new procedures within the school. The
Board of Trustees at Deans included lawyers, accountants, management and property
consultants. Regular 'strategic planning days' were organised by key trustees for the
Board and the Principal. The trustees organised annual 'customer satisfaction
surveys', asking for written comments from the parents on the operation and
performance of the school. To ensure that the written comments were representative,
ten per cent of the non-respondent parents were telephoned by the trustees. During
1995 the Principal introduced 'exit interviews' for any staff who were leaving the
school.
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Although the Principal did play an important role in the financial management and
administration of the school, the trustees and the Bursar also assisted him. The
ongoing responsibility for maintaining the accounting records rested with the Bursar.
She was an ancillary staff member who had been employed as a teacher-aid. As the
Bursar she collected any monies from the students, banked any cash received, checked
and paid all accounts, coded any documents and entered the details on the computer.
The Bursar produced monthly reports, which detailed the income and expenditure
against budget levels. The monthly reports were presented to the Board of Trustees.
Annual financial reports were also prepared by the Bursar, who was assisted by the
Treasurer of the Board of Trustees (a qualified accountant and partner in a local
accounting firm) and the Principal. The Principal explained the development of then-
accounting system like this:
I had no financial knowledge when I first became a principal. I had to
implement a financial management system at the previous school that I was at.
An accountant (my father) helped me to set up a system at that school. At
this school, the chairperson of the Board of Trustees understood accounting
and set up a system. He was helped by a person contracted out by Rotary
(club) (Principal Deans, October 1993).
The total direct funding managed at Deans was approximately $240,000. Funding
was not such a critical issue as Deans were able to secure significant donations from
the local community. The ability of the school to secure local funding was illustrated
by the annual school fair, with a profit in excess of $21,000. The ability of the school
to raise local funds enabled the school to upgrade the administrative block. In late
1994 the project was initiated and the trustees were required to find half of the
funding before the Ministry of Education would provide the rest. The school took a
$75,000 loan to fund the expansion to be repaid over 10 years. Within the first year
(1995) the trustees were able to repay more than $10,000 which had been received
through donations. However, with the growth in local funding, both trustees and
teachers suggested that the ideal of free state education was being lost. One trustee
suggested that as parents they were being required to fund their children's education
twice, once out of their- taxes and once out of their pocket. Another trustee suggested
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that the State was 'delegating' the cost of public education to the parents and the
issue of funding was fundamentally a governmental rather than a local problem.
There is a myth about us, that we can do it all ourselves. We probably can but
it is a dangerous principle. We would have to fund-raise to cover basic
educational needs (Trustee Deans, August 1994).
The trustees actively embraced the ability to make decisions at the school level and
the day-to-day financial and managerial autonomy that the education reforms brought.
Considerable resources were invested in additional teaching support and programmes
such as music tuition, remedial reading, drama, maths extension, Maori language,
etiquette and manners; and, in some cases, tutors for specific 'special needs' children.
However, the trustees and the teaching staff did not have the same view on the reform
changes. One teacher expressed it like this:
Many of the trustees are from a business setting. They regard the school as a
business and us as producers and try to tell us what to do. They believe we
have the same values as them and are producing an educational product.
However, teaching is more of a vocation than a business. We are not
producing a product, we are part of a process (Teacher Deans, November
1994).
The trustees were keen to become directly funded for teaching staff salaries while
teaching staff saw these changes as threat to their security and autonomy and the
direct funding as a threat to their job and income. The tension between the staff and
the trustees was recognised by the Principal who suggested that the problem was
essentially a problem in communication rather than a fundamental clash of values.
There has been a little tension between the trustees and the teaching staff. I
think the Board have had to learn to move a bit slower in these kinds of areas.
There have been some nervous moments with the development of some of the
policies. The Board have learnt that it is important to consult the staff before
the policy is developed rather than presenting them with a draft policy. This
communication has also be facilitated by informal breakfast discussions that
now happen twice a term (Principal Deans, July 1994).
While the Principal was supportive of some of the managerial aspirations of trustees
he found himself in the role of mediator between the Board and teaching staff and as
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the moderator of those within the Board that wanted to bring rather than absorb
change.
The staff were taken too far and too fast. One of the trustees wanted
privatisation of the school properties and bulk funding of teacher's salaries.
He developed a personnel manual and wanted to take teachers off their
collective contracts and put them onto a school based agreement. I thought
that it was time to catch our breath and bed down the changes that we have
already made. We need to get off the treadmill of change we have been on.
That is where the Board is focusing now, developing practical policies to
implement all of the good ideas we have had (Principal Deans, October 1995).
By 1995 the trustees discovered that they could not implement change when faced by
teaching staff resistance. The issue of bulk funding salaries was strongly opposed by
the teachers and the Board of Trustees withdrew the bulk funding proposal. In 1995
only one of the existing trustees stood for a second term. However, the new Board of
Trustees still had an impressive depth of professional expertise: both the chair and the
secretary of the Board were lawyers and the treasurer a chartered accountant. The
new trustees were different in that they saw their role as absorbing change rather than
introducing change into the school and were keen to restore positive relations with
teaching staff. This difference between the old and the new trustees is best illustrated
in a discussion of performance pay incentives. The previous Board of Trustees had
set aside a fund to reward teachers that performed particularly well during the year.
The new Board rejected the idea of rewarding individual teachers for their
performance and instead used the fund to give a bottle of wine at Christmas to all
teaching staff (both part and full time).
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They have slotted in very well. This Board is doing very well in the PR
stakes. Were having a Board thank-you, we have always had them, this
Friday. They have been more perceptive of who to invite. They have just got,
there is a couple of them - two woman on it, have got this empathy thing.
And everyone on the staff, it doesn't matter whether they are full time or part
time, they are going to get a bottle of wine as a 'thanks very much' piece. Just
a nice little touch that hasn't happened in the past. We have decided that we
are not going to spend that on money (sic), we are just going to give everyone
the same regardless of whether they are part time or full time (Principal Deans,
December 1995).
The Picot Report (1988) maintained that the management of the school should be a
partnership between the professional teaching staff, the trustees and the community.
This also led to tensions within the school. The emphasis on being more accountable
to parents involved notifying parents of a number of the teaching programmes and of
any school trips. However, a number of parents were not satisfied with a notification
and wished to actively participate in and critique classroom activity. While parents
were encouraged to show an interest in their children's schooling and to discuss this
with teaching staff, teachers suggested that there could be a fine line between interest
and interference. One teacher said:
They (parents) feel that they can assess our teaching and know more about
what should happen than we do. Some come right into the classroom during
the day and want to know why you are doing what you're doing (Teacher
Deans, November 1994).
Another major source of concern for teachers was the curriculum changes and
measurement and assessment requirements. These changes introduced another level
of visibility into the classroom process and many teaching staff were uncertain how
they should deal with new systems of student assessment and measurement. A
number felt that the emphasis on measurement was detrimental to their teaching.
All we seem to do is measure everything. When the ERO and the Ministry
visit, you feel that you should produce more data - you should have numbers
for everything. They try to prove that teaching is more effective with statistics
(Teacher Deans, November 1994).
It is hard to do assessment because of the way that we teach. We try to take a
personal approach and adjust what we do for individual student needs. That
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makes it difficult to measure. Accountability involves statistics, paperwork
and measurement. I have to conduct my physical education classes with a
clipboard in one hand and a whistle in another. This is because I have to write
everything down in order to be accountable and satisfy the Ministry. There is
more paperwork for everything (Teacher Deans, November 1994).
Again, there was an attempt by the Principal to 'manage' the changes by focusing on a
limited number of areas, giving teaching staff time to become familiar with the new
systems and to adjust to the changes.
I get very worried about assessment. There is an assessment frenzy going on
right throughout New Zealand and everyone is running around like their heads
were chopped off. We are trying to get off the treadmill, this year we are only
looking at four subjects. We are looking at reading, maths, handwriting and
swimming. We are trying to develop achievement statements at each class
level for those four subjects. We have found that it has been impossible to get
everyone interpreting it in the same way. So therefore we have got to go back
again and ask what do we mean when we are looking at the reading age of an
eight year old. So people are using the GAP test and some are using running
records and everyone is using different running records. So we have got to
standardise, we have now found our glitches (Principal Deans, October 1995).
6.3.3 Summary
In many ways Deans was the textbook success story for the quasi-market reform of
education. The school was popular, it had an excellent reputation and lots of parents
wanted to send their children there. Deans was the show-school for other less-
successful schools in the Christchurch area. Yet, on closer investigation the school
seemed to be a victim of its own success. Despite the rhetoric, resources did not
follow a growth in roll and reputation. Because it was successful, parents wanted to
enrol their children in the school. However, this placed pressure on teaching staff,
classrooms and administrative facilities and the trustees were forced to cap additional
enrolment.
One important factor in the 'success' of the school was a wealthy, well-educated local
community. Because of this most parents had a commitment to education and a strong
interest in the welfare of their- children. While this contributed strongly to the
educational achievement within the school, it could also be a threat to the teaching
staff as some of these parents were happy to challenge what the teachers did.
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Because of a wealthy local community the school was able to raise substantial levels
of local funding. However, this created some tension as the school received less from
the State and were expected to fund their own projects. The school was able to elect
a board of trustees who were the envy of most other schools. However, this was a
mixed blessing. The trustees had a different agenda to the teaching staff and, at times,
were not just absorbing the reforms but actively promoting managerial changes within
the school. This colonising threat was reduced with the election of new 'empathic'
trustees in 1995.
At Deans, the pressures for change came from two directions: those within the school,
particularly key trustees, who had an ideological commitment to the change process
and from the new institutions that were formed after the 1993 legislation, particularly
the ERO and the Ministry of Education's national curriculum demands. While the
administrative changes were absorbed, some trustees were a potential colonising
force, committed to private sector practices. However, they could be resisted by the
teaching staff and were therefore less of a threat than the ERO and the Ministry
whose initiatives directly impinged on the teaching work.
The Principal played an important role in how the school managed the reforms.
Generally he welcomed the new freedoms; the freedom to introduce new practices
into the school and the freedom to take entrepreneurial initiative when he felt that it
would benefit the school. During 1995 the Principal initiated a major project to install
information technology which would cost well over $150,000. In order to finance
this he planned to get local businesses to pay the cost of the equipment. He also
planned to get one of the major computer companies to sponsor the school as a
reference site.
The Principal of Deans fitted what Laughlin et al. (1994a) described as the absorber
wheeler-dealer. While he does show strong entrepreneurial tendencies, he is not
detached from the operation of the school or alienated from the teaching staff. This
was evident when the Principal became the mediator between the managerial
tendencies of the trustees and the values and concerns of the teaching staff. The
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Principal also established himself as gatekeeper, determining what changes would be
acceptable and what would be resisted.
The Bursar tended to absorb many of the day to day financial responsibilities, freeing
the Principal to plan, or as he puts it - "dream dreams" (Principal Deans, July 1994).
However, he also took any opportunity to make money or obtain additional resources
when he considered that it would benefit the students. He expressed this philosophy
in the following quote:
The key questions that I always ask myself are "What's in it for the kids?" and
"Am I spending this year's money for this year's children?". It is really an
issue of being transparent in what you are doing (Principal Deans, July 1994).
6.4 SCHOOL 3: STRAVEN HIGH
6.4.1 Profile of the school
Straven High was a state coeducational secondary school and it was built in a middle
class suburb in the north of the Christchurch. The average income of the local
community and the proportion employed in professional and managerial positions
were higher than the national average.
The pre-reform 'school zoning' systems had a significant influence on local property
prices. Families would 'buy into the area' in order to send their children to Straven.
The Straven High Board of Trustees chose to maintain a zone or 'enrolment scheme'
restricting third form enrolment to the local 'zonal' area. The school continued to
experience demands for enrolment from students outside of the 'zone' many of who
were declined. Despite the continued external and growing internal (within the zone)
demand for student places, the Straven roll remained relatively constant over the
period of the study. However, the trustees were concerned about the population
growth in the area and suggested that the school 'zone' might need to be reviewed.
Straven High came into being during the post 'baby boom' expansion of the school
population in the 1950's and 1960's. Further buildings were added to the school
during the late 1960's and early 1970's. In 1993 the roll was over 2,000 students and
there were more than 100 teaching staff, which made Straven one of the largest
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schools in the region. The school has a reputation for high levels of academic
achievement in state examinations.
6.4.2 Response to the education reforms
Straven was often regarded as one of the success stories of the education reforms.
Part of this image of success was due to the size of the school, which made it practical
to appoint staff and to implement systems to handle the new administrative and
financial responsibilities. The Principal regarded the changes as a challenge, he
welcomed the new freedoms that were offered and led the school in a very pro-active
response to the reforms. He argued that the changes could benefit the school and
pupils rather than seeing them as only a threat.
We prefer to lead rather than follow and will maintain a high level of energy in
developing new programmes to ensure that students gain maximum advantage
during this period of change (Principal Straven, 1992 Annual Report).
In particular, the devolution of financial and administrative responsibility provided the
opportunity to make decisions within the school rather than having to wait on
approval from the Department of Education. The reforms provided the Principal with
the opportunity to restructure the way that the school ran and re-modelled the
management structure of the school along more commercial lines.
I feel that there is a flaw in the management structure of schools. A manager
should deal with policies not implementation. In this school we have both an
associate principal and a deputy principal. Now our management structure
was such that the Principal directly supervised the associate principal, the
deputy principal and thirteen HODs. The efforts of the chief executive, so to
speak, were spread too thinly. Now I had the associate and the deputy
principal that were on a high seniority level but they had no real management
function, they only looked after the pastoral care of students. So I lifted their
work responsibility so I could use their energies better. So I left myself with
supervision of the HODs of guidance, mathematics and the Finance and
Administration Manager and shared out the responsibility for the supervision
of the other HODs to the associate and the deputy principal (Principal
Straven, September 1995).
To reflect the change in his role the Principal changed his job description to
Principal/Chief Executive, to reflect the combination of professional leadership and
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management responsibilities (Principal Straven, July 1994). Very little formal training
was available for the principal / chief executive role. However, some of the private
sector courses were useful. He mentioned a course run by a group of private sector
managers to introduce school principals to management techniques such as strategic
planning and total quality management. Many of those techniques he then applied in
running the school.
Straven High had a stable Board of Trustees with a low turnover. Most of the
trustees stood for two terms (six years) and a number continued for three terms (nine
years), maintaining a continuity of experience and expertise.
Many of the people who were on the first Board of Trustees stood for a
second term. However, a number felt that 6 years was quite enough and only
three of the seven parent representatives remained on the third Board. When
the treasurer resigned, the second Board co-opted a professional accountant
as the new treasurer who, together with the three parent representatives who
were re-elected, ensured good continuity after the 1995 election (Chair
Straven Trustees, September 1994).
The ability to co-opt additional trustees with professional skills meant that accounting
and property management were maintained as areas of strength within the Board. All
of the three boards elected had professional accountants and engineers as members.
This was further supported with teaching, legal and managerial expertise.
We have been able to get a very well qualified Board from the [local] parents.
We have expertise in the accounting and finance area from both the previous
treasurer and in [X]. [X] used to be on the PTA committee and has a child in
form three. We are also strong in the property area. [Y] is an engineer and is
responsible for property management at the airport. The abilities of these
people has been a big help in coping with our responsibilities under
Tomorrow's Schools (Principal Straven, September 1995).
Much of the work of the Board was conducted at the committee level. There were
six committees: staffing, finance, property, student welfare, curriculum and
employment conditions. Three additional committees were also established to
oversee the work experience unit, plan a major building construction and to develop
the community education programme. Each committee made a regular report to the
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Board. Although Education Services1 provided secretarial services to the Board prior
to Tomorrow's Schools, this responsibility shifted to the Deputy Principal.
In order to support the new accounting, property management and administrative
responsibilities within the school a new position was created, the Finance and
Administration Manager. In 1989 the Principal and Board of Trustees decided that
the school would manage their own accounting rather than employ external
accounting services. With the assistance of the Head of Department (HOD) of
Commerce, the trustees and Principal designed an accounting system for the school
and purchased the necessary software. Initially the financial management of the
school was the responsibility of the Executive Officer. However, this arrangement
was considered unsatisfactory and Ernst & Young were asked to review the situation.
They recommended that a new position be created to oversee the accounts and
administrative staff. A Finance and Administration Manager was appointed on a part-
time basis in 1991 and was re-employed full-time from 1992. He was responsible for
the accounting system, internal and external reporting, the administration computer
network and oversaw the secretarial section. He answered directly to the Principal
and played an important role in the finance committee of the Board of Trustees.
Responsibility for property and ancillary services was delegated to the Property
Services Manager (ex Executive Officer).
The Finance Manager supported the HOD's budgetary responsibilities. He provided
easily accessible accounting advice, which was invaluable in the HOD's preparation of
departmental budgets. The HODs also appeared to be more willing to adopt financial
responsibilities because there was an expert available who could quickly and clearly
answer any queries they may have. The fact that the Finance Manager had teaching
qualifications and was actively involved in the teaching programme also increased his
credibility within the school.
1 Education Services was previously the Secondary School Council. Under the reforms they were restructured into a
private, contestable support service.
104
With the restructure of responsibilities at Straven, the Executive Officer became the
Property and Services Manager. He oversaw all maintenance and administrative staff,
was responsible for planning maintenance and building within the school and played
an important part in the property sub-committee of the Board of Trustees. He
answered to the Associate Principal rather than directly to the Principal.
The need for financial expertise at Straven becomes evident when one considers that
the funds managed by the school changed from $140,000 before the reforms to $1.2
million (although $600 thousand was senior staff salaries) after the reform. The 'bulk
funding' of the operation grant significantly increased the freedom of school principals
and boards to make decisions at the local level without having to consult the
Department of Education (or Ministry of Education).
We do have a lot more autonomy than we used to. We do not have to ring
the Department (of Education) when we need to do something. Minor capital
works are a good example: we don't have to waste time negotiating with the
Department, we just go out and do the maintenance we need (Principal
Straven, July 1994).
Historically, we could not move money from one budget to another. We
could not use book money to buy calculators even if we had bought all of the
books we needed. Therefore, we would always spend all of a particular
budget even if we did not need what we bought (Principal Straven, July 1994).
Because a significant part of the operational grant was based on student numbers, the
obvious way of increasing the funds (and teaching positions) available to the school
was to increase the number of students attending the school. Therefore, as schools
became aware of the funding and staff implications they started to seriously compete
for available students. The Principal at Straven commented that he was reluctant to
share his plans and experiences with other principals because they might "steal a
march" (Principal Straven, July 1994) on him. Because of their academic reputation
the school was able to attract a number of fee-paying overseas students, which also
had direct financial benefits for the school. However, these benefits were costly. The
Principal was involved in several overseas trips to promote the school, particularly in
the Asian-Pacific area. Extra staff was employed to teach the overseas students and
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additional costs were incurred to build new classrooms. However, the financial
contribution from overseas students was recognised by the chairman of the Board of
Trustees who stated in the 1993 school accounts that:
The Board has noted the difficulty that would exist in financing the school's
operations if it were not for the contribution made to the operating budget by
the overseas fee-paying students (Chair of the Board of Trustees Straven,
Financial Accounts 1993).
Overall, the school consistently maintained a surplus on operations and there was
significant level of local fund-raising. The ability of the school to generate local
funding became evident as in 1995 when the trustees prepared plans to construct a
new auditorium for the school. In total the project would cost around $200,000 and
much of this amount was to be raised through local fundraising.
While the school was able to raise funds, they had been adversely affected by the
changes to the staffing formula. The 1991 cuts to the secondary staffing formula had
caused a loss of 4.5 equivalent teaching positions at Straven.2 This resulted in a
reappraisal of teaching staff, two permanent staff being "redeployed" and four part-
time staff losing their jobs. The Board of Trustees decided to reduce by one the
number of counsellor positions within the school because of the Ministry reduction.
An external consultant reviewed this decision in 1994 and the Board was advised to
reinstate the position. This was achieved by "rearranging staffing allowances within
the school" (Interview September 1995). Two of the staff affected by the 1991 cuts
restructured their work on a job-sharing basis. This "enabled them jointly to make a
full teaching contribution to the school while raising their young families" (Interview
September, 1995). This job-sharing agreement was initially on a trial basis but
became permanent in the following year. While the changes were clearly a response
to the economic necessity, the central thrust was to protect the 'mainstream' teaching
of the school. The redeployment exercise was initially driven by financial factors but
^ See Appendix 4.
106
the ultimate results were decided by the educational imperative of providing the best
possible education for students and the needs of the staff.
As in most other schools, the teaching staff were concerned about the growth in
measurement and assessment. The measurement issue had two aspects, measurement
of school performance and measurement of student performance. The ERO review
process measured and assessed the school and the teaching staff. The 1992 ERO
review of Straven School recommended further measurement and analysis:
The data the school has on student achievement should be more extensively
analysed especially in regard to the performance of equity target groups and
the progress students make in their time at the school (ERO Report, Straven,
August 1992).
However, in discussion the Principal also raised some major issues about the
operation of the ERO and the benefits (or lack of benefit) of the review for the school.
The ERO reviews do not have a big effect on the way the school runs. They
just come in and remind us that we have certain legal obligations and that
there are certain rules and regulations we must adhere to. They come in with
some ideas, but they aren't real practical. The problem is that they don't have
teaching credibility. A lot of people in these government organisations are
people who didn't succeed as professional teachers and are attracted towards
those places. You don't expect innovation from them. Just procedure and
technique, not innovation in education (Principal Straven, September 1995).
The tendency towards measurement was the Ministry of Education 'Assessment
Initiative' and measurement requirements of the NZQA qualifications framework
which required teachers to explicitly measure and quantify student performance. The
Principal was supportive of the qualifications framework, arguing that the unit
standards would assist teachers in analysing how their subject was built up, would
clarify what needed to be taught, and would clearly indicate how one subject related
to another. However, he was dismissive of the process of implementation and the
over-emphasis on measurement:
But my concern is that we are trying to drive a tack with a sledgehammer, that
the assessment part is overtaking the learning. And every extra hour you
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spend on assessment you are going to spend one less hour on learning. And
that is a great coneern to me. It is the assessment part that I think is getting
too much time and I am not sure why.
And some of the solutions they have for the difficulties worry me as well. I
have one department setting re-tests after school. If you don't pass your unit
you have a chance to do it again. But most teachers are not going to retest
their students after school. This department is involved in a trial, but most
teachers can't do that. It is this jolly re-testing all of the time.
The NZQA's latest solution is for teachers to walk around the class and look
at their books. If it looks like they are doing their examples well, there is no
need to re-test them and you can tick them for it. From the sublime to the
ridiculous.
(Principal Straven, September 1995).
6.4.3 Summary
Parents and the media saw Straven as a successful school under the reforms. The
school had a stable and skilled Board of Trustees, they were able to raise a significant
level of local funds, they had a growing roll and they could attract as many overseas
fee-paying students as they were willing to accept. The students scored consistently
well in local and national examinations and the school had a strong reputation for their
sporting and musical achievements.
The introduction of new financial and administrative responsibilities flowing from the
implementation of the education reforms led to a major review and restructure of the
responsibilities within the school. An accountant was appointed as Finance and
Administration Manager and the Executive Office took responsibility for the
management of the buildings and grounds. The two administrative staff at the school
were assisted by the Treasurer (from the Board of Trustees), who was also an
accountant. The Principal welcomed the increased freedoms to make decisions and to
restructure the school and saw the reforms an opportunity that could be turned to the
advantage of the school and would therefore benefit students. Rather like the
Principal at Deans, the introduction of managerial practices and orientations were
accepted because it was thought that this would most benefit students.
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The Principal, the Finance and Administration Manager and the Executive Officer
absorbed the administrative and financial responsibilities and protected the teaching
staff from most of these changes. However, it was not possible to protect the
teaching staff from the new forms of measurement and explicit accountability arising
from the ERO reviews and the NZQA requirements.
The role of the Principal in the management of the reforms was interesting because it
illustrated both engagement and disengagement. The Principal distanced himself from
the day-to-day management of the reforms so that he was free to provide direction for
the school, or, as he put it, to be the chief executive. The restructure of staff
supervision within the school was also explicitly designed to free the Principal from
'administration' to focus on 'policy'. While the Principal did not engage in
particularly entrepreneurial activities, he took a managerial orientation towards the
school and spoke of the school in strongly corporate terms. This corporate
orientation also extended to his relationship with other schools, which had shifted
from one of co-operation to one of competition in the quasi-market environment.
Within the Laughlin et al. (1994a) framework the Principal had a 'managerial
educational orientation'. Of all of the principals studied, the one at Straven seemed to
fit the Laughlin et al. (1994a) types the best; he had delegated many of the financial
and administrative responsibilities to others (the Finance and Administrative Manager
and the Executive Officer), he had a strong management concern and an interest in
developing appropriate management structures in the school and had already started
becoming interested in management prior to the reforms.
6.5 SCHOOL 4: AROHA COLLEGE
6.5.1 Profile of the school
Aroha College was a state coeducational secondary school located in the east of
Christchurch. The school was established in 1961 as part of a high school building
boom throughout the city and the facilities were reasonably standard for a state
secondary school. Most of the buildings were erected in 1961; a gym was added in
1966 and additional teaching space and a school library were provided in 1969.
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Although the school was built for nearly 1,000 students, in 1993 they had a roll of 647
students. The school had 43 teaching staff in 1995 although this had dropped to 38
in 1996.
Aroha College was located in a working class area where most of the residents were
on an average or below-average income. However, Aroha also drew students from
some of the poorest areas of the city. There are two reasons for this: first, Aroha has
developed a reputation for dealing with 'difficult' children, and therefore tended to
attract students with both social and educational difficulties and second, Aroha was
seen as the 'school of last resort' - taking children who had been rejected from other
state schools for behavioural problems. The Principal argued that the philosophy of
open access to all students was linked with the school mission '.. . to encourage
students to believe in themselves and to reach their fullest potential' and as such the
purpose of the school was not strict academic achievement.
The most important thing is always to get the kids to believe in themselves. A
lot of them come here when they can't get in anywhere else - we become the
school of last resort for the whole city (Principal Aroha, October, 1994).
The key informant in this school was the Principal. However, she was absent
(research fellowship to America) for one year during the study and the key contact
became the Deputy Principal during that time.
6.5.2 Response to the education reforms
Aroha did not 'compete well' in the post-reform quasi-market. Aroha was based in a
relatively poor neighbourhood and did not find it easy to raise funds from the local
community or patents. They also did not have a strong academic reputation like
Straven did. Therefore, although the school adopted an 'open roll policy' they did
not find it easy to attract students and, over the study, experienced a fall in student
numbers. By 1995 the roll had dropped below 500. The difficulties were made worse
by problems associated with student discipline and financing.
The school is looking good. I have also been tough on the kids, both how
they look and how they behave. This had led to a drop in vandalism and
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improvement in the school's image. Part of this is an attempt to market the
school to overseas students. But you can't predict how kids will behave.
Parents also tend to blame the problems experienced on the school, when most
of the problems are a reflection of the problems existing in the community
(Principal Aroha, July 1994).
Unlike the other schools studied, the Principal at Aroha was a woman. She described
her role as having four key functions: pastoral, leadership, visionary and political and
said that her concern for students was the main motivation to remain in the education
system. Her leadership style was quite different from the other principals interviewed
in that she placed a much stronger emphasis on her pastoral responsibilities. The
Principal also played an important political role as advocate for the school. Within the
local community the Principal was the 'front person' for the school and at a national
level the Principal actively opposed moves that would disadvantage the school and
monitored the changes in government education policy by regularly visiting
Wellington and actively confronting politicians.
At Aroha the School Executive Officer (EO) supervised all support staff, even
handling hiring of new staff when necessary. The EO began as the Principal's
secretary in 1979 but was appointed as EO in 1992. The EO had oversight for both
property and finance and the supervision of support staff, carrying direct responsibility
for property and grounds, tendering for maintenance contracts and monitoring the
budget. As such the EO was involved as part of the buildings and grounds committee
of the Board of Trustees.
The direct responsibility for accounting and finances was delegated to the Bursar.
She answered to the EO. The Bursar's responsibilities included collecting and
banking all cash, paying and coding invoices (which were then sent to Education
Services) and overseeing the balance on all government grant accounts. She was also
responsible for running the school stationery shop. Together with the EO the Bursar
was a member of the finance committee of the Board of Trustees. The Principal
restructured the financial and administrative procedures in the school so that teaching
staff were buffered.
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Teaching staff do not handle money. That is all handled by the Bursar now.
Teaching staff are inclined to lose money or leave it around where it could get
taken. So we have improved the system for cash control. Teaching staff do
not naturally consider financial issues so we attempted to institute systems to
help them be better managers (Principal Aroha, September 1993).
Because of the Principal's ability to co-opt people, Aroha was able to build a
reasonably solid Board of Trustees. Additional members were co-opted to provide
appropriate financial and property expertise and to provide representation from the
local Maori and Samoan communities. Aroha continued to employ the Canterbury
Education Services to act as secretary for the Board of Trustees. Both the Board and
the Principal adopted a very co-operative style, regularly involving parents, staff and
students in evaluating policies and programmes. The Principal appeared to have little
direct input to meetings although the Board paid a lot of attention to what she did say.
One might suspect that key issues were well discussed prior to the meetings. Much of
the work of the Board was conducted in committee. There were six committees:
finance, buildings and grounds, curriculum, personnel, student welfare and the
management group (which handles the disabled and the work experience units within
the school). While trustees attend these committees they were also attended by
teaching staff, ancillary staff and, in some cases, students. Decisions were made by
the committees and then reported to the Board of Trustees. The composition of the
Aroha Board of Trustees had been reasonably constant. There was no need for a
trustee election in 1995 as all of the previous parent representatives stood again
unopposed. The Board generally had the confidence of the teaching staff and were
seen as 'being thorough and doing a good job' (Comment from a trustee meeting
October 1994).
The increased autonomy and the freedom to make decisions at the school level rather
than having to seek approval from the Department of Education was seen as one of
the most positive features of the reforms.
I like the independence for making decisions that have come from the reforms
... the delegated autonomy of Tomorrow's Schools has allowed us to let our
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own contracts and employ our own carpenter and therefore bring minor
maintenance in-house (Principal Aroha, September 1993).
Funding continued to be a problem within the school and the financial situation
became worse in 1994 when the school lost the equity grant (see the section on Matai
school and appendix 4 for more details on this grant). Aroha was no longer
considered particularly deprived as this grant was targeted at the very worst schools
in the country. The Principal contacted the Ministry on a number of occasions to
argue that Aroha was a special case and that they should receive special funding.
However, she was unsuccessful and the school financial situation became worse.
The finance area has become a real concern. There is a noticeable and
growing gap between the rich and poor schools. This gap is particularly
noticeable in a socio-economic area like ours. We can't raise the local finance
that a richer school could. This also shows in our school fees. If we tried to
increase them much they just wouldn't get paid. We also have very few
overseas fee paying students. So these things are a struggle for us. I am also
concerned about how the system is changing. The equity grant system is
inadequate in meeting the special needs of schools such as ours. There is also
talk about changing the funding system to advantage large schools more
(Deputy Principal Aroha, July 1994).
Serious attempts were made by the school to attract local funding. Aroha approached
local business for support and the school ran a second-hand sale to raise some cash.
Aroha also let out school facilities to a commercial English language school and
reluctantly decided to seek foreign tee-paying students to assist the financial situation.
I have been forced to prostitute myself and advertise for overseas students in
an attempt to balance the books (Principal Aroha, September 1993).
There is no way that we should have to fund education for our kids by taking
in fee paying students from overseas. That is morally unacceptable. But the
reality is that there is probably no school in Christchurch that could balance
their budget if it didn't have overseas fee paying students. That is the reality.
We have seven or eight overseas students now and that will increase (Deputy
Principal Aroha, September 1995).
However, none of these initiatives solved the problem. Therefore, the Principal
argued that their financial situation was a central rather than a local problem and that
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the Ministry had to decide whether it wanted to fund the school adequately or close
them down.
Well, we made lots of cases to the Ministry but we are not regarded as a crisis
situation. Lots of schools are running deficits and I don't think they are
concerned quite frankly. What it means is that we have got no money in the
bank to look at maintenance and so (teaching) blocks are not going to be
painted and that sort of thing. So there are real problems here (Acting
Principal Aroha, September 1995).
I am philosophical about finance. I do the best I can with what we are given.
But if we go broke the government can bail us out or shut us down. They
have under-funded us so it is their problem not mine. I won't lose any sleep
over what I can't control (Principal Aroha, October 1994).
We are running a deficit budget this year. We had the Manager of Finance
from the Ministry of Education down here at a meeting. He asked how many
Principals were running a deficit budget and three quarters of us were. We
need $25,000 so we are probably one of the worst (Principal Aroha, October
1994).
Because Aroha was located in a less affluent neighbourhood there was a real concern
that some students would be denied a quality education because of other social,
behavioural or psychological needs that they had. Health and social welfare agencies
had experienced a reduction in their funding and were reluctant to assist in any but the
worst cases. In consequence many of the 'lesser incidents' were left to the schools to
deal with. School staff, particularly the Principal and the Deputy Principal, found
themselves acting as de-facto social workers which reduced their ability to address the
educational needs of the students.
We face so many demands. Although our job is to promote learning, schools
are expected to deal with issues of social welfare and health. Our kids cannot
leave these things at the gate when they come to school. If schools could only
be institutions of learning (which is what we should be) and not have to deal
with other matters we would do our job well (Deputy Principal Aroha, July
1994).
While teaching staff were buffered from the administrative responsibilities, they did
feel the effects of staff cuts. At the end of 1995 the Ministry told Aroha that the
school was going to lose a further 5.3 teaching positions in the next year. The
114
projected school roll for 1994 had been 600 students. However, on 1 July 1995 it
was discovered that Aroha only had 480 students enrolled. Therefore, the guaranteed
minimum staffing for 1996 dropped to staffing the school for a roll of 484. At the end
of the year the Acting Principal initiated a 'redeployment process'.
It is going to be a difficult term. Because we had a drop in the roll in the last
eighteen months we are going to lose 5 1/3 staff so we are going through a
redeployment round. It is still a very nasty process. We also lose positions of
responsibility - PR units. So people are going to be demoted within the school as
well. So it is a nasty situation and a very hard one to live through. I think that the
school staff have confidence in the process and if you have confidence in the
process and you make sure that the process is used that does help. But it affects all
staff. Not only do you have the people who lose their positions and lose PR units
but you have larger classes next year and people go who do all sorts of things
around the school which need to be picked up by the people who are left. There
are all sorts of implications which means that it affects everyone in actual fact.
Also because you have fewer numbers the whole funding is decreased and you
have got to look at your whole budget and areas like ancillary staff which takes
almost half of the schools' bulk grant budget. So you have got to look at making
reductions there.
(Acting Principal Aroha, September 1995).
6.5.3 Summary
The research revealed that at Aroha the reforms have proved to be a mixed blessing.
While the Principal and trustees welcomed the new autonomy and the freedom to
make decisions without consulting the Department of Education (as they had done in
the past), the local area was not particularly wealthy and the school found it hard to
raise funds. As a consequence, finance became an important focus within the school.
However, this was always secondary to the needs of the staff and students.
The Aroha Principal generally fitted what Laughlin et al.'s (1994a) managerial
pastoral headteacher category because although she took a direct role in managing the
reforms she also delegated many of the financial and administrative aspects to other
staff in the school. The finance and administrative tasks were transferred to the
Bursar and the Executive Officer, while the NZQA accreditation process was
managed by the Deputy Principal. The pastoral role of the Principal was emphasised
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more than any other school studied. However, it would be wrong to say that the
Principal distanced herself from the reforms. She created an explicitly political role
for herself as an advocate for the school at both a local and national level. Much of
this advocacy role was concerned with the financial position of the school, but it was
more than that. It also involved defending the reputation of the school in the local
community and co-opting individuals with the skills needed by the Board of Trustees.
By late 1995 there was a distinct shift in the attitude of the Principal towards the
reforms. When she found that they could not balance the budget, even though they
were taking on overseas students and leasing school facilities to outside bodies, she
argued that they faced a central funding problem which could not be resolved locally
and the government had to choose either to fund them sufficiently or to close them
down.
6.6 ANALYSIS OF SCHOOLS
The research model presented in Chapter Four provides the initial basis or 'set of
categories' (rebuttal, absorption, colonisation and evolution) for the interpretation of
the interview/discussions and observations of the researcher in relation to the schools
studied. Both the rebuttal and the evolution pathway were considered unlikely based
on the facts of the reform process (see Chapter Five Para 5.8). However, both
absorption and colonisation were possible.
The empirical evidence in this chapter suggests that there was an example of what
Laughlin (1991) called the re-orientation pathway. The reforms led to changes in the
way things had been done, but did not appear to have altered the core values of the
schools or directly impact the teaching process (which would be required for
evolution). This conclusion was based on a number of findings. First, the elected
trustees absorbed a considerable amount of the administrative workload delegated to
the schools under the reforms, effectively doing voluntarily what the Department of
Education and the local education boards had been paid to do (Gordon 1992b, p.
188). This absorbing role was particularly important in the areas of accounting and
property management. Second, in all of the schools studied there had been a
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significant change in the role of the principal within the school. While this was most
obviously the case at Matai, all of the principals interviewed found that they were
carrying a heavier administrative load and that their role had become more managerial
and less pastoral. At Deans and to a lesser extent Straven this process appeared to be
welcomed while at Aroha the process was resisted by a principal who argued that her
role should remain a mix of the pastoral and the managerial. Part of the pastoral role
involved shielding teaching staff from as much of the financial and administrative
responsibilities as possible. The third factor that indicated re-orientation was the
growing importance in all of the schools of administrative support staff. These
individuals were required to carry the responsibility for financial and property
management within the schools. The two high schools - Straven and Aroha, created
new positions and the two primary schools altered the role of the school secretary (in
the case of Matai) and teacher aid (in the case of Deans).
The absorbing process observed in this study showed a strong parallel with Laughlin
et al.'s (1994a) account of how schools responded to the LMS (Local Management of
Schools) reforms in the UK. Laughlin et al. (1994a) argued that small groups made
up of the headteacher, deputy teacher and supported by administrative and/or
secretarial staff were central in absorbing or managing the financial and administrative
responsibilities associated with LMS. While there were many similarities between the
responses in the schools studied and the responses of headteachers discussed in
chapter two, the only real example of an absorbing principal was Matai where there
was not the trustee support for the principal to delegate effectively. Once he
established his position and developed the necessary skills among the trustees, he
moved closer to the managerial educational 'type'. The absence of 'absorber' type
principals was a key difference between this project and the UK studies. One of the
discourse partners who had a long involvement in education argued that there had
been a number of 'absorber' type principals in the Christchurch area who had taken
early retirement or left education 'unable to cope' with the changes. On this basis one
could conclude the absorbing type was not viable in the long-term. However, this
proposition requires further research.
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The type of principal found in this study was the 'managerial' rather than the
'absorbing'. However, the types of managerial orientation identified by Laughlin et
al. (1994a) were difficult to find. The orientation of the principal at Aroha fitted both
the managerial pastoral and the managerial educational 'type' while the principals
from Deans and Straven fell somewhere between the managerial educational and the
managerial entrepreneurial types. While it seemed reasonably easy to distinguish
between absorbing and managerial principals, one might question whether the sub¬
categories are distinct. However, all of the principals interviewed expressed a strong
commitment to education and to the students and justified their actions in educational
terms.
.. .we only want to give our kids the same quality education that other kids get
(Principal Matai, October 1994).
So, on the basis of these case studies, the New Zealand education reforms generated a
re-orientation, closely paralleling the absorbing groups, which developed in the UK
schools. However there are a number empirical elements that were not fully captured
by the re-orientation model:
1. One Board of Trustees (at Deans) became an active force for change within the
school. A process that brought them into open confrontation with the teaching
staff.
2. The structural loss of the Department of Education as a significant steering media
and the impact of fragmenting its role into new organisations such as the NZQA
and EPvO is not addressed.
3. While teachers and teaching staff were relatively unaffected by the financial and
administrative changes implemented, they were deeply affected by the changes in
curriculum and assessment procedures.
The first issue highlights the theme in the Laughlin-Broadbent framework that the
absorbing group has the potential to turn into a colonising force within an
organisation. The dominant presence of management-orientated individuals at Deans
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caused a significant clash of values between the teaching staff and the trustees.
Teaching staff suggested that the trustees viewed the school as a business and
education as a product. It seems clear that these trustees succeeded in introducing
some changes into the school such as private sector management practices and
financial performance rewards. While many of these changes seemed to be tolerated
by the teaching staff, the threat to trial bulk-funding of salaries generated a strong and
vocal resistance from the teachers. While changes in the way the school operated
seemed to be acceptable; to give the trustees direct control over their salary, and
therefore over their job, was not acceptable. Therefore the attempt by the trustees to
introduce change into the school was unsuccessful and the Principal was forced to act
as mediator between the trustees and the teaching staff. Very few of the trustees
stood for re-election in 1995. One of those who was very keen to introduce change
was advised by the principal to "leave it for a term and maybe stand again next time"
(Principal Deans, December 1995). So although the trustees did have clear colonising
tendencies they were not able to overcome the resistance of the teaching staff. It is
interesting to note that the point of resistance was not an issue of how to teach but
about their own job security and income. Perhaps it is a threat to income and
therefore individual security that leads to resistance rather than a challenge to the
more abstract interpretative schemes / lifeworld values.
The restructure of the Department of Education highlighted the structural impact of
change. The elimination of the Department of Education and its replacement with a
Ministry, removed a major institutional buffer for teaching staff and schools. The
Department was a steering media, which monitored the performance, activities and
values of individual schools. It did this by controlling many aspects of how the school
operated such as setting staffing entitlements, salary levels and employee conditions
and defining curriculum. It took major responsibility for recruiting teachers and
exercised some control over procedures for appointments. The Department also had
a secondary role as a buffer between the political demands of government and the
needs of schools. As such it typified the progressive public administration values
described by Hood (1995). Because the Department of Education had a history of
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being lead by educationalists (Nash, 1989, p. 116) it shared with teaching staff a
common core of values. A telling comment on the change from the Department to
the Ministry of Education was made by one of the top managers at the Ministry who
observed "it is very hard to find an educationalist here when you need one these
days"! (Interview Ministry of Education, August 1994).
New external institutions were created by the reform process, which lacked the buffer
role that the Department of Education had and were intended to act as colonising
steering media. The ERO provided an assessment of school and trustee performance.
Any school that did not comply with the government requirement or was not deemed
to have effective student progress was identified and publicly reported. Schools had
no option but to comply with the requirements of these reports. Both the NZQA and
the Ministry of Education defined and regulated the school curriculum. These
steering media provided a continuing change influence and pressure for explicit
educational performance measurement within the schools studied.
The nature of the changes also proved to be an important factor in determining the
colonisation pathway. The introduction of financial accounting controls into the
schools appeared to have a limited impact on the school as a whole. Generally
accounting information played a planning and co-ordination role which was managed
by the 'absorbing group'. Initially it appeared that the Ministry of Education used the
accounting information to monitor individual schools. However, upon investigation,
it proved that the financial reports were not used for any decision making process at
the Ministry and no significant feedback was provided from the Ministry to the school
(Interview Ministry of Education, November 1994). The accounts did form part of
the published national accounts and fulfilled the statutory financial reporting
obligations of the school. By preparing and submitting financial accounts in
compliance with the Public Finance Act (1989) schools were seen to be accountable
and to be exercising sound governance and management practices. This finding was
consistent with Edwards et al. (1996a) who argued that accounting practices served
to structure visibility within UK schools. The primary objective of the accounting
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system was to provide legitimacy for both externally and internally initiated changes.
Further research is required on the question of the role and validity of the accounting
measurement and reporting in educational institutions.
While the administrative and financial reforms were absorbed by the principal,
administrative staff and/or trustees and only had a limited direct influence at the
teaching level, the curriculum reforms and NZQA changes had a real and significant
effect at the classroom level. Why were the administrative changes absorbed while
the changes to curriculum and teaching were not? Perhaps because the curriculum
and qualification changes directly impacted what teachers were required to deliver in
the classroom it was not possible to absorb the changes. This highlights a new area
for research. Perhaps change can only be absorbed when it does not directly impact
the 'real work' (Laughlin et al., 1994a, p.65). Change that does impact the 'real
work' is more likely to lead to colonisation and alter the interpretative schemes.
The next chapter introduces Section Three, which addresses the second and
contrasting contextual area studied in this dissertation, the institution of general
practice within the New Zealand health system. The health system illustrates the
theme of conflict between lifeworld values and managerialist reform initiatives as it
was subject to major structural and financial reforms. Chapter Seven analyses the
context of general practice in New Zealand and summarises the reforms implemented
between 1986 and 1993.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FORMING AND REFORMING THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The first section of this chapter describes the development of the New Zealand health
care system. While a complete summary of this process is clearly the subject of a
dissertation in itself (and one in another subject) an attempt is made to identify
lifeworld values that have played an important role in the establishment and evolution
of the New Zealand health system. It was necessary to provide a historical context in
order to analyse the objectives of the government in reforming the system and the
responses of the GPs studied to those reforms.
Much of the modern health system was the product of the 1938 Social Security Act
and particular attention is paid to the role of general practitioners in the formation of
that act and the system that developed. The second section of this chapter details the
relationship between the steering media (the State) and the system (GPs). As a result
of the confrontation between the GPs and the State in 1938 (see section 7.2), GPs
established high levels of autonomy and relatively little control from the State and a
relatively open-ended fee for service budget. Between the 1940s and the 1990s there
were a number of reform initiatives whereby the State attempted to gain more control
over GPs and to cap the open-ended fee-for-service budget. These skirmishes
demonstrated the ability (and inclination) of GPs to resist government initiatives
(colonisation forces), particularly initiatives that were likely to impact their autonomy
and/or income.
In 1991 the government announced a quasi-market structure for the health care
system. This structure became law in 1993 and fundamentally altered the funding
relationship between GPs and the government from the fee-for-service to a
contractual arrangement. The last section of this chapter describes how GPs in New
Zealand have responded collectively to the changes. While there were a number of
government documents that described the policy proposals, little study had been done
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in how the initiatives were developed and how they were implemented. Therefore the
content of the second and third sections of this chapter was substantially original
research. Other authors have been referred to where possible, however a significant
proportion of the material was drawn from interviews and unpublished
documentation.
7.2 HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE IN NEW ZEALAND
The State was involved in the provision of health services from the beginning of
European settlement in New Zealand. From 1841, civil servants designated as
Colonial Surgeons, or Health Officers, were appointed to each principal settlement to
meet the medical needs of the imprisoned, the insane, the impoverished and the
indigenous (Wellington Independent, 29 April 1846). Colonial hospitals were also
established by the State to "offer the fruits of Pakeha civilisation to the Maori" (Dept
of Health, 1974, p. 12) and to address the issue of native susceptibility to European
illnesses. During the provincial period (1854-76) benevolent societies were
established in various centres to organise health services for groups whose needs were
not met by the State. The benevolent societies were involved in the establishment of
hospitals, funded partly by local subscription and partly from the State and managed
by locally elected hospital boards.
The development of a comprehensive health system was hampered by the view that
hospitals were a place for the poor, and the wealthy were generally treated in their
own homes. However, by the 1920s the attitude towards the hospitals had changed
from the view that 'the hospital was an act of charity' to 'health care was the right of
all citizens' (Department of Health, 1974). This change was coupled with the fact that
the growing complexity of medical and surgical techniques made entry to hospitals
necessary for adequate treatment.
The first Labour Government was elected in New Zealand in 1935 and it remained in
office until 1949. Crucial to their election success was the promise of wide ranging
social and economic reforms, of which the reform of health care formed a small but
significant part. The Labour Government recognised the need for a change in the
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provision and availability of health care services and sought to implement a tax-funded
health system which would provide all citizens with access to free health care on the
basis of need. The policies of the Government were to establish:
a) a universal general practitioner service, free to all members of the community
requiring medical attention,
b) free hospital or sanatorium treatment for all,
c) free mental hospital care and treatment for the mentally afflicted,
d) free medicines and
e) free maternity treatment, including the cost of maintenance in a maternity home.
7.2.1 General Practice
The policy of free access to health services promoted by the government was strongly
resisted by doctors in the form of the New Zealand branch of the British Medical
Association (B.M.A). The doctors saw the State funding of health care as a threat,
undermining their direct, fee-for-service, relationship with their clients, and as a means
of giving the State a long-term stake in the oversight and control of their work.
As a result of the stance of the B.M.A. there was a three year struggle (1935-1938)
between the doctors and the State. The struggle was resolved with a partial
compromise. All citizens would have tree access to public hospital care financed from
taxation, while tax financed subsidies were made available to those choosing to use
private hospitals. Primary health care would not be directly funded by the State.
Instead, subsidies would be paid by the State covering the cost of consultation and
prescribed pharmaceuticals. These subsidies were gradually extended to cover a
range of other diagnostic and therapeutic services utilised by GPs. This compromise
between the State and the doctors became enshrined in the 1938 Social Security Act.
In defence of their right to charge a fee-for-service the medical profession managed to
entrench a high level of autonomy and control. This was most obvious in primary
health care. General practitioners enjoyed the right to practice where they chose, as
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they chose, for the price they chose, while being able to draw on state subsidies for
their fees and for resources, especially pharmaceuticals, used in the practice of
medicine. As patients required a referral from a GP before they could use state-
funded secondary services, the GPs were effectively enfranchised as the gatekeepers
to secondary care services and to the services of other health care providers such as
physiotherapists. This system placed the GP in a position of power and created a split
between the funding of GP based primary care services and the funding of hospital
based secondary care services (Fougere, 1993).
7.2.2 Lifeworld Implications
The development of the New Zealand health care system in the 1930s did not have the
strong religious influence found in other countries or in the development of the New
Zealand education system. However, it is possible to identify two key values that
formed the basis of the system. The first value was expressed by the State and was
that health care was the right of all citizens. This 'value' became quite central to the
health system as it developed. The other (perhaps contradictory) value was the right
of the medical profession to practice without being in a direct accountability
relationship with the State. Because the GPs retained the subsidised fee-for-service
arrangement, they were not employed by the State, but claimed the fee-for-service
subsidies on their patients behalf. This maintained the autonomy of the medical
profession and protecting them from direct control by the State.
7.3 REFORM OF HEALTH CARE
After the establishment of the Social Security Act 1938 the New Zealand health sector
grew rapidly in size and cost. While the growth in health care expenditure was
considered acceptable in times of economic prosperity, the economic crisis that
emerged from the middle of the 1970s led to significant attention being devoted to
curbing public sector expenditure. The health care system was subject to criticism
which was expressed in several major reports. In 1974 the Labour Government's
White Paper, A Health Service for New Zealand, advocated major reform of the
health care system to achieve greater cost-effectiveness. The 1974 White Paper
125
proposed the regionalisation of health services through the creation of 14 Regional
Health Authorities. Initially the Regional Health Authorities were to be responsible
for publicly provided hospital and public health services but this was to extend to
primary care in the longer term. Although these proposals were bitterly resisted by
the medical profession and seemed to be shelved after a change of government in
1975, the idea of regionalisation and the integration of the split between primary and
secondary health services continued to gain political support. In 1983 the National
Government introduced the legislation to enable the formation of regionalised health
organisations known as Area Health Boards. However, it was not until 1989 that all
of the Hospital Boards were dissolved and Area Health Boards were fully
implemented.
During the 1980s two more reports were produced: The Health Benefits Review'
(<Choices) in 1986 and The Report of the Task Force on Hospital and Related
Services2 (The Gibbs Report) in 1988. Choices was concerned with the options for
funding and purchasing health care and offered two broad alternatives. First, the
government would remain the dominant funder of health care, but services would be
provided on a competitive basis from private and public providers. Second, the
government would remain the residual funder of health care, to ensure access for all
individuals to health services, but most of the funding would come through regulated
private insurers and health maintenance organisations. The second option, involving
compulsory health insurance and private provision, was rejected by the Labour
Government.
In 1988 the Labour Government commissioned die Hospital and Related Services
Taskforce to produce a review of the existing New Zealand public hospital services.
The taskforce were asked to examine the existing structure of the health system and
to propose an overall programme of reform. Their report entitled Unshackling the
1 Scott C., Fougere G. and Marwick J. (1986).
2 Gibbs A., Fraser D. and Scott J. (1988).
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Hospitals was released in April 1988 and became know as the 'The Gibbs Report'
after its chairman Mr Alan Gibbs.
The Gibbs Report targeted three key areas within public hospitals which needed
attention: poor management performance, lack of management information and the
need for restructuring to create a competitive market for health. The taskforce was
critical of the existing triumvirate model of management where responsibility rested
with three executives: a nurse, a doctor and an administrator, rather than with a single
chief executive. The taskforce claimed that this structure led to poor management
relationships, poor decision making and inefficient organisations. The central
negotiation of staff salaries and conditions by the Health Services Personnel
Commission (HSPC) was seen as detrimental to productivity. Central negotiation and
triumvirate management were replaced in the State Services Act (1988) and the 1988
amendment to the Area Health Board Act (1983). All public organisations were
required to have a single general manager responsible for performance and the HSPC
was disbanded and the responsibilities were delegated to the individual institutions.
The taskforce stated that it was impossible to evaluate the current efficiency of health
care organisations with the lack of costing and management accounting information
and considered this to be another major short-coming of this sector.
The most radical of the recommendations made by the taskforce was the creation of a
competitive market for health. It argued that the dual obligations of the Area Health
Boards to 'purchase' and to 'provide' health services were inconsistent. This proposal
was foreshadowed in the options outlines in Choices and the suggestion of more
private sector involvement in the provision of health care. The thinking of the
taskforce was also influenced by key Treasury staff who had already shown their
support for a competitive market in health care (Treasury, 1987, p. 159).
The structural reforms proposed by the taskforce sparked considerable debate
throughout the country. Although the fourth Labour Government chose not to
implement any of the major structural changes recommended in either of the two
reports, it did follow a direction more in line with the Choices recommendations. The
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Minister of Health of the 1987 Labour Government chose to continue with the
establishment of Area Health Boards. As part of the push for greater efficiency
rudimentary performance contracts were introduced between the Minister of Health
and Area Health Boards. Each board was required to sign performance orientated
accountability agreements (Ashton, 1992, p. 149).
December 1990 saw an election and a resulting change in government from the
Labour to the National Party. Although the National Party's slogan for the election
campaign was 'Creating a Decent Society', it immediately revealed a policy of
targeting welfare and reducing public expenditure. Before the end of December the
newly elected Government established yet another health sector task force to 'identify
and investigate the options for defining the roles of the government, the private
sector, and individuals in funding, provision and regulation of health services'3. The
taskforce didn't release a report to the public, however they did produce a document
(known as the April Report) which was based on the earlier work of Choices and
Gibbs. The April Report outlined a number of options for the future of the health
system, and formed the basis of a later government strategy paper - Your Health and
the Public Health (Upton, 1991), generally known as the Green and White Paper.
This was released in July 1991 as a 'statement of government policy for reform of the
New Zealand health care system' (Upton, 1991). The Paper announced that all Area
Health Boards were to split into separate purchaser (Regional Health Authorities) and
provider (Crown Health Enterprises) organisations. All state owned hospitals become
Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) and were required to contract, on a competitive
basis, with Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) for state funds. RHAs would receive
a population based funding pool and would be responsible for purchasing health
services for a geographical area.
3
Description of the task as outlined in the Terms of Reference for the taskforce published as Annex 1 in Upton
(1991).
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The health sector taskforce did not seek public submissions and its activities were not
publicised. Therefore most the details of its activities and the relationship between the
taskforce and the subsequent Government policy document only became evident
through a series of personal interviews with key taskforce members (see Barnett and
Jacobs, 1997). In theory, several issues raised in the Green and White Paper were
open to public discussion: how the new system would be funded (from government or
from some form of social insurance), the nature and definition of core health services;
and the concept of health care plans as a competitive alternative to the RHAs.
However, in reality most of the key decisions had already been made and there was
relatively little opportunity for the public to influence the proposals. Easton (1994)
maintained that this was an intentional device on the part of the Government, a device
he called 'Policy Blitzkrieg'. Under this approach political pressures from special
interest groups (principally the medical profession) and from the public as a whole
could be reduced by moving rapidly through the proposal and implementation stages.
As soon as the Green and White Paper was presented to parliament in 1991, the
Government began to take steps to implement the proposals (Easton, 1994, p. 224).
The essential features of the Green and White Paper, with the exception of the
proposed health care plans, were incorporated into the Health and Disability Services
Act 1993. A number of other organisations were established as part of the 1993 Act.
The two main ones were the Core Services Committee and the Public Health
Commission. The Core Services Committee (The National Advisory Committee on
Core Health and Disability Support Services) was an independent advisory committee
appointed by the Ministry of Health. They were required to advise the Minister of
Health on the services which New Zealanders could expect to receive from a publicly
funded health care system. In reaching their conclusions the Core Services
Committee were required to consult widely with the public and with health and
disability support professionals. This original concept of generating a public
consensus on what services should and should not be provided by the State effectively
failed (Cummings, 1994) and the Core Services Committee focused instead on the
development of a series of best practice guidelines.
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The public health responsibilities of the Department of Health were separated under
the 1993 Act and became the responsibility of the Public Health Commission. It was
considered that a centralised public health body would provide better planning and co¬
ordination of initiatives than the RHAs. The Commission's role was to assess public
health needs and to advise the Minister of Health on policy. The Commission did not
provide any health services themselves but purchased services from providers on
behalf of the government. In 1995 the Minister of Health decided to re-absorb the
Public Health Commission into the Ministry of Health.
In July 1993 the Department of Health was restructured into a policy advice unit
(Health Amendment Act 1993, Sec 38) known as the Ministry of Health. The
restructure of the Department of Health resulted in a number of new organisations
which were previously part of the Department, two of which relate directly to general
practice. The first, Pharmac, was formerly the Health Department's drug tariff unit.
It became a separate organisation which was owned by the four RHA's. Pharmac
negotiated with pharmaceutical companies for the subsidy level for each medicine on
the pharmaceutical schedule.
The second, Health Benefits Ltd, was formerly the Benefits Payment Office of the
Health Department. This was also owned by the four RHA's. Health Benefits Ltd
(HBL) administered, on behalf of the RHAs, all the primary care subsidies that were
paid to providers. Examples of provider groups paid by HBL are general
practitioners, laboratories, midwives and practice nurses subsidies. Health Benefits
Ltd also acted as the clearing house for the processing of GP prescriptions and
therefore providing information on GP prescribing behaviour. Currently HBL is
responsible for a post-payment claim audit programme intended to identify any cases
of fraud. This resulted in a prison sentence for a GP who was convicted of fraud (NZ
Doctor, 9 June 1995, p. 9).
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7.4 GENERAL PRACTICE - GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES
7.4.1 Social Security Act 1938
The basis for the State subsidy of general practice was established as part of the 1930s
negotiation between the State and the medical profession. The General Medical
Services Benefit (GMS) was available to any medical practitioner who provided
medical services for patients. Essentially, any registered practitioner could claim the
GMS. There were also a number of other benefits that could be claimed: travelling
fees, rural practice bonus, immunisation fee and fees payable in respect of general
medical services provided on public holidays and at night. Additional subsidies were
also available for the employment of practice nurses4 and attendance at maternity
cases. Although the State provided funding for the medical services there was little
attempt to control how or where GPs practised. Individual GPs were free to set up
their practice wherever they liked and to practice medicine as they chose.
The subsidy system was intended to ensure that the public had free access to medical
care but this was never strictly the case. From the beginning patients were required to
pay part of the cost of a visit to the GP. The subsidies were subject to regular
revision, through the Social Security (Medical Fees) Regulations, but did not keep
pace with levels of inflation and the real value of the GMS fell from around 75% of
the total fee when it was first introduced in the 1930s to less than 20% in 1992
(Ashton, 1992, p. 149).
4
Currently this stands at $11 per hour for 30 hours a week. Which leaves the GPs paying out of practice income
about $235 per week for a full time practice nurse.
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Table 7.1: G13 Change Timeline
1938 Social Security Act (1938) - the establishment of the 'access by
need' health system.
1986 Commerce Act (1986) - GPs free to advertise
1990 GP contracts
1992 Restructure of the GP subsidy system
1992 Uniservices report on the formation of Independent Practice
Associations (IPAs)
1993 Health and Disability Services Act (1993): the separation of
purchaser and provider. GPs required to contract with local
Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) rather than the State.
7.4.2 Commerce Act 1986
The first major change to influence general practice was the deregulation of the
primary health market. The aim of the Commerce Act (1986) was to promote
competition in New Zealand markets. Under the provisions of this act it became
possible for doctors to advertise and to take a more market approach to the provision
of primary health care. It was expected that this would introduce an element of
competition into the health care market.
7.4.3 July 1990 Budget and 1990 GP contracts
From 1989 the Labour Government was involved in an internal policy debate on how
to fund and manage primary care services. Much of this debate centred on the
Primary Care Project Group within the Department of Health and in the Office of the
Minister of Health. The work of this group was driven by both equity and economic
concerns. From an equity perspective the group focused on the growing cost to
patients of visiting a GP and they were concerned that this cost might represent a
barrier to access, particularly for people on low income. From an economic
perspective the project group were influenced by the NPM contracting models
promoted by Treasury and the fact that formal performance contracts were
successfully established between the Area Health Boards and the Minister of Health.
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Within New Zealand there were only a few medical practices that had formal
contracts and were funded on a capitated rather than a fee for service basis. These
practices were generally run by one of the trade unions and provided subsidised
medical services to their members while paying the GP an annual salary. These
practices provided a model for the proposed change in the GP funding structure.
Under the proposal GPs would be funded on a direct contract rather than subsidised
through the existing GMS system. Unpublished project group discussion papers
outlined five objectives of a GP contract:
1. Better access for users (financial, time, geographical, cultural, knowledge of
entitlements).
2. Move towards population-based care; more health promotion and health
protection.
3. More attention towards quality assurance and improved quality in primary medical
care.
4. Better management of government expenditure on primary health care (one
implication was that government needed better information about what was
happening in primary medical care).
5. Control of government expenditure on primary medical care and on referred
services.
(Unpublished Papers, 1989 - Primary Care Working Group: Ministry of Health).
In the budget of July 1990 the Minister of Health publicly announced the concept of
GP contracts and offered GPs who would sign a contract with her a higher level of
government funding. The funding was such that all patients who visited a contract
practice received free services. The provisions of the contracts are summarised in
Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2: The 1990 GP Contract Provisions - Ministry of Health (1990)
Provisions of the Standard Contract for the Provision ofMedical Services 19/90)
1. General obligations of general practice
Each practice must comply with the New Zealand Health Charter, the attached codes of
General Practice and Nursing Services and participate in a programme of quality assurance.
They had to co-operate with other bodies in the achievement of "The New Zealand Health
Goals and Targets". Practices had to provide 'appropriate' range of primary health care
services. Any new employees or associates who joined the practice later are required to accept
the contract also.
2. Obligations to provide primary health care information
Each practice was required to actively co-operate with the collection of information on patient
details (name, address, patient number, sex, occupation and ethnic group), claim records
(patient number, claim details and treatment referrals). On a periodic basis the Director-
General could request any information for monitoring health goals and policy and practice
records could be accessed for audit purposes.
3. Obligations to effectively administer primary health care
Each practice was required to fill in any forms or comply with any administrative
requirements deemed necessary.
4. Obligation on Fees
The practice was not permitted to charge lees in excess of those stipulated by the Minister.
Subsidies would be adjusted according to the Consumer price index. Each practice was
required to display the current schedule of fees for the public to see.
5. Obligation on nursing services
The Minister would pay the practice nurses salary at 90% of the award agreement. Each
practice nurse has to provide a range of specified clinical and promotion/educational services.
Practice nurses were also required to report on patient contact and services provided,
participate in ongoing continuing education and in quality assurance activities.
6. Rural bonus
An annual cash grant would be available to practices who have significant consultations and
were isolated from other GPs and from the nearest general hospital.
7. Termination of contract
Three months notice was required by either party for termination of the contract. The practice
was also obliged to notify the Director-General if there was a significant change in the
structure of the practice.
The 1990 GP contract contrasted sharply with those introduced in the UK. While
there was some attempt in New Zealand to define and influence the role of the
practice nurse there was no real attempt to define GP behaviour or the nature of
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general practice. The principal obligation was a restriction on practice fees,
compliance with ethical codes and provision of additional information to the
Department of Health. The GP contract scheme was formally abolished by the
National Government from March 1991.
7.4.4 1991 Green & White Paper and Health and Disability Services Act 1993
In 1990 the newly elected National Government rejected the health policies and
reforms of the previous Labour Government and turned to the quasi-market models
advocated in the Choices and the Gibbs Reports. Although the 1991 policy paper
Your Health and the Public Health made little or no reference to general practice,
interviews conducted with the taskforce members and data extracted from the
taskforce files indicate a considerable interest in primary health (see Barnett and
Jacobs, 1997). References were made to studies of managed competition, GP
fundholding as developed in the UK, and a strong emphasis was placed on the
integration of public budgets for both primary and secondary care:
The Government plans to integrate the funding for all personal health services
- visits to doctors, prescriptions, other community based services, hospital
services - and to place the responsibility for managing all this funding with the
Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) . . . (Upton, 1991, p. 41).
As the RHAs held the budget for both primary and secondary services GPs would be
required to establish some form of direct contract with their local RHA. Upton
(1991) presented five different forms that the contracts between GPs and the RHAs
might take:
• Saiaries - salary contracts are often accompanied by performance agreements
which specify what hours should be worked and what responsibilities should
be fulfilled.
• Fee-for-service - Under this arrangement the provider is paid a fee for each
consultation or procedure. Sometimes the doctor sets this fee; sometimes it is
a fixed amount negotiated between the doctor and the insurer or government
agency which pays the fee.
• Capitation - the doctor or other care provider is paid an annual fee for each
patient enrolled in their practice.
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• Risk-sharing contracts - doctors can be placed on contracts under which they
bear a share of the cost of any prescriptions, diagnostic tests, hospital
admissions, and so on, which they order for their patients. These kind of
contracts can be used to encourage doctors to choose cost-effective care for
their patients, and strive to prevent their patients needing high-cost care.
• Budget-holding contracts - budget-holding is a type of risk sharing contract.
The doctor is given an annual budget for each client enrolled with their
practice, and required to meet all of the costs of their prescriptions, diagnostic
tests, and perhaps the costs of some other referrals, from this budget. This
type of contract, with some modifications has been introduced in some general
practices in the United Kingdom.
(Upton, 1991, p.48).
The Health and Disability Services Act 1993 translated the government policies into
law. Although most of this Act was concerned with the structure and operation of
hospital services, GPs were included as a 'provider' of health services. Each GP had
to negotiate a purchase agreement with their local RHA. The nature of the agreement
was flexible and there was no restriction within the Act on the type of 'purchase
agreement' which a RHA could establish or the kind of 'provider' from which they
could purchase.
Some concern was expressed by the NZMA (New Zealand Medical Association) that
certain GPs might be unwilling to enter into explicit purchase agreements with the
RHAs. In order to maintain the continuity of services for patients of such GPs a
special provision was made under Section 51 of the Health and Disability Services Act
for a pseudo contract.
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Table 7.3: Section 51 Health and Disability Services Act 1993
Arrangements relating to payments for health and disability services
(1) Where the Public Health Commission or a Regional Health Authority gives notice of
the terms and conditions on which the Commission or authority will make a payment
to any person or persons, and, after notice is given, such payment is accepted by any
such person from the Commission or Authority, then—
(a) Acceptance by the person of the payment shall constitute acceptance by the person
of the terms and conditions: and
(b) Compliance by the person with the terms and conditions may be enforced by the
Commission or Authority as if the person had signed a deed under which the
person agreed to the terms and conditions.
Regional Health Authorities were permitted to publish what is known as 'Section 51
notices' specifying a set of terms and conditions of medical service. A GP who
refused to sign a formal contract could make a subsidy claim under Section 51
without signing any contract.
The effect of the Section 51 provision was that formal contracts were voluntary and
GPs could choose to maintain an effective status quo by claiming under the Section
51 provision. The Section 51 agreements were to remain in force for two and a half
years and conditions could not be changed within that time without agreement by both
parties. Individual GPs could withdraw from the coverage of the notice by giving
four weeks notice. After the 1 July 1995 the RHA could change the agreement with
six months notice to the GP. However, by 1995 the RHAs did not show much
interest in changing this arrangement as a significant proportion of GPs (over 60%)
were already operating under a formal contract.
7.4.5 Patient targeting and charging
In 1991 the newly appointed Minister of Health announced that the existing GP
subsidy would be cut. Medical subsidies were restricted to children, beneficiaries, the
old and the chronically ill. Under this system subsidies were based upon targeting and
patient means testing, so government subsidies for GP visits were only available for
high users, those with 'low income' and children (Ashton, 1992, p. 146).
137
The subsidy system was announced in the 1991 budget and came into force from 1
February 1992. Subsidy entitlement was based on what was initially called a
'Kiwicard' and was later renamed the 'Community Services Card'. Those who
received a welfare benefit paid by Income Support Services were automatically issued
with a Community Services Card. Other individuals had to apply for one. Although
application forms were held by GPs, the cards were managed by the National
Community Card Centre (a unit of the Income Support Service). In order to qualify
for a card joint family income had to be below a specified level (e.g. Single $16,500
p.a., Married $26,000 - as at 1995).
High use and chronically ill patients were also subsidised. If a patient with an ongoing
condition visited their GP (or hospital outpatients) more than twelve times within
twelve months they qualified for a High User Card and experienced the same subsidies
as those with the Community Services Cards. Patients applied for a High User Card
through their GP but the cards were processed and managed by Health Benefits Ltd
for the RHAs.
There were three major benefits of holding a card. First, adult patients were
subsidised $15 per GP visit (children under 5 get $25 and children over 5 get $20).
Adults that did not hold a card did not get subsidised (although children are subsidised
$15). Second, card holders were only required to pay a $3 part-charge for
prescription item while others paid a $15 charge per item. Third, those who held a
card received free outpatient treatments at public hospitals.
The targeting system was a mix of social concern (access to health care for the poor)
and Treasury economic logic (financial incentives, cost-shifting from the State to the
public). It might seem strange that so much effort was devoted to restructuring this
system with the 1991 proposals under way. However there were two reasons for this:
1. The subsidy restructure was an attempt to save money (Examiner, Feb. 21 1991:
p. 1) or at least cap the growing public health budget (Scott, 1992) at a time that
the government thought that they were in a financial crisis (Scott et al., 1990).
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2. The targeted system represented the status quo prior to the 1993 restructure and
therefore formed the basis for all of the Section 51 agreements and the starting
point for all contract negotiations between GPs and the RHAs. So although the
system was no longer mandatory from 1993, it did have a significant influence on
the subsequent agreements.
7.5 GENERAL PRACTICE - PROFESSIONAL RESPONSES
The New Zealand medical profession rarely took a passive response to governmental
initiatives. This was clearly illustrated in the historical role of the medical profession
in the structure of the 1938 system and the formation of the GMS benefit. In the light
of this historical tension there was surprisingly little response to the Commerce Act
(1986). The main reason for this was that the Commerce Act (1986) had a very
broad scope. It applied to all companies and all professional groups. Its implications
for the medical profession did not become evident until some time after the Act was
passed.
The Commerce Act (1986) had a limited impact on general practice. Most
practitioners were reluctant to compete or advertise and there has been no visible
impact on fee levels (Bell and Fay, 1991). However, there was a small number of GPs
who responded eagerly to the new opportunities and a number of new central city
practices which advertised extensively, opened longer than usual hours and offered set
price fees. These practices tended to be regarded with disdain by other GPs (Kearns
and Barnett, 1992).
There was no doubt that the 1990 contract was intended to directly impact on GPs.
The response was immediate, vocal and wary (Press, July 25 1990, p. 3). The
Minister of Health stated that she did not choose to consult with the medical
profession in the development of the GP contracts because of "their aversion to
restrictive charges" (National Business Review, 26 July 1990, p. 3).
Some GP practices chose to accept the contracts seeing immediate financial and
access benefits for patients, some were strongly opposed seeing a threat to their
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autonomy and an intrusion by the State. The 'opposition' group said that they were
suspicious about signing any contract that limited their fees because they did not trust
that the Government would fulfil their end of the agreement and keep subsidies in line
with inflation (Press, 27 July 1990). Initially some of the executives of the NZGPA
(New Zealand General Practitioner Association) supported the concept of contracts,
however, because of the resistance to the contract proposal within the membership,
most of these people were removed from office and replaced by others who strongly
opposed the contracts. The NZMA (New Zealand Medical Association) and the
NZGPA took the Minister of Health to court, arguing that a direct contract with the
State was a threat to the primary relationship between the GP and the patient. While
the NZMA and NZGPA lost their case, the combined resistance to the contracts and
the change in government in 1990 saw an end to the contract scheme. However,
relationships between the government and the GPs were seriously soured as a result
of this conflict.
It is not surprising, following the 1990 experiences that the proposals of 1991 and
subsequent legislation in 1993 were also regarded with suspicion and, in some cases,
outright fear by many GPs. The introduction of the RHA into the funding process
and the requirement for GPs to contract directly with 'the State' was also perceived
as a threat to GP autonomy and control:
We fear an amoeba-like Health Department with its pseudopodia interfering
even more with our prescribing, our diagnostic investigations and our ability
to help our patients (Marshall, 1992).
The response of the medical profession to the 1991/1993 changes took many forms.
However, a key change was the proposal and formation of IPAs (Independent
Practice Associations).
7.5.1 IPAs
The competitive threat from new entrepreneurial practices had provided the incentive
for doctors to group together and establish after-hours practices in many places
around the country. Therefore, establishing a collective front was seen as a sensible
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response to the requirement to contract with RHAs and the 'threat' from the
1991/1993 changes to their funding arrangements.
In June 1992 a group of academics based at the University of Auckland were jointly
commissioned by the New Zealand General Practitioners Association (NZGPA) and
the Health Reforms Directorate to advise on the formation of policy for primary
health care in the new environment. They recommended that 'providers' organise
themselves into groups called Independent Practice Associations (IPAs) as an
effective way to address the financial and managerial complexities faced by GPs, to
maintain the autonomy of GP practices, to reduce potential transaction and
administrative costs and to facilitate risk sharing between the health providers and the
RHAs (UniServices, 1992, p. 9).
To some extent the concept of the IPA was similar to the Stockle and Reiser (1992)
suggestion that medical professionals could adopt unionisation, for the purpose of
bargaining with institutions or purchasers, as a way of protecting themselves against
change and the threat of corporatization. The Health Reforms Directorate, who were
responsible for driving the reforms, had no clear idea of how primary health
contracting would operate. The concept of IPAs was sold to the Health Reforms
Directorate by GPs who argued that IPAs would provide an effective way to pass the
risks associated with the open-ended fee-for-service payments from the RHAs to the
primary health care providers. The IPAs were also promoted as an effective way to
simplify the process of negotiating contracts. In effect, the IPA would act as an agent
in the contract negotiation between member GPs and the RHA. Therefore the RHA's
contracting costs would be cut as they would only need to contract with a few IPAs
as compared to hundreds of GPs. There were also strong incentives for GPs to group
together. Malcolm (1993) argued that there were six different factors which
motivated the development of the IPAs from a GP perspective:
(1) Providing some protection for GP interests;
(2) A stronger negotiating body with the RHAs for the development of services;
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(3) Through budget holding the GPs would be able to provide a more flexible range
of services for their patients;
(4) Improving patient care through working more collaboratively with other providers
including nurses, CHEs etc.;
(5) Shifting the balance of care from secondary to primary and;
(6) Improving the health of patients and community.
Factors (1) and (2) were linked with the fear of the changes and the threat of
interference to medical autonomy. Malcolm (1993) indicated that many GPs thought
that they would be 'left alone to get on with the job' if they were a part of a large
group. Factors (3), (4) and (6) were concerned with improving the quality of medical
services and 'being better doctors'. Factor (6) involved both obtaining resources and
political action. This showed the potential of the IPAs to become an active change
agent rather than just a passive change absorber. Later work conducted by Malcolm
& Powell (1996) found some empirical support for factors (1) protection and (2)
negotiating contracts. Research conducted by Forsearch (1995) also came up with a
similar conclusion.
In 1995 about 40 IPAs were established around the country and over 50% of the GPs
were members. Two different types of IPA emerged: one was provider orientated
and the other was patient orientated. Most of the IPAs were of the first type and
were based around a provider grouping in a specific geographic area. Generally these
were focused on GPs but some also included practice nurses, midwives and other
primary care providers in their membership The, second type of IPA. was based
around a specific group of patients. These commonly involved Non-European ethnic
groups and offered alternative services in addition to those provided by most general
practices. One example of this kind of IPA was the health centre based on the
Kirikiriroa Marae in Hamilton. This was a capitated centre with approximately 1500
people on the register, many of whom had a particularly poor health status. The
health centre provided free or low cost health services based on the patient's ability to
pay. It was staffed by a full time GP, a community health worker and a nurse. The
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local Kaumatua also provided spiritual advice and traditional Maori medicine as
required.
7.6 SUMMARY
In many ways the Social Security Act (1938), can be seen as pivotal in the emergence
of the modern health care system in New Zealand and is important in establishing the
concept of 'access by need' as a core lifeworld value in health care. However, from
this early point GPs challenged the state/steering media initiatives in order to ensure
their autonomy and financial security. From the 1940's to the early 1990s there were
a series of initiatives to restrict this GP autonomy and the open-ended financial
obligation of the state connected with it. These initiatives culminated in the Health
and Disability Services Act 1993 which required GPs to negotiate a formal contract
for their service with their local Regional Health Authorities (RHA).
While the New Zealand GPs had been able to generate a rebuttal pathway in relation
to the 1990 contract proposal, they did not have the power to reverse the structural
changes implemented in 1993. By the time that they identified the threat the changes
were firmly entrenched in Government policy. The explicit intention to exclude the
medical profession from the policy process meant that the reforms were not the
product of a process of open discourse and the weight of the better argument.
Therefore it is not particularly credible to argue that the reforms were an example of
the evolution pathway. The reform of the New Zealand health system dislocated the
existing steering media arrangements and the equilibrium between the State and the
GPs. Under the new arrangements a equilibrium needed to be re-established. The
obligation to negotiate a formal contract with the RHA represented a new form of
financial control and visibility for the GPs and a perceived threat to their professional
autonomy. Under the Laughlin (1991) model, a change in steering media will lead to
either a re-orientation or a colonisation pathway. This is consistent with the UK
studies of GP reform analysed in Chapter Three. Laughlin et al. (1994b) found that
the new responsibilities arising from the UK GP contract led to a reorientation within
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the practices studied where the changes were absorbed by the practice nurses and
practice managers.
The next chapter explores how the changes were managed in five New Zealand GP
practices. Based on the studies of the UK health reform described in Chapter Three
and the analysis of the New Zealand reforms in this chapter, one could expect an
example of the reorientation or the colonisation pathway. The exact nature of this
change process will depend on whether the new responsibilities were absorbed by
specialist work groups within the practices or whether the creation of IPAs as an
intermediate organisation between the GPs and the RHA introduced a new element
into the relationship. Based on Laughlin et al. (1994a), it seems that such a group has
the potential to manage the perceived threat to GP autonomy and income, protecting
the 'core work' of the GP practice.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF CHANGE:
FIVE CASE STUDIES OF GP PRACTICES
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to describe and analyse the five GP practices studied
and how the practices 'managed' the reform changes they experienced. This chapter
contributes the empirical 'flesh' to the Laughlin-Broadbent model of change pathways
and absorbing work groups. The reforms described in the previous chapter were
perceived as a threat to the lifeworld values, the autonomy and the income of GPs.
Therefore, since GPs were unable to rebut the changes it was expected that they
would attempt to resist the change in some way. However, it was also clearly
possible that the reforms may produce fundamental changes in the 'real work' of the
medical practitioners and result in the process of colonisation.
The research interviews began in September 1993. By this time the 1990 GP
contracts had been abolished, although there was a legacy of tension and distrust
between GPs and the State. This tension was highlighted when one GP stated:
The Government has historically been malevolent, not supporting GPs. They
have taken a publicly derogatory approach, suggesting that GPs are ripping off
the system to the tune of about $40,000 each (GP1 Practice Three, November
1993).
The Commerce Act, 1986 altered the work environment for GPs. Prior to 1986, GPs
and other professional groups were exempt from the legislation prohibitmg price
fixing arrangements and anti-competitive behaviour. Ethical restrictions tightly
defined what was considered acceptable advertising and promotion for a GP even to
the point of defining the lettering size permitted for signs. The introduction of the
Commerce Act, 1986 was part of a shift away from protection for professional
groups. Since the Act GPs have operated in a more contestable and competitive
environment.
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GPs experienced increased competition from both 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. In terms
of 'outsiders', other professional groups, such as midwives, have gained much more
recognition and acceptance. Following the Nurses Amendment Act 1990 midwives
were able to establish themselves independently of GPs and claim full subsidies for
delivery and maternity care. This move brought the midwives into direct competition
with the many GPs who also provided maternity services and the drop in maternity
cases attended by GPs was directly traced to the growth in independent midwives.
Practice nurses have also expressed an interest in establishing independent practices.
This has also been combined with political pressure to allow other professional groups
prescribing rights (Shaw, 1994). While this did not move beyond the discussion
stage, it placed GPs under direct competitive pressure and generated a clear defensive
reaction (see NZ Doctor, 1 September 1990).
Increased competition also came from 'insiders' within the medical profession. A few
GPs saw the change process as an opportunity to earn more money and adopted a
more entrepreneurial approach to medical care. Most commonly this involved
establishing practices in the high traffic central city areas, advertising and offering
reduced fees. Established GPs felt that these new practices were 'creaming off the
easier jobs' (GP1 Practice One, December 1995) and saw them as a threat to their
patients and income levels. However, few patients chose to switch to the cheaper
practices.
The subsidy changes and the patient targeting system introduced in 1991 had major
implications for GP/patient relations and for practice income. From a GP perspective,
the targeting system categorised the patient population into the subsidised and the
unsubsidised. Patients were only entitled to a State subsidy while they maintained a
valid community services card. However, these changes did not generate much
response from the medical profession. There appear to have been two reasons for
this: first, alterations to the GMS subsidy system were not unusual as the government
had altered the subsidy levels many times since the system was introduced. Second,
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the subsidy changes were obscured by the larger and more threatening reform process
(Ashton, 1992, p. 160).
The most important issue that faced GPs in 1993 was what kind of contract they
would establish with the local RHA. Although the reforms were announced with
surprisingly little public discussion, the time between the announcement of change in
1991 and its implementation in 1993 allowed considerable time for debate. The initial
implications of the proposals for GPs were somewhat sketchy but over time two clear
facts emerged (1) the responsibility for primary health budgets were delegated to the
RHAs and (2) GPs would have to contract with the local RHA for subsidies.
During 1993 the GP practices had to choose between three different kinds of contract
arrangement. First, GPs could continue to claim their existing fee-for-service
subsidies under the Section 51 arrangements. Second, GPs could develop their own
contracts with the RHA. Third, GPs could join together into Independent Practice
Associations (IPAs) and develop collective contracts with their local RHA. The
pressure on GPs was further reinforced by a general feeling of uncertainty, negative
feelings about what the government would do next and a conviction that whatever
was going to happen, it would not benefit GPs:
We had no confidence that any system conceived by politicians and
bureaucrats would be good for us. There were also all sorts of extraordinary
rumours about what the reforms would involve. Anything from insurance
companies taking over and setting up major health care plans to budget-
holding, abolition of GMS and abolition of the practice nurse subsidy. There
was a lot of uncertainty and we had no confidence that anything that anyone
from the Minister of Health down would come up with would be any good for
us (Gri Practice Two, March 1995).





Practice One was located in an upper socio-economic area on the north-west side of
Christchurch. It was a well established practice, had celebrated its 25th anniversary
and they had 14,500 people on the regular patient list.
The practice was established by two doctors in 1970 and one of the founding doctors
was still part of the partnership. The buildings were purpose built as a medical
practice and were owned by an external landlord. The fact that the buildings were
intended for only two doctors placed some pressure on space. A multi-service centre
was established in 1994 next door to the medical centre and contained a pharmacist,
psychologist, dietician, child health nurse and podiatrist. Although it was independent
the practice works closely with the new centre, particularly with the pharmacist.
There were five GPs associated with the practice. There was one full time
receptionist, two who were part time, three full time practice nurses and one full time
practice manager. Most of the administration was dealt with by the practice manager
and one of the GF partners who took on the 'staff partner' role, setting agendas,
chairing partner's meetings, dealing with salespeople and external contacts and
resolving any conflict that emerged within the practice. The financial structure made
the doctors more like associates rather than partners as each practitioner had he/r own
patient list and retained he/r own profits while sharing expenses. As one of the GPs
put it, "technically we are in competition with each other, but in a very co-operative
sort of way" (GP1, June 1995). All other staff were employees of the practice.
Practice One was part of an after-hours collective, which meant that health services
were available to all patients of the practice outside of regular practice hours. The
GPs had an orthodox approach to medicine. The only kind of alternative treatment
available was acupuncture and, according to the GPs, "that is pretty mainstream now"
(GP1, June 1995). The stated philosophy of the practice was:
• To maintain a friendly, caring, professional relationship with patients.
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• To provide a high standard of personalised health care for our patients.
• To meet both the physical and emotional needs of the patients.
(Practice One Newsletter, 1995).
The practice provided a full range of primary medical services although they did not
run any specialised clinics or seminars. They argued that health education and
prevention was important but because there was no funding for preventative care.
The GPs also found that patients were reluctant to visit 'unless they are sick'.
Prevention is pretty opportunistic and forms part of the consultation where
possible. Unfortunately there is not funding for preventative care and there
aren't all that many people willing to spend money to come to a doctor
without anything wrong with them so we don't do preventative care except
when we have the opportunity (GP1, June 1995).
Patient's emotional needs were addressed by one GP who had an interest in
psychotherapy treatment. The practice also provided full maternity care and specialist
expertise in diving medicine.
X is interested in diving medicine, he had qualifications in that, a diploma in
diving medicine, so he sees a lot of divers, recreational and commercial. He
also had an interest in psychotherapy, he does a lot of psychotherapy
counselling. One of use does a lot of maternity and obstetric work but the rest
of use are generalists (GP1, June 1995).
The practice nurses worked closely with the GPs although they were not assigned to a
particular GP. The nurses generally checked a patient before they were seen by a GP,
conducted tests or changed dressings when required. They also managed the patient
recall system and fur conducting immunisation and cervical smears. There was very
little in the way of independent practice-nurse function.
Between 1993 and 1995 the practice did not experience a significant change in patient
numbers. One of the practice nurses suggested that this was because they had a
significant number of accident cases that were funded through the State ACC
(Accident Compensation Corporation) insurance programme. The consistent patient
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numbers were also related to the fact that they were dealing with a relatively wealthy
community.
In 1989 the practice computerised the patient database and accounting system. This
involved the purchase of computer equipment and of the Alumni software (a brand of
computer software used extensively by GPs in the Christchurch area). By 1990 the
age/sex register, patient recall system and all accounting/claims were managed via the
computer. Patient details were entered by the receptionist and computer generated
invoices were presented when the appointment was completed. The same data
formed the basis for subsidy claims (e.g. GMS, ACC, immunisation and maternity)
which were automatically generated by the system.
One of the GPs in this practice (GPl) had been involved in the local Area Health
Board and remained well informed on the state of the changes. As the research
progressed this individual became the key informant and was an important source of
information on the state of the changes generally and on how those changes were
affecting the practice. Although interviews were conducted with the other GPs, the
practice nurses and practice manager, GPl's comments were often the most
informative and therefore, are the principal source for quotations.
8.2.2 Response to the reforms
From 1993 the GPs in Practice One chose to be part of the Pegasus IPA and to accept
the contract negotiated by Pegasus. Those involved felt that the Pegasus agreement
would put them in a better position than accepting the Section 51 arrangement.
On the 1 July the Government dcccnuulised ine heaiin funding. GPs fell under
section 51 of the Health and Disabilities Services Act. This was all very
detailed and GPs automatically became a party to this. Pegasus restated the
Section 51 material in 16 pages. Those who signed the Pegasus contract did
not have to try and comply with Section 51. This was a strong incentive to
sign with Pegasus (GPl, October 1993).
Pegasus have acted as a buffer for the individual GP. They have more clout
that an individual GP. Both Pegasus and the medical association (NZMA) are
pretty influential (GPl, October 1993).
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While the reforms did not have a major impact on the operation of the practice,
membership of Pegasus did bring some changes. Pegasus announced that GP subsidy
claims would be audited on a regular basis. This led to changes in the way the
practice allocated work between the GPs and the practice nurses.
Therefore, we have altered what we claim for under the GMS system.
Historically you could claim GMS for any medical service provided, but the
doctor had to see the patient. The practice nurses often treat patients for
warts. The patient had to wait to see to doctor before the nurse could treat
the warts (otherwise we would not be able to claim the GMS). We decided
that there was no point in them seeing the doctor (because they had to wait
unnecessarily) and had the nurses deal with it. Now we no longer claim GMS
for this service, but we have to charge the patients directly, much to the
reluctance of some of the nurses (GP1, May 1994).
As the study progressed, the contractual arrangements had little or no influence on the
operation of the practice. However, membership of the Pegasus IPA did. A number
of the GPs in the practice became involved in the Pegasus laboratory utilisation
project and the pharmaceutical-prescribing project.1 Earlier attempts to change
prescribing were criticised by GP1 as there were no financial incentives.
They (PreMeC)2 conduct prescription analysis, which is interesting but has
little impact on my prescribing behaviour. Prescription analysis provides
details of a GP's prescribing costs over a four-week time period and a
comparison to the prescribing levels of other GPs. But there is no incentive to
be a more economic prescriber. Maybe if we had a budget for
pharmaceuticals it would make a difference, but currently I can see no reason
why I should not give my patients the best available. So although these
systems are being introduced to measure expenditure in the different areas
there is still no real incentive to change behaviour (GP1, May 1994).
Within a year he had changed his mind and argued that there were incentives to
change his behaviour as a GP. These incentives came from the Pegasus projects and
the contracts between Pegasus and the RHA. Although individual GPs did not benefit
financially, savings made were retained by Pegasus to be used for patient services.
' See Appendix 2
2 See Appendix 3
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Basically it is the fact that the Pegasus group has got a contract with the RHA
so we get to retain control of some of the savings made. That is the incentive
and it is quite powerful. Without that you are only doing it for the good of the
general person - it is a bit vague (GP1, March 1995).
In Practice One the participation in the Pegasus projects went beyond passive
involvement. One of the GPs became a facilitator and convenor for one of the
pharmaceutical project groups.3 This not only involved co-ordinating the
pharmaceutical group meetings but also attending steering meetings organised by
Pegasus.
Well, one, I get paid for it, but that wasn't really the incentive. The pharmacy
project, I feel it could be quite exciting. I have known for years that there are
big savings to be made in prescribing - it is just simply a matter of us applying
grey matter to it and yes, it's an opportunity to put it into practice and I was
keen to get involved in that. So by being facilitator for my little group (12
GPs) I think that it gives me an opportunity to influence peoples' prescribing
for the better. The idea is that all of this makes the use of the money more
cost effective. I guess it just comes back to the fact that I believe in what I do
and anything that can keep up the standards of service quality has got to be
good (GP1, June 1995).
The researcher suggested to some of the GPs strongly involved in the Pegasus
projects that they had bought into what they were trying to avoid in the 1990 contract
attempt. However, they did not accept that, arguing that the central problem with the
1990 contracts was the attempt to control GP income.
The problem with the GP contracts was that there was going to be
government control over what we could charge and inevitably, over the years,
our fees would not keep up with expenses and inflation and that would mean a
decrease in our incomes. There was no way we were going to have that.
Changes are more acceptable coming through Pegasus Yes, we are in
control, these are contracts that we have negotiated and accepted on our
terms. I guess we regard ourselves as self-employed and do not wish to have
our work conditions regulated. Basically it boils down to money and income.
If there was going to be State control over our fees that will lead to a drop in
our income and that is the bottom line (GP1, March 1995).
3 See Appendix 2
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8.2.3 Summary
Practice One was a large practice, which was relatively well informed about the
changes. From the beginning it was clear that it was the local IPA, Pegasus, that was
the change influence rather than the State or the RHA. GP involvement in Pegasus
led to a review of the practice claim procedures and developed into active
participation in the laboratory and prescribing projects. Although there was an earlier
interest in prescribing behaviour and involvement in the PreMeC prescription reviews,
there were no real incentives to change. The Pegasus budgetholding projects
provided the required incentive. What was driving the interest was the concept of
'doing better medicine'. The leaders in Pegasus were seen as actively working
towards this end and seeking to improve the status of primary health care. As part of
Pegasus, individual GPs felt that they too could contribute to that goal.
8.3 PRACTICE TWO
8.3.1 Practice Description
Practice Two was well established and had been operating for over twenty years. It
was located in the South of Christchurch on the border between a wealthy and a poor
community. Over 13,000 patients were enrolled with the practice.
The facilities were purpose built in 1972 and were owned by the GPs. The building
was originally intended for four doctors and the expansion of the practice over the
years lead to considerable pressure on space. Together with the consulting rooms,
nurses station and emergency room, there was also a pharmacy and a physiotherapy
clinic on site. Both of these services leased their space off the GPs.
Practice Two provided a full range of primary health services but saw promoting
healthy living as a key aspect in the practice philosophy (Practice Two Newsletter,
1995). This was linked with an emphasis on preventative care, particularly of
children, which involved a well-developed immunisation programme and the provision
of free health checks for children. Attempts had been made to provide outreach
clinics in medial specialities such as diabetes. Four of the doctors practised obstetrics
and maternity services (two nurses had midwifery qualifications). Other staff also had
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specialist interests including family planning, child abuse, psychotherapy, care of the
elderly and alternative therapies.
The practice ran its own accident and emergency service, which was staffed by a
doctor and a practice nurse during practice hours. The centre was also part of the
after hours collective.
There were seven full time equivalent practitioners working at the centre, with the
same number of practice nurses (Practice Two Newsletter, 1995). The Practice
Manager was responsible for the overall running of the practice and was assisted by
five receptionists/telephonists and two secretaries. A project manager was appointed
separately for a budget-holding initiative project. The practice was structured as a full
partnership, which was somewhat unusual, in that all of the doctors shared both costs
and income. All non-GP staff were employed by the partnership.
The practice nurses played a critical role in the provision of service to patients. Each
nurse worked with one doctor in a team approach to patient care. Patients identified
with a doctor/nurse team and had open access by mobile phone. If no appointments
are available, the patient was able to talk to the appropriate nurse in the first instance
and in this way many day-to-day problems were speedily dealt with.
I started in 1973. Then we did what the doctor directed; the doctor rang the
bell and you answered. Now we work as a team. Jointly the doctor and the
practice nurse run the practice. I do a lot more on my own initiative since the
changeover from GMS to capitation and have my own patient list seeing me,
including things like 'Well Woman's Clinics' and Child Checks. I also do
education like family planning, asthma advice and counselling. Each time I see
n notipnt it ic monrHpH r\n tlia t-\o monrHc cn tlia Hr\r»tnr Vnnu/c \irV»ot rrr\£»c
U ^/UWlVllh iv AO 1 WVV./1 WVU VSAA kA AO pUHVAAt IWVV/lkAO OV_/ bAAV U^/VIV/1 AVI AV/ » » U H AA14. V. ^ V7 V/U
on (Practice Nurse, February 1994).
While the practice had computerised its patient records, appointments, recalls and
accounting a number of years ago, they decided that the system needed to be updated.
In 1992 the practice employed a consultant to advise on the best computer solution
for the practice. A new system was implemented involving a networked PC cluster
providing word-processing, presentation and communication software which were
primarily used by the practice manager, the secretaries and the project manager. The
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upgraded medical software was installed in 1993 on a UNIX system. The practice
computer system was further enhanced in 1995 to enable the practice to down-load
data from the laboratory and incorporate that directly into patient records. It was
proposed to extend that to x-rays in 1996.
There were three individuals who were willing to be interviewed on a regular basis
and who became key informants within Practice Two. These were the GP who had
supported and initiated the fund-holding project (GP1), the Project Manager and the
Practice Manager. Comments that were not possible to attribute to a particular GP
(group interviews) have been identified as (GPs).
8.3.2 Response to the Reforms
Practice Two was exceptional; it already had a reputation, for what some would
describe as strange, and others, innovative behaviour. This was reflected in the full
partnership structure of the practice and the team arrangement between the GPs and
the practice nurses. One GP observed that "they (other GPs) are used to us being
different here. That is nothing new" (GPs, August 1995).
Rather than becoming part of the Pegasus collective arrangement, Practice Two chose
to develop their own contract with the RHA. In order to make early progress prior to
the reforms being implemented in 1993, the Department of Health called for proposals
for projects aimed at trialing new ways of delivering primary health care services. The
Department emphasised their interest in fund or budget-holding strategies. Practice
Two were one of the few sites around the country that became involved in this trial.
The project began in July 1992 with a ^updated budget for paiieni subsidy rather than
the traditional fee-for-service subsidy. Capitation meant that the practice received a
fixed dollar amount of State subsidy rather than a subsidy per qualifying patient visit.
However, as two-thirds of patients were above the income level for subsidy eligibility,
Practice Two continued to rely on a significant portion of practice income being
raised from direct consultation fees paid by patients or their insurers.
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The process of negotiating an initial contract between the practice and the Health
Reforms Directorate proved to be slow and difficult. Much of the first year of the
contract (1992-1993) was spent in setting up the budgets, protocols and procedures.
There were two reasons for this delay: first, there were no precedents for this type of
contracting which involved everything being negotiated from the beginning. Second,
there were difficulties in the negotiation process. Those involved in Practice Two
suggested that there was some hesitation on the part of the purchasers to conclude a
contract without a risk-sharing arrangement (in which the practice would become
liable for any overspending - see 7.7.4). In order to "get something signed" a
component of risk was accepted by the practice in the capitation agreement.
We found them (the Health Reforms Directorate) very inflexible and very
ideologically set in their thinking. I think that they were largely Treasury led
or driven and they had this concept about budget-holding which needed
refining in a number of ways - principally in the area of risk sharing (GP1,
March 1995).
Risk sharing seemed a very silly idea to us. In fact, we fortunately came out
on the right side of the ledger and we agreed to share, to take a small amount
of risk because the project would have never got off the ground otherwise.
We would have just got into an argument for the whole year. If we had came
out on the wrong side of the ledger they would have found it quite hard
getting any money out of us because we would have complained loudly and
vigorously that the budgets had been set on an inaccurate basis. As it turned
out we didn't need to do that. We came out ahead to the tune of about $800
(GP1, March 1995).
In July 1993 Practice Two signed a more extensive contract covering not only
capitation but also immunisation, pharmaceuticals, laboratory tests and direct funding
for administration costs. At this point the responsibility for the budget-holding
project transferred from the Ministry of Health to the local RHA. While Practice Two
held actual funds associated with patient capitation and immunisation,
pharmaceuticals and laboratory test budgets were nominal. Pre-project levels of
practice expenditure were used as a starting point for setting budgets. Adjustments
for expected national increases were negotiated between the practice and the RHA to
provide the budget for the forthcoming year. From the practice's perspective no cash
was involved in the pharmaceuticals or laboratory budget-holding although separate
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records were kept by the RHA and any 'savings' were apportioned on a negotiated
basis between the practice and the RHA. The RHA also retained control over how
the practice was to spend their share of 'savings' specifying that they could only be
used to 'directly benefit patients' rather than to boost practice income in any way. The
contract between Practice Two and the RHA was re-negotiated in 1994 to include
bulk-funding of the practice nurse subsidy. At the end of 1995 the existing contract
was rolled-over to facilitate re-negotiation in early 1996.
There were three reasons why Practice Two became involved in budget-holding.
First, some of the staff were frustrated with previous change initiatives which they
saw as highly prescriptive and forced on GPs. By becoming involved in a relatively
unformed project at an early stage GP1 felt that they could influence the reform
process to the advantage of both patients and themselves.
Change was inevitable, so the budget-holding project gave us a chance to be
involved in the process rather than having change forced upon us. We felt that
the budget-holding project would give us a chance to be pro-active and a have
a say in future developments in general practice. Unless we became involved
we would be left out in the cold (GP1, March 1995).
Second, there was the potential for significant advantages for the practice, particularly
in the development of computing and information systems. The idea of technology as
an incentive was also evident in the reviews of the UK budget-holding practices
(Robinson and Le Grand, 1994 p. 83). Third, there was strong leadership from one
member of the practice who saw the budget-holding as an important professional
challenge. He took the principal responsibility for setting-up and co-ordinating the
project. Once the Project Manager was appointed and the budget-holding process
was running his role changed to resource person. When asked why he was willing to
take on the additional responsibility and workload he said:
I have been the one who was interested mainly, I suppose. I read that most of
the budget-holding practices in the UK had someone who is the motive force.
That person has to take on some kind of directorial role. It usually seems to
be someone in their forties who requires a change or an extra interest in their
lives. Well, going back to the original motivation, I suppose it was a
challenge. But I quite enjoy it really but I am not sure why, I just do. The GP
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life can become pretty mundane otherwise. Also I have become an expert on
something, which I quite like (GP1, March 1995).
In the UK these kind of people characterised the first-wave of budget-holding.
Robinson and Le Grand (1994, p. 83) described these people as follows:
For many of the first wave, this was the leading edge thing to do. They were
teaching practices, which had made all the improvements they could. Some of
the younger doctors in their late thirties or mid career had got a little bored
with general practice and this was the next mountain to climb.
8.3.3 Effect on the practice
It was recognised that budget-holding would increase the administrative workload of
the practice, and so the project specifications included a full time Project Manager
(who was appointed in August 1992). She was responsible for dealing with the
external contracts and managing the workload associated with the project within the
practice.
The principal external contact was with the purchasing authority, now the RHA. The
Project Manager had to negotiate the contracts based on agreed budgets, obtain
approval for expenditure of "savings" and prepare regular reports as agreed in the
contract. Within the practice her role extended beyond a pure focus on the budget-
holding project to include an involvement in practice quality assurance and planning.
She monitored financial, medical and patient trends for feedback to the practice. Data
was obtained on GP prescribing patterns and test ordering which were analysed by the
Project Manager and presented at weekly peer-review meetings. The feeling within
the practice was that without the additional support from the Project Manager, the
administrative burden would have been unacceptable and the practice would not have
got involved in the project.
Well, the project has provided a full time job for one highly competent
manager. There is no way we could have managed it without her. Without a
manager we would never have done it, it would have been an absolute disaster
(GPs, August 1995).
The Practice Manager dealt with the remaining administrative workload. She was
responsible for co-ordinating the administrative aspects of the practice, overseeing the
158
accounts, wages and computer system and making sure that the practice ran
smoothly. This work was not new and was not a direct result of the reforms or the
budget-holding process. In the past, the partner of one of the GPs was employed to
administer the practice. But because of the size of the practice and the money
involved, they found it necessary to employ a full-time staff member. This also made
it possible to bring 'in-house' functions such as accounting that had been done
externally. The Practice Manager argued that it was cost-effective for the doctors to
pay her to do the administration as it freed the GPs to deal with more patients.
The direct effect of the budget-holding process on the patients was minimal.
The budget holding project doesn't affect patients in that they won't notice
any difference when they come into the practice. However, in the long-run,
we expect that there will be savings and improvements in the practice that the
patients will notice (Project Manager, February 1994).
However the effect on the behaviour of the GPs seemed to be real and significant.
Because of the contract requirements, it was necessary to collect and report
information on practice activity to the RHA. This meant that GP activity became
much more visible and subject to review. In the past there was a danger of records of
patient visits being lost and no GMS claim being made. Under the budget-holding
contract it became necessary to keep a full record of consultations in order to
establish a claim rate to the satisfaction of the RHA. This record keeping process
quantified the consulting rate of each GP/practice nurse team and made it visible to all
of the practice.
The doctors have better information (including costs) on what they do e.g.
prescribing and lab tests. We now ensure that we get a full record of
consultations (we were losing some consultations). We need to keep a record
of the consultations so we can tell the RHA what our consultation rate is.
Now that we are capitated we do not get paid GMS (per person) as people
attend rather our funding is paid monthly based on our patient register and the
national consultation rate (Practice Manager, February 1994).
With a budget established, significant attention was also devoted to GP prescribing
behaviour and test ordering. Studies were conducted of prescribing and ordering
behaviour and the levels of laboratory tests were significantly reduced.
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Yes, it was really easy to drop down the lab tests ordered by about almost
25% straight away. It was quite clear that with some motivation we could
make savings there easily (GP1, March 1995).
Changing prescribing behaviour proved to be more difficult. However, reductions
were made through a combined process of 'best practice protocols' and peer review.
With prescribing we saved an insignificant amount of money in the first year.
But the second full year we held our prescribing costs to the same level
whereas the rest of the country have gone up about 8%. It was part of our
deal that our budget goes up in line with the national increases. Bearing in
mind that we are historically low prescribers. The year before I went into
budget-holding I ordered about $35,000 worth of laboratory tests which is
well on the low side of the Christchurch average which ranges from $30,000
to $105,000 per GP. The person ordering all of those tests are obviously
seeing more people but it is doubtful that they would be three times busier. So
there are obviously other reasons for it (GP1, March 1995).
We managed to come in under budget last year and it looks like we will this
year too. We have significantly reduced expenditure on lab tests, but
pharmaceutical expenditure is erratic. There is considerable seasonality which
can be captured for forecasting purposes. However, there are influences
which are outside of our control such as when we get a new patient with an
expensive drug. We have little control over that sort of thing as most of the
drugs are maintenance. We can also get a peak fluctuation in winter when
more people tend to get sick (e.g. flu) (Project Manager, February 1994).
Because of the size of the practice there is a lot of peer review and discussion
of prescribing patterns. The GPs and nurses have regular meetings and these
have acted as a spur to rationalise referrals and lab tests. The GPs have
discussed current prescribing levels and were unable to identify any immediate
changes. We have developed in house treatment protocols for specific
conditions e.g. asthma (Project Manager, February 1994).
Significant savings were made within the practice by monitoring GP prescribing
behaviour and the use of laboratory tests. These savings were used to provide
additional services for patients rather than to increase practice income. However
there was some concern that the RHA had taken a strict interpretation of the contract
agreement, which precluded the practice from benefiting from an initiative.
We have been allowed to spend money on ear, nose and throat surgery for
children, employing a counsellor/psychologist within the practice and we have
proposed a terminal care fund, but they have not approved that yet. They
haven't allowed us to reduce the fees for children (GPs, August 1995).
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Other people seem to get all the benefits. A lot of our expertise is unpaid for.
A huge amount of the work we do, which we are experts at, we get no money
and no return for our effort at all. We think that it is time we got something
out of our efforts. We used the savings for ENT (ear nose and throat)
operations. The CHE (Crown Health Enterprise) benefits because they don't
have to pay for ENT consultations that we are paying for in private. The
RHA benefits because they don't have to pay the CHE so much in ENT. The
patient benefits because they get free consultations with a private specialist
and the specialist benefits because they get paid for it. The silly buggers who
did all the work, us, don't get anything. Everyone else benefits except us. We
are saving the money but we don't get anything and the RHA only let us spend
it on what they would otherwise pay for. The southern RHA will not allow us
to use savings to reduce fees for non-cardholding children. Yet in Wanganui
this is trumpeted as a great benefit from budgetholding that the children get
seen for free (GPs, August 1995).
With the savings, the RHA only let us spend them on things that save them
more. Our income has dropped; we are working even harder and we aren't
making more money. We can't do anything. I would like to make alterations
(to the practice buildings) but the RHA won't let us spend any savings on that.
I would like to alter the access to the toilets so people in wheel chairs can get
in without one of the nurses having to carry them (Practice Manager, August
1995).
By the end of 1995 there was some relaxation in the RHA position. While the
practice was still prohibited from directly benefiting from their savings, the RHA was
willing to consider projects that might indirectly benefit them.
We can more or less do what we want with the savings now. Other people
started doing the things we wanted to do and they (the RHA) kept telling us
that we couldn't do them. Like docs in Wanganui were able to use their
savings to make cheaper visits for children. It was also a practical issue. The
RHA simply didn't understand how this place worked. They assumed that
each doctor would benefit from the individual savings made. And it doesn't
Tt ^Aoon't r^aor»riKa nrliof Vionnanc KarP /
»» V./1 IV lliUk »» Uj . Ik VJWOll i. UVOVllL'V CI UUl tiupJWllO nvio yi. A. i
Project Manager, December 1995).
While the practice nurses had always had an unusually high level of freedom within
the practice this freedom had been increased by the shift from the GMS subsidy to a
capitated budget. To claim the GMS required that the patient must see the doctor.
This placed a strict limit on the 'chargeable' role of a practice nurse. When the
practice became capitated the practice nurse began to take a much more active
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preventative and educational role. This was seen as one of the most positive benefits
of the capitated funding!
8.3.4 Summary
Practice Two was a large and innovative practice. During 1992 key individuals within
the practice responded to an invitation from the Ministry of Health to pilot budget-
holding. There were a number of different motivations that led them to get involved:
first, there was a reaction to the change process. Change was seen as dictated from
the politicians and bureaucrats. Effectively, their response was to become pro-active
and seek to have an effect on the developments. The practice also received some
direct benefits in terms of a new computer and a staff position, which were funded as
part of the project. However, a major reason for their involvement was an enthusiast
within the practice who was looking for a challenge.
The staff within the practice argued that the actual operation of the budget-holding
had minimal immediate effects on patients. However, there were some significant
changes in GP behaviour. The budgets focused attention on the laboratory tests
ordered and prescribing behaviour. This was combined with a process of peer review
and best practice protocols. As a result some significant savings were made. Most of
these savings have been spent on providing additional patient services. The shift from
the GMS system to a capitated budget fitted well with the flexible role of practice
nurses. They were no longer restricted by the fact that they could not claim GMS.
Although the practice remained separate from Pegasus to start with, they joined in
1995 (although they have maintained their own contractual arrangements). There
were two reasons for this: first, there was a desire to share what they had learnt with





Practice Three was located in a middle to low socio-economic area of Christchurch.
There were 1800 patients on the practice list. The stated emphasis of the centre was
on preventative health and care for the whole person, as reflected in their mission
statement:
The general medical practice provides a full range of medical services
including maternity with an emphasis on preventative health and care for the
whole body (Practice Three Newsletter, 1995).
The practice was established in 1980 by one of the GPs who was operating out of his
own house. In 1988, he joined with two others and established a combined
counselling training course, a Christian counselling centre and a medical centre. They
purchased the current site and re-designed it to suit the medical practice / counselling
programme.
The centre offered a range of specialist services including counselling and
psychotherapy. In 1989 they were joined by a second GP although they ran relatively
independent practices, effectively operating as two independent GPs. Only one of the
two GPs (referred to as GP1 in this section) was willing to be interviewed. This was
not considered a critical problem as the two GPs operated quite separately.
Practice Three provided the typical GP services, some minor surgery and some
counselling.
My practice is a relatively typical general practice ... in broad terms we
provide general practice services; general medical services ... under general
practice you have got all of the nuts and bolts types of things, and a little bit of
minor surgery. Sew people up if they come in with cuts, and then it is just
referral of people if they need to go on [to secondary services] (GP1, June
1995).
Although he had previously done maternity work, the numbers had fallen to the point
that he had decided to stop altogether. He attributed the drop in maternity cases to
the growth of independent midwife services and the fact that the second GP was a
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woman and patients preferred to see her for maternity care. The two unusual features
about Practice Three were that the GPs were involved in the counselling and the
training program, and, because of referrals from counsellors, the GPs treated an
atypical number of patients with depression. GP1 had a special interest in addictions
and was the visiting medical practitioner for a local alcohol addiction programme. He
was also involved in several community based psychiatric half-way houses.
There were three staff who shared the receptionist's role on a part-time basis, in total
equivalent to one full-time position. There was one practice nurse who shared her
time between the two GPs and a specialist practitioner who was also associated with
the centre. The practice nurse was responsible for immunisation, cervical smears and
managing the recall process. She also conducted specific services such as blood
pressure checks as requested by the GPs. While working out of his home GP did not
have a practice nurse and so he still worked independently of the practice nurse.
In 1987 Practice Three installed a computer system, which managed the patient lists,
billing, government claims, immunisation recalls and accounting. One unusual aspect
of this system was that it included computer based patient records. Each GP had their
own terminal where they recorded patient notes and prescriptions after each
consultation. When GP1 was asked why he had included patient records, when most
practices just computerised the patient list and the accounting, he said that:
It seemed to me that to do anything efficiently you had to get it computerised
... it also seemed to be a way of doing a bit of research on your data, I
would be interested in that. And the reason for doing the whole thing, I
couldn't see the point in just doing accounts and it's been the right decision,
I've never regretted eumputerising. I uon'i understand why other doctors
don't do it (GP1, June 1995).
8.4.2 Response to the Reforms
At the first interview the GP said that he had been able to ignore the earlier changes
(such as the 1990 GP contracts) which basically 'blew over'. However, he was not
able to ignore the 1993 health reform changes and felt a lot of stress about what was
going to happen (GP1 November, 1993). However, he decided to join Pegasus and
accept the collective contracts as he did not want to negotiate his own contract. He
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argued that although he could not trust the government (and by extension the RHAs),
he would have some protection and would receive better treatment as part of the
Pegasus group.
There are market forces everywhere else but we are not allowed to compete
fairly. I don't want contracts because I don't feel that I can trust the
government. They are quick to point out faults but don't recognise the good
will that does exist. I have cut my costs and reduced my prescribing levels
(GP1, November 1993).
I am part of Pegasus because I am keen on GPs showing solidarity. This is a
way for GPs to act as one rather than being picked off. This is a danger
because the government has historically been malevolent, not supporting GPs
(GP1, November 1993).
Joining Pegasus caused very little change in the way the practice operated. Basically
the funding and claim requirements were maintained and the only difference was that
claims were sent to Pegasus rather than the Department of Health. GP1 wasn't keen
to be directly involved in the change process and saw his involvement in Pegasus as a
way to pass the politics onto someone else.
I only have a low involvement in Pegasus. I tend to avoid the politics. I am
happy for others to do it but see that solidarity is important. NZGPA is still a
very powerful political group. It represents the national body and provides
input at the governmental level. They deal with things such as the maternity
benefits and the relationship with the midwives. Pegasus has more input at the
RHA level. They manage the bargaining with the RHA and the administration
and pay-out of the GMS (GP1, May 1994).
However, although he was not directly involved in any of the Pegasus project groups4
he did start to change his use of laboratory tests as a result of some of the changes
underway.
I have noticed some competition between the labs. We have received details
of the costs of all of our lab tests. This has had some influence on my
behaviour as I have tried to reduce "pointless" tests and am now less inclined
to tick boxes that I don't absolutely need (GP1, May 1994).
4 See Appendix 2
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I'm sure that the focus on costs of lab results has influenced me quite strongly.
Knowing it costs roughly $20 to do a swab, it quite influences you about
swabs knowing that liver function tests costs you about $21-$22 makes you
think "is it really necessary". So I would say I've probably reduced. I don't
think I was a high user of those things in the first place but I've reduced them
considerably (GP1, June 1995).
GP1 was already concerned about his own prescribing but found these concerns were
strengthened by the educational material provided by Pegasus and from the PreMeC
prescribing review process. He got involved in the PreMeC prescription analysis
programme5 to provide feedback on his own prescribing. However, he was already
reluctant to prescribe more expensive drugs unless there were clear medical benefits.
Sometimes I get pressured by the patients (and the salesmen) to prescribe the
more expensive drugs. I would generally prefer to prescribe a cheaper drug if
it is as effective (GP1, May 1994).
Plus some data they get through from Pegasus about prescribing of antibiotics
in bronchitis which said that it has not been proven to be effective, influences
you to try to reduce prescribing ... The prescribing things are more
educational. More like information about treatment things like medications to
use for say urinary tract infections, what cost it is and what people are using
(GP1, December 1995).
8.4.3 Summary
GP1 was concerned about the relationship between GPs and the State prior to the
implementation of the 1993 restructure. Many of these concerns were based on
previous attempts by the State to change GP behaviour. However, as part of Pegasus
he experienced a rollover of terms and conditions. He joined Pegasus as an act of
solidarity with other GPs and was happy to let others deal with the politics and
negotiate the contacts He was not directly involved in the Pegasus leadership,
meetings or projects. However, he was affected indirectly by the focus on laboratory
tests and prescriptions, the new cost visibility and monthly budget reports. Generally
he saw the changes brought by Pegasus as being a positive improvement to GP
practice. He placed a heavy emphasis on the 'educational' role of the Pegasus
5 See Appendix 3
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information (Dec 1995) and did not appear unduly concerned about the budgetary
monitoring because "the way it is being done at the moment is not interfering, it is
simply feedback and the choice on prescribing is still an independent choice" (GP1,
December 1995). The fact that Pegasus was being run by GPs whom he respected
rather than managers or accountants seemed to reassure him about the changes
underway.
They are good people. Mostly I think I would be in tune with those sorts of
people anyway. People like ... I respect them and I have worked with them
and I don't think that they see [things] too much differently from how I do. I
respect them from having seen the kinds of stances they take - the kinds of




Practice Four was originally started in 1946 and was purchased by one of the current
partners in 1974, the second partner joining a few years later. The current site was
bought soon after 1974 and was in an unusual location with State housing on one side
and one of the more wealthy areas of Christchurch on the other.
There were four staff involved in Practice Four; two doctors, a full time receptionist
and a full time practice nurse. The receptionist was responsible for the financial tasks
such as the collection of cash and the completion of the ACC, GMS and immunisation
claims. Most of her medical work involved supporting the GPs in tasks such as
taking samples and measuring patient temperatures. Although she saw some patients
herself, they also had to be seen by one of the GPs and when she was required to
provide advice to patients that telephoned the practice she generally recommended
that they come and see the doctor and provided little advice herself.
Both GPs shared the same facilities and staff, but ran relatively separate practices with
separate patient lists. One GP had a relatively elderly practice because of the patients
inherited from the original 1946 practice. He took a special interest in geriatric
medicine and had an active interest in a number of the local residential homes. The
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second partner had a specialist interest in occupational and forensic medicine. The
practice provided a full range of primary health services including accident and
emergency services and full maternity care. The concept of 'full service' was strongly
ingrained in the practice ethos. It was interpreted as a willingness to make house
calls, and a commitment to see a child immediately if the parent was concerned.
There was also some criticism of younger GPs who lacked the skills that were
historically expected from a GP such as simple surgery and maternity services.
I qualified with a hundred deliveries under my belt. Nowadays I am taking
medical students and they have never seen a delivery (GP, May 1995).
Although it was possible to increase the practice size, it has been kept small by choice,
both in terms of the number of practitioners and the patient list. This was part of the
practice ideal of building a relationship with patients and offering 'traditional' quality
service.
In 1993 Practice four purchased the Alumni computing package. They did this
because the accounts were 'becoming a shambles and were time consuming' (GP,
May 1995). The system automated the accounting and the subsidy claims (GMS and
ACC). The incentive to 'tidy the accounting' was reinforced by the threat of a claim
audit from Pegasus, which meant that practices needed to provide an audit trail, and
the pressure from the RHA to computerised patient registers. The Alumni system
automated the existing patient recall system, which was seen as particularly important
for child immunisation. In the middle of 1995 the Practice Four also added a
computerised appointments schedule. Since the practice nurse maintained the patient
recall system the responsibility for the computer was shared between her and the
receptionist.
While there are two GPs in Practice Four, only the second partner was willing to be
interviewed. This was not considered a problem as the two GPs ran relatively
independent practices. Any quote identified as (GP or GP1) refers to the partner
interviewed.
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8.5.2 Response to the Reforms
When asked in the first interview what changes the health reforms had caused the
immediate response from GP1 was that there was more paper work now. Reports
and invitations to meetings had come from the Ministry of Health and both the RHAs
and the CHEs had sent material for GPs to read. He suggested that he could not read
all of the material he had been sent. He also had some real fears about what the
contracting arrangements would involve and how that would affect the practice and
felt that others (particularly non-GP administrators) were trying to tell him what to do
and how to run his practice.
I have been a GP for 20 years now. Alter that amount of time you know what
you are doing. You know how to relate to patients and know what does and
doesn't work. There has been a significant growth of different groups trying
to tell us what to do. I am often sceptical regarding their purported level of
knowledge (GP, October 1993).
They talk about empowering patients. The pressure groups often have a
significant influence of non-medical administrators. Looking back over the
last 10 years there has been a significant growth in the power of these pressure
groups (GP, October 1993).
Practice Four chose to join Pegasus and accept the collective contract with the RHA.
GP1 thought that by joining Pegasus they would not have to negotiate with the RHA
themselves and would 'get the best deal from the RHA'. He also saw Pegasus
membership as an important way of providing stimulation and peer support that they
would not get in a small practice.
The IPA allows us to focus attention onto areas where we have some power.
We would be like a fish out of water without Pegasus. It means that we are
less vulnerable than we would be by ourselves and we get the best deal
possible from the RHA. Really, it means that we deal with the RHA more
efficiently than if we tried to negotiate as individual practices (GP, October
1993).
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In a big practice you get lots of input. But in a small practice like this,
Pegasus provides a measure of community or support. The IPA: it means that
we are less vulnerable than we would be by ourselves. Because we are part of
Pegasus we get the best deal from the RHA and we deal with the RHA more
effectively as a group (GP, October 1993).
During 1994 GPl's attitude towards the reforms began to change from reserved
wariness to conditional approval. This change was due to a number of factors. First,
it had become clear that most of the conditions/rights of GPs, such as the fee-for-
service, had been maintained under the changes.
I have always said that the best fee we receive is what we get directly from the
patient. You do a good job, you receive your money and you have a happy
patient. There are no political strings attached (GP, May 1994).
Second, as he became more familiar with the new structures he become more
confident that he could ensure good care for their patients.
I am now more familiar with the new system and know where to send people
and the right individuals to deal with - the informal contacts are being re¬
established (GP, May 1994).
In November we ran up against the Radiologists. It was a monetary and
organisational issue rather than a professional one. They didn't want the GPs
muscling in, "GPs aren't qualified to run radiology". We don't want to run
radiology but we can organise it so our patients get the best service. There is
an important 'Patient Advocacy' role for the GP in secondary care (GP, May
1994).
Third, the issue of how the reforms were to affect General Practice had become
clearer and it was clear that the New Zealand changes were different to what had
happened in the UK. GP1 had worked in the UK and saw aspects of the UK NHS
reforms as undesirable.
The doctor delegates a lot of the work to the nurses. Sometimes they (GPs)
only sign their name at the bottom. I found that system unsatisfactory. I like
to do the job of being a doctor. I enjoy the hands on aspects, I am not a form
signer (GP, May 1994).
Fourth, GP1 became more involved in Pegasus and was better informed on what was
happening. Because of this he developed a belief that the changes could benefit
general practice.
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I have become more involved in Pegasus and have attended a number of their
meetings. I can see that targeting is there to help people. The regular Pegasus
meetings have been helpful (GP, May 1994).
The active involvement in Pegasus also extended into a number of other areas. GP1
became involved in the Pegasus laboratory, prescribing and outpatients project. He
argued that the Pegasus projects were really just an extension of the peer review
process, a process that would make GPs reflect on what they were doing which would
lead to better treatment for patients.
It is really, it is a huge peer review process. I go along and the whole thrust of
Pegasus is to look at what we do, do it well and keep nudging forward in
areas. It was like a self-audit - it was making ourselves look at what we do,
questioning assumed ways of doing things. It's good! ... Basically it involves
me submitting what I do to other people's scrutiny. I guess that's the simplest
way of putting it. Because I've got identifiable laboratory and prescription
pads, they can tell what it is I'm up to (GP, May 1995).
Involvement in the laboratory and the prescribing process did lead to some change in
drug and test usage. However, the main issue was seen as quality rather than cost. A
regular theme in the interviews involving GP1 was a concern to maintain the standard
of service provided to customers. The concern for standards was reflected in 1995
when he was invited to become part of the Pegasus audit committee. Although this
involved additional work, he accepted the job and explained the role of the audit
committee as follows:
We are like the Fire Brigade. We are really only auditing things when they go
wrong. We audit the stuff ups, or a doctor gets himself into trouble, or
wheeled out and we sit down and decide what course of action, and what best
to do. It is peer audit and claim and financial. What we have noticed is the
two very quickly spill into each other. If there's a stuff-up you often find
there's a claim stuff-up as well at the same time. That's where it gets
contentious and where we get involved. I am pleased to say we haven't had a
hell of a lot of big work done. There's been a bit come through, but not
excessive (GP, May 1995).
I think it's (Pegasus) a mutual association - it's like an old fashioned guild or a
collective and we are all volunteers, there are financial incentives, other than
that there is no strong - there are quite a few people who chose not to - its like
an old fashioned guild of like minded people getting together and saying "Well
let's do this well" or "Let's do this to the best of our ability". And a lot of us
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are different - we range from the ultra dry to ultra wet (managerial vs. service
to the poor), if I may use that term - there is scope for tons of different people
still to be part of Pegasus. There is no heavy hand that says we've got to think
like this, or do like this, or do like that (GP, May 1995).
While many of the changes initiated by Pegasus were now seen as being positive, GP1
did have some reservations about the 'privatisation' of healthcare. He told a
following story to illustrate his concern that the move to private provision was going
too far and the public health system would not remain intact.
I think the health reforms are broadly in the right direction. But I'm getting a
little bit worried - when I got this in the mail from Dr X, a gastroenterologist.
Dr X is a very upstanding, honourable doctor, a very religious person, very
much involved in his church. Dr X is a very genuine, hardworking person and
he was a very strong supporter of the public health system. He had no desire
to be part of what he essentially saw as the business of medicine. In other
words charging patients. Now Dr X has started up a private practice. Even
those dedicated to the ideal of a public health system have been forced to turn
to private practice. Maybe the reforms have gone a bit too far down the
private road. People are going into private practice to survive ... that doesn't
save anyone any money (GP, May 1995).
8.5.3 Summary
GP1 had initial reservations about the changes of 1993 and how they would affect the
practice and that 'outsiders' would try to tell him what he should be doing. Once
implemented there was no real change in how the practice was run or funded. There
was, however, a noticeable increase in paperwork. Both GPs became part of Pegasus
and felt that they would be less vulnerable as part of an IPA. They also thought that
they would obtain a more favourable contract as part of an association than they
would as individuals. The fringe benefits of joining Pegasus were peer contact and
support from other GPs.
By 1995 GP1 saw that his autonomy was not seriously threatened and his attitude
towards the changes warmed. He became directly involved in Pegasus, regularly
attending meetings, was actively involved in the laboratory and prescribing projects
and, ultimately, becoming part of the 'audit committee' for Pegasus. The changes
coming through Pegasus were welcomed as they were seen to improve the quality of
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general practice and the status of general practitioners. However, he was concerned
that the 'public health system' and free access to those in need were disappearing.
8.6 PRACTICE FIVE
8.6.1 Practice Description
Practice Five was established by a sole practitioner over 18 years ago and it was
located on the east side of Christchurch. One of the current partners bought a share
of the practice in 1983 and was joined by the second partner in 1989. They moved to
their present location in 1990 which they purchased from a property developer and
renovated to serve as a medical practice. Practice Five was fairly small with 2800
patients on the register. The local area was noted as one of the poorest in New
Zealand with a low average income (one third lower than the rest of the city) and high
levels of unemployment.
The practice was made up of three GPs, two men and one woman although two of
these doctors worked part-time. There were two practice nurses (sharing half time
each), and two receptionists (who also worked half time each). The emphasis on job
sharing led one patient, in jest, to label the place the 'part time practice'. The partners
had separate patient lists but shared expenses. All of the other staff were employed by
the GP partners.
Interviews were conducted with the two GPs. The third (female) GP was not a
partner and was employed by the partners on a part-time basis. She was not available
for interviewing. The partners were referred to individually as GP1 and GP2.
Interviews were also conducted with three of the practice nurses and one of the
receptionists.
While both partners had a generalist approach to medicine, one had a particular
interest in acupuncture treatment and the other in industrial medicine. One of the
partners had an active maternity practice, but the maternity cases had decreased since
1993 to virtually nothing. He attributed this decrease to the growth in independent
midwife services:
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There were basically less and less deliveries because the midwives were doing
more and more. So I was left with the more difficult ones, spending the night
on the phone and ending up not even delivering the baby anyway, it became
more and more unsatisfying and stressful. Unsatisfying being on call all of the
time and doing stuff-all. So I thought well, what is the point? Why lose the
sleep? I always said that when I hit forty I would give up delivering babies
and it took me a year longer than that. But it was really the political thing, the
midwives are really taking over and I was getting less and less to do (GP2,
December 1995).
The ideals of this practice were described as 'community and family orientated
medicine with a strong preventative stance' (GP2, December 1995). The preventative
approach was reflected in a number of free health screening clinics offered by the
practice: Well-Children-Checks and weight loss and cholesterol lowering clinics aimed
at adults. The practice nurses ran the clinics. Even though these services were free to
the patients they were not well patronised by the community. The practice nurse
suggested that this was because people were reluctant to visit the doctor when they
were not sick (Practice Nurse, March 1995). Disease prevention also received a
strong emphasis in the practice newsletter (1995). Here patients were encouraged to
take steps to lower the chances of getting cancer. The practice nurses had an
unusually high direct patient contact - they handled the telephone contacts and
patients saw them directly for things such as blood tests, blood pressure or
weight/diet advice. In these cases, the patients would only see the doctor if the nurses
considered that it was necessary.
The low average income of the local community had a big impact on the nature of the
practice. Some patients do not have the cash to pay for their visits so the practice
receives little or no income from these people. Many of the patients that telephoned
the practice nurses wanted basic advice such as how to fold and put nappies on a baby
and when a baby should be given solids. One of the practice nurses explained it like
this:
You do a lot of things that if people were mothered properly in the first place
you would never need to do. Things like girls coming in and you have to
teach them to fold nappies properly and put them on their babies ... GP2 said
that what he would like to prescribe for patients is friends, money and a
holiday and a lot of the people we deal with will never have any of them. It is
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quite tragic really. We make jokes about putting depro provera in the water
to stop 15 year olds having babies. I mean the only way you handle what we
are doing is to make a joke out of it because the whole system is quite tragic
(Practice Nurse, March 1995).
In 1995 Practice Five installed a new computer system running the Alumni computer
package. The GPs were encouraged by the receptionists and practice nurses to
computerise, because most of the administrative responsibilities were handled by the
receptionists and/or the practice nurses. The new computer system simplified the
issue of patient billing, outstanding accounts and subsidy claims. The patient recall
system, which was the responsibility of the practice nurses, was also computerised.
8.6.2 Response to the Reforms
From the first contact with Practice Five, the GPs were very concerned about the
1993 health reforms. They felt threatened by the obligation to contract with the RHA
and the power of the government changes to affect their income.
The Government can legislate and affect our practice. Historically they have
been pretty anti-GP. All of the money and power has gone to secondary care.
If we didn't spend our budgets, we didn't get enough next year and we lost
any of our savings to secondary care (GP1, October 1993).
The practice nurses interviewed also expressed some concern about the reforms and
how they would affect their positions. Some of the nurses saw the changes as a threat
to the practice nurse subsidy.
The changes are making us feel uneasy. But it is a generalised uneasiness. It
would be interesting if you talk to the other practice nurse, because she runs
much more scared about the whole process than me. She is quite sure that
some day soon the nurses subsidy is going to come off and we will lose our
jobs. I don't see it that way (Practice Nurse, March 1995).
Because of their concern and their reluctance to get involved in 'politics' the GPs
were content to let Pegasus conduct all of the negotiating with the RHA and to
establish a contract for them. They felt that as part of Pegasus they had more
influence than they would as a separate practice.
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As part of the Pegasus group we have more clout than we would individually.
I wouldn't trust anyone in the RHA. We get to define the GP role with
Pegasus rather than the RHA defining the role of a GP (GP1, October 1993).
In later interviews the ongoing contact with Pegasus led to increased confidence on
the part of one of the GPs. This was also combined with a feeling that Pegasus would
enhance the position of GPs in dealing with secondary care services.
I am feeling quite a bit happier about the changes than I was earlier. I have
only had a very limited involvement in Pegasus, but I see them acting as an
effective counterfoil to the power of the Southern RHA (GP1, May 1994).
I have an older practice. I can see a potential threat from the geriatric
specialists as their funding is cut. Currently they are providing an excellent
service, but they may be forced to attract my patients in order to extend their
budget. But we now have some defence against the power of the specialist
groups as Pegasus gives us more clout as GPs (GP1, May 1994).
GP2 had some reservations about the Pegasus contracts. While membership of
Pegasus protected the practice from politics and from budget cuts by RHA, he still did
not trust the RHA.
Pegasus certainly gives us more negotiating clout and they also gave the RHA
what they wanted. The RHA still presents a threat, but they are reasonable
just now. Everybody is working together at the moment, the GPs, Pegasus
and the RHA (GP2, May 1994).
The pilot studies initiated by Pegasus are going well, but there is still the
danger of budget cuts, especially if the pilot studies don't deliver savings.
There are always cuts and restrictions. The levels of paperwork are just the
same, but there is now more frequent audit. The waiting lists are just the same
in the public clinics. However, patients are saying that the ACC case
managers are making life easier for them (GP2, May 1994).
Although the two GPs were not involved in Pegasus project groups, the contact with
Pegasus and the focus on laboratory tests and prescribing had led to some changes in
their behaviour. Both of them become more aware of which tests they were ordering
and which drugs they were prescribing.
During 1995 Pegasus started to track individual GP spending on prescribing and
laboratory tests. All GPs were required to record an identification number on all of
their prescriptions and on all of the tests they ordered. This gave Pegasus the ability
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to analyse, pinpoint and to monitor individual prescribing and laboratory use.6 GP
feedback on monthly lab expenditure became a regular feature in 1995 and in 1996
similar reports were introduced for prescribing.
I didn't have a clue how I was prescribing before. So it has been useful in that
respect. I don't look at it for ways of saving me money; I just look at it for
ways for maybe I can improve. It provides feedback for me (GP1, March
1995).
They send out reports on a monthly basis showing your costs compared with
other GPs and compared to the numbers of patients seen. It just jogs in your
mind that tests cost money and so it is quite good. I have probably made a
couple of changes - I'm not doing quite so many tests but it's not because of
costs it's just because I sense that is appropriate at the time. I have been
jogged along by cost but I don't look at a test and say "My God, that's
expensive I'm not going to do it". I just do more of what is an appropriate
test rather than ticking everything (GP1, March 1995).
There was clearly some tension created by the new forms of visibility. Both GPs in
Practice Five claimed that the prime objective of the monitoring was education and
improving prescribing rather than cost cutting. And yet the reporting system was
focused on how much different drugs and tests were costing.
Cutting costs isn't the prime objective but there is appropriate prescribing and
there are bad habits - its just an educational thing looking at what is
appropriate and if there are ways and means of doing things which would save
money but would still work, then that's fine ... I think at the end of the day
they are trying to educate people to look at their prescribing habits - improve
it really, cost being a secondary effect as far as I'm concerned. If there are
ways and means of improving prescribing, which at the end of the day saves
money, then I suppose that's line ... they have been giving out information
sheets on how much laboratory tests cost and things like that and again little
educational brochures on what is appropriate for different tests and what you
may achieve out of them and things like that (GP1, March 1995).
GP1 argued that the prime objective of the prescribing and the laboratory projects
was not to save money but 'to be doing better or more appropriate medicine' (March
1995). This involved making savings without 'any loss to patient management or
6 See Appendix 2
177
ongoing care' (March, 1995). The changes to GP prescribing and laboratory usage
were not perceived as a threat for two reasons: first GPs had some choice in how
involved they became and second the changes were initiated by other GPs rather than
being imposed by the government or the RHAs.
8.6.3 Summary
Initially there were some questions and concerns about how the 1993 changes would
affect Practice Five, however both of the GPs argued that things had remained the
same. Pegasus was seen as a protection against the RHA and GPs thought they
would have more clout and get better contracts as part of an IPA. Having a large GP
group would also give them an effective voice and enable GPs to get a better share of
the resources that had traditionally gone to secondary care. Even so, one of the GPs
still had reservations about potential budget cuts and the growing waiting lists.
Although they were not involved in any of the Pegasus project groups, the focus on
laboratory tests and prescribing had led to changes in their own behaviour.
Educational material and cost information provided by Pegasus led to a reduction in
tests ordered.
8.7 ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES
The research model presented in Chapter Four indicates that there are four different
change pathways: rebuttal, re-orientation, colonisation and evolution. However,
based on an analysis of the reforms in chapter Seven, the rebuttal and the evolution
pathways do not fit the evidence. Prior to 1993 it was difficult to identify how the
reforms would affect GPs, as the change was nnlv one small part of a larger reform.
It was unclear how the contracting relationship would operate. Because of this,
perhaps intentional uncertainty, it was not possible for GPs to resist and rebut the
change as they did the 1990 contract proposal. Even if they chose to accept the
Section 51 agreements they were still getting a contractual arrangement and were still
subject to the control of the RHA. If they did not accept any form of contract the
GPs would lose a significant proportion of the practice income. Evolution was not a
serious possibility as the medical profession had been excluded from the policy
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formation process under a strategy of policy blitzkrieg (Easton, 1994). Therefore, the
kind of discursive process necessary for evolution was not possible and there would
be either a re-orientation or a colonisation pathway.
In the GP case studies two different responses to the contracting requirements
emerged. Practice two chose to engage with the changes and develop their own
contract with the RHA. The other practices studied chose to group together and
accept the collective contract negotiated on their behalf by Pegasus. This next section
reflects upon these two different responses, how they fit with the Laughlin (1991)
change models.
8.7.1 Practice Two
The most exceptional case was Practice Two. This practice stood out from the other
practices studied (and from most of the practices in the country) as they chose to
develop their own contractual relationship with the RHA. Rather than responding to
the changes imposed Practice Two sought to take an active role in forming the
changes. However, this active role led to new administrative responsibilities within
the practice. Although all of the practice partners were 'budget-holding' the primary
responsibility was restricted to the lead GP and the Project Manager. Both the
political (negotiation) and administrative (budget-holding) responsibilities were
delegated to this small group, treeing the other staff to continue with their medical
responsibilities. This change to the structure within Practice Two can be seen as
characteristic of the reorientation pathway and was similar to the UK findings.
It seems curious that Laughlin et al. (1994a) devoted so much effort to theorising the
role of small groups in schools and the influence of key individuals in those groups
and yet they did not apply the same analysis to the GP practices. If the lead GP was a
headteacher Laughlin et al. (1994a) might well have suggested that he was an
absorber-wheeler dealer or even a managerial-entrepreneur as he showed clear
entrepreneurial tendencies in the way they he encouraged his practice to become
involved in the budget-holding initiative. Therefore, could this case actually be an
example of colonisation rather than re-orientation because of the entrepreneurial
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tendencies of the lead GP? In order to have colonisation the lifeworld values of the
practice must be altered by the change in the organisational structures. Based on the
interviews it was clear that Practice Two was already considered radical so their
willingness to become involved in the budget-holding initiative, while being unusual,
was consistent with their existing tendencies. It also became evident that while the
lead GP had entrepreneurial tendencies, these were not shared by all of the other
members of the practice. Yet the other practice members were happy (for the greater
part) to allow the lead GP and the project manager to handle the financial and
administrative responsibilities associated with the budget-holding project. This was
more consistent with the re-orientation pathway where change is absorbed by a small
group than the concept of evolution. However, it was evident that evolution
remained a real possibility within Practice Two.
8.7.2 IPA membership
The most perplexing issue in the study of the other four practices was the apparent
lack of response to the Government-initiated changes at the practice level. There was
no real change in values, the way they practised or in the tangible elements of the
practices. Initially this suggested that the reform initiatives may have been resisted by
these practices (an example of the rebuttal pathway described in Chapter Three).
However, this seemed unlikely as the changes were legislative and structural and
somehow the reforms had to be accommodated and/or absorbed. This
accommodation/absorption function came through membership in the local IPA and
illustrated a previously unknown form of the re-orientation pathway. The practices
responded to the requirement to contract by joining the Pegasus IPA. It was the IPA
structure that provided an important 'absorbing' mechanism at an institutional rather
than a practice level. The IPA served to absorb the changes initiated by the State and
to provide security against perceived threats to GP autonomy. Historically, collective
action provided GPs an effective strategy to resist government imposed change and
the IPA structure provided a logical extension of that response. Rather than
managing change on an individual practice level, the change was managed through
what Walker and Mitchell (1996) call the supra-organisation. Individual GPs could
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delegate change (and threat of change) to the IPA to manage rather than having to
contract individually with the RHA and could settle back to 'being-good-GPs'. This
absorbing role became clear in the interviews:
I think that Pegasus is a security blanket for a lot of doctors in the area who
thought, "What the hell is going to happen?" Pegasus was seen as a group
doing something and anyone could join and be swept up under their skirts (GP
Practice 2, March 1995).
Pegasus is the great white hope, it has kept the RHA off GP's backs (Dialogue
Partner One, May 1994).
The concept of an institutional absorbing mechanism represents a significant extension
of the Laughlin et al. (1994a) work, which only focused at the organisational level and
did not consider the possibility that an absorbing group could operate at the supra-
organisational level.
Another interesting extension of Laughlin et al. (1994a) becomes clear when one
focuses on the kinds of change that were absorbed. Laughlin (1991) was concerned
with how organisations absorb external change forces. The imposition of the 1993
legislation was an example of this kind of change. However, organisations also faced
internal change forces stemming from inherent contradictions and conflicts. The
development of IPAs provided a new way to manage the professional / financial
tension. Not only did the IPA buffer the GPs from government reforms (at least those
that joined), it also buffered them from economic-rationality, absorbing the financial
contracting, the financial management and budgeting associated with the contractual
accountability model.
GPs operating in New Zealand have always had to balance a tension between their
professional obligations and the financial necessity to charge patients. In Gorz's
terms, general practice was both subject to economic rationality and not subject to
economic rationality. Some of the GPs interviewed commented explicitly on this
professional / financial tension.
A fellow in this afternoon, I didn't charge him - he was in tears - he's had every
possible, imaginable, conceivable form of deprivation - he's been sexually
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abused, physically abused, in jail, drugs, you almost feel sorry for the poor
little bugger, there's no way you can charge people like that. You pick up
what the Government offers, end of story. You can't do anything else, there's
no way you can charge people like that. But on the other hand, in a strictly
business sense, why should I provide a half hour service, I want to be
businesslike and tough, why should I give him half an hour of my time for
fifteen bucks and the very next person who came in, as it happens, after a gap,
was a young mother - her husband's a successful self-employed tradesman
with a good business and works hard - but I charge her $17, get $15 from the
Government - $32. There's not much logic in that - it's not quite right (GP
Practice 4, May 1995).
The perennial tension that all GPs experience is that they must run a business
and they must care for their patients. Some find it very frustrating. A good
example is terminal care. You may visit a lot but you can't charge them much.
They need what they have for funeral expenses. In providing the patient care
that is needed you are financially disadvantaging yourself and it is not as if
your costs go away (Dialogue Partner One, June 1996).
Historically the tension between the professional ideal and the financial were managed
by delegating the economic or financial aspects to the practice nurses, which freed the
GP to behave as a carer (as they did in the Laughlin-Broadbent studies). The practice
nurses collected the fees of patients, followed up the outstanding debts and submitted
the claims for State subsidies. Often the practice nurse made the financial decision to
charge or not to charge a patient.
When a patient doesn't have the money to pay us, then we don't charge. We
have a huge patient debt, thousands of dollars, and that is debt that we have
tried to charge for and we have got a lot of patients that we don't charge. A
solo-mum coming in with child under five and she opens her purse and says I
have got $2 and the doctor says that that won't even pay for my prescription,
we will get a prescription out of the cupboard and not charge them as they go
out of the door. We can get a certain amount of antibiotic on practitioner
supply order which is free - you get so much a month. But if you do it too
much people expect free medical help and they are not necessarily the ones
who can least afford it (Practice Nurse Practice 4, March 1995).
With the requirement for GPs to contract directly with the RHA, the financial
impinged on the professional in a new and threatening way. This was a process that
could not be managed by a practice nurse or even a practice manager but had to
directly involve the GPs. Most GPs were not willing to manage their own budget like
Practice Two. There were two reasons for this: first, managing their own budget
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meant that GPs had to place their income at risk and second, if GPs decided to
manage their own budget they would have to deal directly with the financial
responsibilities.
Pegasus' role in resolving the financial / professional tension became clear in the
discussion on how the savings would be used. Many GPs felt that they could not
charge for treatment of terminally ill patients. However, this decision meant that the
GP lost money. The creation of a 'special needs benefit for patient with terminal
illnesses' by Pegasus meant that a GP could care for those in need without being
concerned about their ability to pay them.
The downside of Pegasus absorbing this financial/professional tension and the
responsibilities associated with budgetary negotiation and management needed to be
managed by someone. In the case of Pegasus some GPs were willing to take on an
active role. This was the case with GPs in Practice One and Practice Four who
became directly involved in Pegasus and welcomed the reforms as a way to improve
the quality and status of general practice. However, in Practice Three and Practice
Five the GPs were reluctant to become strongly involved in Pegasus. They were
reluctant to get involved in 'politics' and were deeply suspicious of both the
Government and the RHA. These individuals saw Pegasus as both a buffer and an
absorber. A buffer in that it provided protection against the RHA and an absorber as
it absorbed the administrative and financial responsibilities associated with the
contacting arrangements. However, as indicated by Laughlin et al. (1994b) the
danger of an absorbing group is that it will develop colonising tendencies. Pegasus
IPA was clearly established to absorb the financial and administrative risks associated
with the New Zealand health reforms. However, within the practices studied the GPs
accepted the new forms of visibility and financial control that came from Pegasus
while they had previously resisted changes initiated by the State.
That's why I like the idea of Pegasus, it's been sort of a relatively powerful
group, it might just tone down things a bit, as long as they don't go over the
top and get too politically motivated themselves (GP Practice Four, May
1995).
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The Pegasus guys are very clever. They have managed to walk the line
between doctors' autonomy and managed health care. Autonomy has been
stripped away and the doctors stand naked with their order forms. That they
have got as far as they have is a real tribute to the way it has been run. The
Pegasus guys are very clever. There is a strong belief that by making these
changes everyone will be better off; the GPs will cement their position in
healthcare and savings will end up coming back to the GPs (Dialogue Partner
Two, June 1995).
The first quote indicates GP concern about the colonising power of Pegasus while the
second quote highlights the interesting contradiction between a loss of autonomy,
visibility and the GPs' belief that these changes would benefit them. It has become
clear that Pegasus is not just an absorbing institution, but that it also has colonising
tendencies. Since the end of 1994 there has been little effort by the RHA to initiate
change as Pegasus had adopted the responsibility to change GP behaviour as part of
their budget-holding programme.7 Involvement in Pegasus did begin to change the
way individual GPs behaved. But when they were challenged regarding their
prescribing and laboratory testing they argued that the changes involved practising
better medicine and that saving money was only a secondary concern. The changes
were justified in terms of a professional rationality rather than an economic one.
Pegasus also became an important force to 'balance' the GP / secondary consultant
relationship and a voice for GP concerns (or the concerns of the Pegasus leadership)
in both local and national issues.
GPs have had minimal political clout. If we needed something we had to pay
for it out of our own pocket. Specialists can get political support and
generate political pressure if they need anything. GPs have always been the
poor cousin of secondary care. But things may get better because of Pegasus.
Already some specialists have started delegating work to the GPs. Patients
have to pay but they don't have to wait on waiting lists or in a clinic to be seen
(GP Practice Four, May 1994).
These groups (Pegasus and the NZMA) have acted as a buffer for individual
GPs. They have more clout as a negotiator than does an individual GP. Both
Pegasus and the medical association are pretty influential (GP1 Practice One,
October 1993).
7 See Appendix 2
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Whether further changes will also be accepted so easily remains to be seen. Morgan
and Willmott (1993) argue tnat a key role of accounting is to create visibility.
Pegasus used information technology and accounting to record and monitor individual
GP prescribing and laboratory spending. At the time of the study the financial
controls appeared to be accepted, but there was some evidence that early savings
were the easiest to secure and resistance would grow as there was pressure for
ongoing financial gains.
The contractual accountability requirement seemed to have been resolved through the
IPA structure. GPs only had to account to other GPs for their action while the
government could cap the budget and establish contractual accountability with the
IPA as a whole. Whether this would be sustainable in the long term was also open to
question as there was increasing evidence that other IPAs around New Zealand were
adopting a business-like stance, and a number are now managed by people who are
not GPs (for example PrimeHealth in Tauranga which is linked with Etna). In the
long run it may prove that those appointed to absorb the financial and political






While considerable attention has been devoted to the New Zealand public sector
reforms, there has been little empirical study of how these changes were actually
implemented. Therefore the objective of this dissertation was to present a
contextually informed study of the impact of reform in schools and GP practices in
New Zealand. Both the conduct of the study and the analysis of the findings were
informed by the work of Laughlin and Broadbent (Laughlin, 1991; Broadbent et al.,
1991; Laughlin, 1995). However, the generalisability of the Laughlin-Broadbent
work was limited because their studies only focused on the UK context. This
dissertation provided an opportunity to explore the applicability of their findings and
their methods in a different national setting. This question of generalisability is
important because it underpins the feasibility of international comparative study of the
role of accounting technologies in public sector reform.
From their empirical study of the UK public sector reforms Laughlin et al. (1994b)
argued that GPs had delegated the unwanted elements of the UK GP contract to
nurses and practice managers, leaving their own practices relatively unchanged.
Broadbent et al. (1993) and Laughlin et al. (1994a) argued that the managerial aspects
of UK Devolved / Local Management of Schools initiative were, on the whole,
resisted by teachers and were absorbed by a small group within the schools. Based on
the theoretical model developed and applied by Laughlin (1991), Broadbent et al.
(1991) and Laughlin et al. (1994a), the New Zealand schools and GP practices were
regarded as examples of 'social systems'. These systems were developed over a long
period and reflected certain social (lifeworld) values on the education of children and
the treatment of the sick (see Chapters Five and Seven). The New Zealand public
sector reforms were seen as having colonising potential (Broadbent et al., 1991).
Four schools and five GP practices were selected (see Chapter Four for a discussion
186
of the selection methodology) to provide an opportunity to study the impact or
change pathways (Laughlin, 1991) resulting from the reforms.
Since the early 1980s New Zealand has been in a process of reforming State
institutions and practices. These changes have seen an increase in the importance of
accounting as a basis for accountability and control. Under these changes teachers
and GPs found themselves subject to accounting controls and responsible for budgets.
However, public policy literature indicates that the goals of original policy makers can
be subverted as policies are implemented (see Ham and Hill, 1993). This is
particularly true when 'lower level actors' have significant autonomy in how the
changes are implemented and delivered (Lipsky, 1980). Gorz (1989) argued that
actors such as teachers and doctors have a strong incentive to resist and subvert
changes of an economic rationalist nature. It therefore seemed reasonable to expect
resistance from GPs and teachers to the economic rationalism inherent in the New
Zealand reforms as they have both motive and capability.
9.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This project involved a study of five GP practices and four schools. Interviews were
conducted within these research sites over a period of twenty-seven months. The
next section of this chapter provides a summary of the findings of this project and
reflects on the strengths and limitations of the Laughlin-Broadbent theoretical model,
as a framework for analysing and interpreting these findings.
9.2.1 Schools
The Tomorrow's Schools (Lange, 1988) reforms restructured the education system
within New Zealand. The Department of Education was disbanded and new
organisations were established with an explicit responsibility to monitor and control
trustees and schools. Individual schools were given more autonomy as to how the
school was managed, and they became responsible for many of the administrative and
financial tasks, which were previously performed by the Department of Education or
the local education board.
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Within the schools studied there were significant changes to accommodate the new
management roles. The presence (or absence) of professional and managerial skills on
the elected boards of trustees had a significant influence on how well the schools
adjusted to their new responsibilities. The elected trustees carried a considerable
amount of the administrative workload delegated to the schools under the reforms,
effectively doing voluntarily many of the jobs that the Department of Education and
the local education boards had previously been funded to perform (Gordon, 1992a, p.
188). The professional skills of the trustees were particularly important in dealing
with issues of accounting and property management. The role of the principal within
the school also changed, becoming more administrative and managerial. All of the
schools studied appointed a new staff member or designated an existing staff manager
to oversee the financial aspects of the school management.
The changes within the schools fitted what Laughlin (1991) called the re-orientation
pathway, in that the reforms led to changes in the way things had been done, but did
not alter the core values of the schools or directly impact on the teaching process. As
in the UK, the 'absorbing group' involved the principal and key support staff.
However, in the New Zealand the absorbing groups also involved one or more of the
trustees, which broadens the understanding of who can be actively involved in the
absorbing process. The distinction between the more active trustees found in New
Zealand and the less active trustees in the UK may have been influenced by the
legislative context. In New Zealand the legal responsibility for the schools rested with
the trustees while in the UK it rests with the head-teacher / principal.
In the New Zealand schools there was some evidence of the broad 'headteacher-
types' identified by Laughlin et al. (1994a). There were examples of principals who
adopted a managerialist and those who adopted a pastoral approach to the changes.
However, the more detailed groupings described in Figure 3.3 were not supported in
this case. This was because it was difficult to apply the categories in practice as some
of them were very similar and the principals tended to exhibit characteristics of more
than one type. Another concern was that the typology overemphasised the
importance of the principal and tended to ignore the role of other individuals in the
188
process. This was inappropriate in the New Zealand context where the trustees
played such a significant role.
While the general concept of absorbing groups was a powerful tool in understanding
the impact of the reforms on the schools, there were certain aspects of the New
Zealand empirics that were not explained by the Laughlin-Broadbent framework. The
theoretical model tended to obscure questions of socio-economic status of the school
communities. Within the New Zealand school sites, the socio-economic status had a
major influence on how the schools responded to the education reforms. Schools in
wealthy areas (Deans and Straven) had access to financial and professional skills,
which were unavailable to schools in poor areas (Matai and Aroha). These skills were
critical in dealing with the devolved management and accounting responsibilities.
However, the distinction of 'rich' and 'poor' schools is too simple and the differences
observed could be better understood by adopting a broad concept of wealth, which
recognises differential resources in financial, human, social, cultural and natural
capital.
While tasks could be absorbed, the impact of the changes in funding arrangements had
subtle implications for the school as a whole. In the 'rich' schools the changes in
funding arrangements had little impact on the teaching process as the community
could supplement the resources available to the school, although this meant that
education was being privatised by stealth, a process which received little public
attention or debate. The 'poorer' schools were unable to supplement the financial and
administrative resources by drawing on the local community and increasingly sought
to return the problem to the centre. In effect, they rejected the process of devolved
management and re-emphasised the government's obligation to the principles of
equality of opportunity and provision.
While it is not appropriate to generalise on the basis of such a small sample, it was
evident that wealth was a key factor in understanding how different schools managed
the reforms. The Laughlin-Broadbent empirical studies identified socio-economic
community as a potentially important contextual variable in the school sites studied.
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However, their focus on absorbing groups within the school obscured the importance
of the socio-economic community and ignored the nature of the resources and skills
available to each school, which were central to the ability of a school to respond to
the reforms.
In the New Zealand educational context the nature of the changes implemented
seemed to have a significant influence on how they were managed within the schools.
While financial and administrative changes were often absorbed, as predicted by the
Laughlin-Broadbent framework, the changes to curriculum, and the new forms of
accountability associated with increased measurement seemed to directly impact on
the teaching staff. While the Laughlin-Broadbent framework does theorise change, it
focuses more on the change impact or pathway rather than the nature of change itself.
Within the school studies it became evident that the nature and focus of the different
reform initiatives had a significant influence on how they were managed. While the
financial and administrative changes (the most obvious examples of economic
rationality) were generally absorbed within the schools by the principal, administrative
staff and/or trustees, the curriculum and qualification changes seemed to have a direct
impact on teaching staff. Maybe absorbing groups function best if the changes are
peripheral to the central function or 'real work' as in the case of administrative
changes observed in schools. Laughlin et al. (1994a, p. 65) makes a distinction
between the real (authentic) education work and the tasks managed by an absorbing
group. However, Laughlin et al. (1994a) fail to recognise the potential implication of
this distinction, which is that the emergence of absorbing groups may be a function of
nature of the change itself rather than a response to the changes. Currently the link
between the nature of the change initiatives and the change pathway is under-
theorised within the Laughlin-Broadbent model and there is a need to further explore
the relationship between the focus of change initiatives and how the change is actually
managed within organisations.
While the organisational focus of the Laughlin-Broadbent theoretical model
highlighted the role of small groups within schools in managing change, the role of
agencies external to the schools were ignored. In New Zealand the pre-reform
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Department of Education and post-reform organisations such as the Ministry of
Education, the ERO and the NZQA had a significant influence on how change was
managed within individual schools. Prior to the reforms the Department of Education
was an advocate for education in general and a buffer between the political demands
of government and the schools. As the Department was staffed by teachers and
educationalists, it shared many values in-common with the teaching profession. The
replacement of the Department of Education by organisations such as the Ministry of
Education was initiated with a clear agenda to eliminate 'provider capture' and to
reduce the power of the teaching profession. The new organisations were responsible
for promoting change within schools rather than resisting it. The understanding that
these organisations, which are external to the school, can play an important role in
both promoting and resisting change is a significant contribution of this dissertation
and an important extension of the Laughlin-Broadbent theoretical model.
9.2.2 GP Practices
The health reforms in New Zealand were linked to the 1991 government policy paper
- Your Health and the Public Health (Upton, 1991). These reform proposals were
legislated through the Health and Disability Services Act 1993. This Act introduced
quasi-market arrangements into the New Zealand health care system and required that
GPs form contractual arrangements with the Regional Health Authorities in order to
continue receiving State subsidies.
The relationship between GPs and the State was quite different to that between
teachers and the State. Although the Department of Health was also restructured into
a Ministry, this had little direct impact on GPs as the relationship was principally a
funding arrangement rather than the bureaucratic control exercised by the Health
Authorities and the Department of Health in the UK (see Jacobs and Barnett, 1996).
Therefore these funding / contractual arrangements became the key issue in, and the
basis for, the development of the IPA structure.
Laughlin et al. (1992, 1994b) argued that GPs responded to the UK health reforms by
delegating the new responsibilities to the practice nurses and practice managers. In
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effect, the changes were absorbed and the core work of the GP practice was
protected. There was some evidence that prior to the reforms in New Zealand the
practice nurses and practice managers had absorbed the financial and administrative
arrangements associated with the government subsidy arrangements. However, only
one practice in the study fitted the 'specialised work group' (Laughlin and Broadbent,
1995) model. Practice Two developed their own contractual relationship with the
RHA and made a clear structural change within the practice. They appointed a
project manager who, together with one of the GPs, absorbed most of the
administrative responsibilities associated with the project.
The other GP sites studied did not fit the theoretical model and were not consistent
with the empirical findings for the UK. All of the other practices studied did not
negotiate their own contracts but accepted the collective contract negotiated on their
behalf by the Pegasus IPA. They did not deal with the reform changes at the practice
level but delegated the changes to the IPA, which absorbed the changes at the supra-
organisational level (Walker and Mitchell, 1996). Historically collective action
provided GPs with an effective strategy to resist government imposed change and the
IPA structure provided a logical extension of that response. Rather than managing
change on an individual practice level, GPs could delegate change (and threat of
change) to the IPA to manage.
The concept of an institutional absorbing mechanism represents an important
extension of the Laughlin (1994a) work, which was only focused on the
organisational level and did not consider the possibility that an absorbing group could
operate at the supra-organisational level. Another extension of the UK empirical
findings (Laughlin et al., 1994a) becomes clear when one explores the kinds of change
that were absorbed. Laughlin (1991) was concerned with how organisations absorb
external change forces. The imposition of the 1993 health legislation was an example
of this kind of change. However, organisations also faced internal forces stemming
from inherent contradictions and conflicts in the role of the GP. GPs operating in
New Zealand have always had to balance a tension between their professional
obligations and the financial necessity to charge patients (unlike those operating in the
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UK). Some of the GPs interviewed commented explicitly on this professional /
financial tension. The development of IPAs provided a new way to manage the
professional / financial tension. Not only did the IPA buffer GPs from government
reforms, it also buffered them from economic rationality, absorbing contracting and
the financial management / budgeting associated with the contractual accountability
model.
In the light of the New Zealand empirics it became evident that while the Laughlin-
Broadbent theoretical model highlighted the importance of externally imposed
economic rationality, it failed to consider the tension between the economic rationality
and the professional responsibility of the GPs. It also failed to adequately explain why
the GPs in Practice Two chose to willingly take on budgetholding responsibilities
while other practices joined the IPA structure. From a theoretical perspective, the
reform initiatives were contrary to their lifeworld values and they should have found
the financial and administrative responsibilities a threat to their professional
autonomy. However, it was evident that they were willing to accept these new
responsibilities regardless. This raises important questions about the nature of the
lifeworld at the individual / organisational level. Different individuals and practices
had different values and these were not adequately explained within the Laughlin-
Broadbent model.
9.3 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS
A key objective of this dissertation was the evaluation of the applicability of the
Laughlin-Broadbent theoretical model in the New Zealand context. In this study the
theoretical model provided an important contribution both to understanding the macro
reform context and to studying the micro-changes within the schools and GP practice
sites. During the empirical study it became evident that the Laughlin-Broadbent
theoretical model was really two related theoretical frameworks, one which is micro
focused and built on organisational theory (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988; Smith,
1982; Robb, 1990) and group theory (Bion, 1968; De Board, 1978), while the second
broader framework was based on the Habermasian social theory, particularly the
concept of colonisation. There was a strong relationship between the two
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frameworks as many of the micro or organisational concepts closely mirrored the
macro societal concepts. The broad focus of the two perspectives also highlighted an
important relationship between the New Zealand social/structural changes and the
micro-changes in the organisations studied. However, the study revealed that there
were also limitations and aspects of the empirics that were not well explained by the
theoretical framework. These issues will be explored in the rest of this section.
The macro Habermasian framework contributed to the historical analysis of schools
and GP practices within New Zealand, providing a powerful language to analyse and
interpret the development of education and health in New Zealand. However, aspects
of this framework, such as the concept of lifeworld proved to be difficult to identify in
practice. Through reflecting on the origin and development of health and education it
was possible to identify some principles or values that were fundamental to the
process (see Chapter Five and Seven). However, it is not possible to say for certain
that these reflect lifeworld values in the sense understood by Habermas or whether
they were actually the values of a political or professional elite. Another problem was
that the macro-theoretical framework does not effectively theorise changes in the
lifeworld values. Although systems may be established to reflect lifeworld values,
clearly the lifeworld values can change over time. Therefore, it would seem
reasonable that the values embodied in certain systems should also change over time if
this restores the balance between the lifeworld and the system. From the micro
organisational perspective this change which would appear to be a destructive internal
colonisation as it challenges the internal values / lifeworld of the system. However,
from a macro perspective, because it restores the balance between the system and the
lifeworld, it would actually be a process of evolution in a wider societal sense, and
therefore be positive. In effect the Laughlin-Broadbent theoretical model would
misdiagnose the change pathway and condemn as unhealthy (colonisation) a process
that is actually healthy and necessary (evolution). While Broadbent et al. (1991)
acknowledge this problem, their solution is to focus on the process from the
system/organisational perspective. This is a fundamental problem with the Laughlin-
Broadbent model as it challenges the change-pathway distinction, which is central to
their work.
194
Although the Habermasian framework highlighted major social-theoretical themes
associated with the development and operation of health and education in New
Zealand, many of these concerns were obscured during the empirical study by the
organisational focus on change pathways and absorbing groups. On reflection the
theoretical framework led to an over-emphasis on the micro-level change response
and a reduction on the social-theoretical elements. In effect many of the broader
Habermasian concerns with issues such as communication, differentiation and social
development have been obscured by the micro concerns with absorbing groups and
change pathways. This dissertation seeks to re-emphasise the link between the micro
and the macro perspective by focusing on the role of institutions such as the
Department of Health and the IPA. However, further work is needed to integrate the
micro-organisational concerns with the macro-social theoretical perspective and to re-
emphasise the broader Habermasian concepts identified above.
The micro-theoretical perspective highlighted how change disturbances could be
managed within an organisation and emphasised the importance of small groups in this
process. However, there are a number of general issues that remain unresolved within
this aspect of the theoretical model. The identification of change disturbances is a
problem. While, in a tautological sense, change disturbances are what brings change
within an organisation, this does not provide a lot of practical guidance at the onset of
a study. In this case there was a clear suspicion that there would be change
disturbances, however their exact nature did not become evident until well after the
empirical study had commenced.
In the empirical studies there were real difficulties in assessing whether there has been
a change in organisational values, the fundamental criteria for distinguishing between
the Laughlin (1991) change pathways. While it was possible to observe changes in
behaviour, it was very difficult to observe values. Therefore, any judgements relating
to changes in values were a process of inference based on changes in behaviour and
expressed attitudes. This does raise some important questions about the validity of an
analytical distinction based on inference of value changes.
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During the research stage of this study it became evident that the structuralist
organisational focus of the micro-theoretical model was flawed. It was found that by
blurring the internal / external distinction that the organisational boundaries could be
re-drawn and organisations such as the IPAs or the Department of Education could
either absorb the power of a change disturbance or could further amplify the change
experienced in the schools and GP practices. The importance of supra-organisational
groups in both the school and the GP study and the challenge to the internal / external
distinction does indicate that there may be some validity in Grey et al.'s (1995, p. 217)
criticism that Laughlin-Broadbent have a too rigid, too defined concept of
'organisation'. Grey et al. (1995) proposed that organisational models such as
boundary theory (Llewellyn, 1996) be used instead. The blurring of the internal /
external distinction and the fluid concept of 'organisation' found in boundary theory is
more consistent with the supra-organisational groups that were evident in the New
Zealand empirics.
In conclusion the Laughlin-Broadbent theoretical model provided a valuable skeletal
framework for the empirical 'flesh' of this study. While there were clearly limitations
and areas of the empirics that were not addressed by the framework, it is the concept
of the dynamic relationship between the theory and the empirics that is its best
feature. It is evident that the Laughlin-Broadbent framework has changed in response
to the empirical insights from the UK studies and it is also clear that this study adds to
the change and development process. By recognising the limitation of this work and
of the theoretical framework, the opportunity is opened for future researchers to
address these limitations, to expand our understanding of accounting as a contextual
phenomenon and to construct an international comparative evaluation of the changing
role of accounting in the public sector.
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LabourGovernmentandH alth:1984-90 TheLabourgovernments ughtrestr cturehealtinwayc nsis enti
itsobjectivesfrestrainingve llexpend ture,improvinffici ncyan effectivenessandnsuringccountability.M jorr struc uringi1989 focusedonaregionalppr acht sessinghealthne scontr ctingf services.FourteenAr aBoardw reestablishedhicinteg t dpopu tion healthwiospitalndre atedcommunity-baseds rv c .Thb d , astheirprimaryresponsibility,theprotectionandromotifhe l h provisionfabal ncedrangehosp talc mmunityservices,th co-ordinationftheg vernmenta dnon-governme tsector.Bo rdsr eiv d capped,apitatedbudgetsforth irdefinpo ul ions(M lcolm,1990). Thisrestructuringreflectedtheov rallhemfpublics ctorform,wi h theintroductionfgen ralmanagementintArHe lthB ardsdbro ly definedco tractualrelationshipsbetw enBoa dsnthMinist rfHe lt (Davies,1990). Primaryhealthcare,owev r,remainedoutsidccountability structure.Drivenbyfeoserviceandopen-e edbsidyenti l m nts, governmentexp diturethiss ctorincreas daproximatelyip e t perannum(inflationdj sted)duri gthe1980(M lc lm,93),espite useofb thmarketanddmi istrativestrategiestoc taints.Ma k t deregulationprovidedforincre sc mpetitionbactthewasli tl evidenceofsucc ssfulentrepreneurialbehavio rndimpa tfl l (BellandF y,1991;aKe rnsndr ett,1 92).I 0thMinist rof Healthofferedn wdministrativestruc urefGPs—thop ion contractwiththegovernmentf capi tedr hert anfee-for-s rvice payments.Thiswastronglyopp sedbecau eit empttpl cdditional controlsnpractitioners,in ludinglimi ithefeatcou dbec a ge thepati nt(MathesonndHoski s,1992). NationalGovernment'sH althR f rm1990—93 Ina1990reviewofthhealthsectorneNationalgo rnmentconsider d therolefstate,priva esectorandindiv duals,wi haddition l attentiontorgetinga dgreaterc mpe ition(S o t,1994).Whilimight bethoughtthaterestructuringf1989hadr lytimeodem nstra e itseffectiveness,hnewgov rnmentconsid r dt atsy t mw sfla ed. Theyclaimedt atitw sneffici ntnqu t bleb uofcoshifting, providercapturanm nagementinco pet nce(Minist rofH alth,1991). Proposalsf rreform(c ns lid tedastheHeal hndDi bilitySe v cesA t 1993)wereframedaroundthinteg ationfpublicbudgetsfohr mary andsecondarycare ,progressivel ,fodi bilitsupportcciden insurancep yments.Thseparationofpurch sersfr p ovid rso curred througheestablishmentffo rRegionalH altAuth ri ies(RHAs)w ich ©BladcwellPublishersLtd19%
110
JACOBSNDBARNETT
nowactspurchasersfallheal hnddis bilityupportse v cesf geographicarea.Th ypurchaseinsemi-comp titiverketwhichi clud s public,rivateandvoluntaryprovi ers.Th14r ahe lthb rdsw re abolished,andreconstitut das23Cr wnHealthEnterprises(CHEs)i. . corporatisedpr vid runitswhich,whileown dbyts ate,expec edo operateinamark talongwi hoth rp ovide s. Thereformproposals(MinisterfH a th,1991)identifiedinn va ion primaryhealthcaresnimport ntcompo ent.Afewcommentatorshave seenthisaemaininnov t onofther f rms,pr vidingopportunitiest containhithertopen-endedxp diture,tincr aseccountabilityand perhapsalterthbalancebetw enprimaryands condaryse vices(M lcolm,1993).AsintheUK,t erew renodetailsofh wth sest at giesmightb implemented,otherthangen ralth m sofcont acting,capit tiond budgetholding.Significantattentionw sp idbyheM tryofH lthd theHealthR formsDirectoratethed fGPfundholding. GPBUDGETHOLDING Theconceptffundholding( rbu g tholdingasisalleN wZe a d)ingeneralpracticewasfirstormul t dthUKmid-1980s (Maynard,1986).Theconceptisbas nthprinciplet atg neral practitioners,be gclosthepatient,ring odpositionacpr xyforthe'exp rtconsumer'necessarytoop rateffec ivelyiam rk t,and thereforeshouldholdtfundspurchasingea thcare,tl stth primarylevelandpossiblyfors condarycaret . Characteristicsofthefundholdingschemef reUni edKi gdomw re laidoutbytheDepartmentfHeal h(1989).T eseguidelinesindicatedhat onlylarge,well-organisedpractices,o iginallywithlist ftl t11,000 patients(lat rreducedto9,000)coulbconsidered.Fina cialinducem nts wereprovided,inclu ing75pe centfthcostsleasi ,purchasingr upgradingnecessarycomputersystems,and70p rce tfinf rmat onaff costs.Moreover,inthepreparatoryyeanllowancewouldb itc v theextraadministrativeco sfpr paringthpracticef rundholdingtatus. Approximately7percenfp acticesjoin dths hemeitf sty ar(about 300),withthisincreasingo25percentby1993/94(Glennersterl.,1 9 ). Practicebudgetsincludedprovisionforprovidingrimaryhealthare throughepractice,andp rc asingsel ctedse ondarys rvices,diagn st c servicesandpha maceuticals.Followingthimple en atioffu dholdingintheU itedKi gdom1990,anumberfpapersh vr vi wedprog ess, eitherfromthpersp ctiveofindividualpra c s(B in,1992)ororew dely(DayandKlein,1991). Someresearchsugg ststhi nificantffecthbe ntodiv rtoth interestandresourcestowardprimaryh al hc re(H m,1993;nd
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Glennerstertal.,1994).Alongitudinalapp o chh sbeenakenyGlennersterandcolleagueswhound t okrevi wstarlyst gesof implementation(Glen ersteral.,1992)ndwithsubs quent'wav s' f recruitstofundholding(Glennersteral.,1994). GeneralpractitionersiN wZe l ndexpres edsig ificantres rvations aboutthehealthreforms,ab utcontractingwithpurchaserandbout alternativestofeeorser icep yments(B k r,1995).I a ly1 92heN w ZealandDepartmentofHealthcalledf rproposalsf rprojectsaimed trialingnewwaysofdeliveringpr maryh althca es rviceso d rtomake progresspriorth1993implem ntationfthereforms.Ttprojectshat wereselectedfromth75proposalseceived,cov redarangefrovid rs services,withanumberfocusingonexaminingtf asibilityofb thhold anagreedbudg tforllkindsofprimaryheal hcareservices(i. .moving awayfromindividualfeerservicesubs di sortherbenefits)ndh l ngfundstopurchasesecondaryservic sobe alffl entgroups. Themanagementofthpilotproj c swatakenv rbyhspeciallyformedHealthR formsDirectoraten1992andeventuallybyRHAsi 1993.Anumberofreviewshab nundertakenofth erlya d subsequentinitiativ s(B rnett,1993;K rk4;a dKPMGPeaM rwick,1995).Thosepatternsfcontractingwhichemergedweresomewhatdiff n fromthoseinhUK,ainlybecausefther pidgrowthofindep ndent practiceassoc ations(lPAs)'inNewZeal nd.importantommoni sue themicrolevel,though,ishwayinhicthn warrang mentsr influencingthemanageme tofindividualpractices.Th spaperth refore presentsacasestudyofsinglepracticeithsou herncityfChri t hu ch asmeansofillu tratingthead ptatioobudgetholdi g. CASESTUDY:THHEALTHC NTRE CaseStudyMetho s Thisca estudywasbaseondocumentaryanalysisndinterviewswithk participants.Documenta ionfromhepr cticein ludedprojectpr posals, negotiatedcontractsanprogre seportthDep rtmentfH al h. Formalinterviewsandinformaldiscussionswereh ldithk ytaffth practice.Inte viewsw renormallytap -recordedantranscribed. Monitoringrepo tswe epr paredbasehinterv wsa d documentation.Th sewererev ewedbypracticetaff,sw sthp per,f r mattersoffactandinterpreta ion.S ffwi hinhep acticew rlsotivelyinvolvedncommentingnthwork gn tesandil u i atingtheco tentf documents. Thismaterielformsthbaofcasetudyofthimplementationof budgetholding.11isnotintendedbasisf rgeneralisation,buttopre ent OBlackwellPublish rsLtd19%
112JACOBSNDBARNETT ascenarioofexperiencesasguidef rolicymakers,practitione sndh r engagedi ch ngeprocessesi generalpracticendp rh psot rimilar organisations.Thestr nglinkbetw ep acticedr s archfou di c se studiesmeansth tr sul saremoreclearlyrel v ntfon n-academic audience(L psl y,1991). ThePractice TheHealthC ntreiswel -establishedpr ctice,locatei ociallyn economicallymixedom unityfas l,thrivi gc titheS uthI land ofNewZealand.Thepracticeh str ditionofprovidingcompr hens ve familyhealthcare,integratingpreventativedcu a eserv c s. Approximately11,000patientsreen olledwiththp actice,two- hirdsf whom,onthebasisft eirincomelevel,r c iveogovernm ntsubsidy.Th practicerunsitsownrge tmedicalrvicedi partofanfter-hours surgeryarrangem nta doflaIndepen entP cticeAssocia ion(IPA). Servicesarprovidedbypracticeteamfaround30p oplewhichin lu es sevenfulltimeequivalentgen ralpractitioners,sevepracticnurses, practicem nag rdprojectmanager,fiveceptionistsnds cretary.A retailpharmacistandphysiotherapistlsole epaceibuilding. InitiatingtheBudgetholdingProj ct Thedevelopmentfthproj ctisoutlinednTable1.hproj ctwas initiatednearly1992whenhH althC nt evolunte redpar icipate theDepartmentofHealthal ernativefund nginitia ivsexper m ntal capitatedbudgetholdingprac ice.Thr cticeropos dte tfe sibility ofbudgetholdinganddeve opthetab sen c ssaryf rfur her budgetholdingforthep rsonalhealthcareofefinedpopul t on.Ii proposalthepracticelistedtfoll wingbj ctives: •Toinvestigate,negoti teandtr albudge holdingf rs mutpatient services,domic liarynursingservices,labo atoryt s ingandpre ribi . •Todevelopatabaseforusinfurth rbudg th ldingdevelopments. Theproposalalsostipulatedt thprac icebfundef rulimroj ct managertorunthprojecta dfornewc mputersystemtcoll ctnd analysethed taonper tionfproject. Theproposalbecamethasiforc nt actbetw nhD par mentf Healthandthepractice.T responsibilityformanagingthini i tived negotiatingcontractswaspassedanrlyointthH l hR f rms Directorate.Whent ereformedstruc urew sintroduc dn1993h managementndthco-ordinatiofbudgeth ldingco ractbe a e theresponsibilityoflocalRHA.




HealthR formsDirectorateinitia iventract -seedinggranttoinvestigateandri lbudgetho ding -capitationcontr ct(November1992tJun 3)
1993
Signedf rstRegionalHealthAuthoritycontract -capitationcontract -bulkfundingorimmunisatio -budget(nominal)f rphar aceuticalsandlab r ory -paymentforadministration
1994
SignedsecondRegionalHealthAuth ritycontract -capitationcontract -bulkfundingorimmunisatio -budget(nominal)f rpharmaceuticalsandlabora ory -paymentforadministration -bulkfundingorpracticeurss bsidy -establisheddomiciliarynursingproject(November)
Notes: IndependentPracticeAsso iations(IPA )arvolu taryssociationfG silo lare .Th practicestud edinthisc shonegotiateowncon ractw hRHA,blo alIPA hasnegotiatedcollectiventractfomosftheoth rpractic si a .Thidt effectofabsorbingsometheoverheadsbudgeth lding,includiformationystems development,negotiatingandevencarryithriskfa itationall wmembersc ntinue onfee-f r-servicesubsidyarrangements. Motivationf rInvol eme t Thereappeartohavbe nthr egen ralreasonsfopr cticeec ming involvedbudgetholding.First,therewasfrustrationithp evi us changeinitiativeswhichh dbeens nsghlypr scriptivedforceoGP . Wehadnoconfidencei ysystemconc iv dbyp l ticiansa dbure ucratswould agoodthingforus.The ewereallso tsfextraordinaryrumou sb tha reformsw uldinvolve—anythingfrinsurancecompaniest k ngverdset in upmajorhealthc repl nstobudgeth lding,abolitionfGMSndab litionohe practicenurssubsidy.The ewaslotofncertaintyah oc nfidenceth anythingthateMinist rofHealwouldc meupib nyg of rus. Bybecominginvolvednarelat velyunformedpr jectne rlystagthis groupofpractiti nersfeltth ycouldinfluencep oc sadva tage ofb thpatientsandthemselves,l houghthiv wwan ti lysharedy theircoll aguesoutsidethpractic .Secondly,t ewap tentialf significantadvantagesforthepractice,p rticularlyidevelopm ntf computingandinformationsystems.Thir ly,therewarle d r hip
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114JACOBSNDBARNETT fromonememberfthpracticewhosawth sni po tantprof ssional challenge. Ihavebeenthonewhowasmainlyint r sted.Moriginalm tivationw sth ti representedachallenge.Imnoturewhybquiteenjoyachallenge—GPlif canbe omeprettymundaneoth rwise.AlsoIhavbecomenexp rts m thing,whichIquitelike. NegotiatingContractsandBudgets Itwasrecognisedhatbudgetholdingwouincreasetadministrative workloadfthepractice,ansothepr jectspecifi ationsinclud df lltime projectmanagerwhosppointediAu ust1992.Tprojectmanager's responsibilitiesincludtwokeyareas.Thfi stinvolvesthm intenancef relationshipswitthepurchasingaut or ty,owt eRHA.T iincluded negotiatingcontractsbasednagreedbudg ts,obtainingapprovalf r expenditureof'savings'andpreparinggularre o tsasgreedi h contract.Theseconda aw sm itoringfi cial,medic landp t e t trendsforfeedbacktohepr tice.T isinvolv dprovidingi f rmat onnGPprescribingpatte nsndt storderingwhichform deba isf p er- reviewdiscussionnw eklym etings.Ts mextentthirolext ded beyondapurefoc snthbudgetholdingp ojecttincludeaninvolvem t inpracticequalityassurancendpla ing. TheprojectbeganinJuly1992(Table).AcontractwiththMinisterf Healthforpa ientc p tationrathertht ad tionalfee-for-service subsidywaachievedinNovember1992.Capitationm a tth epractice receivedafix ddollaramountofstatesubsidyr th rthans bsidyp r qualifyingpatientvisit.How ver,st o-thirdsfpati tsw rebovet incomelevelf rsubsidyeligibility,thep act cecontinu dt l ,sb fore, onasignificantportionfpracticeincombe gr is dfrd rect consultationfeespaidbyp ie tsrth irin rers. Theprocessfnegotiatinganinitialo r ctbetweenhpracticendth HealthR formsDirectorateprovedbeslowandifficult.Tfi ight monthswereinvolvedi settingupthbudgets,p otocolandprocedures. Thereweret or as nsfothisdelay:fir t,th rew rnop cedentsfthis typeofcontractingwitheverythingb inegotiatedfromthbegin i . Second,therewerediffi ulti snthn gotiationpr cess.T ev lv d thepracticesuggestat erwhesit tiononthpartfepurchasers concludeatractwithoutrisk-sharingarrang mentwherepractice wouldbeliableforanyoversp nding.I erto'g tmethingsigned'a componentfriskwasacceptedbythpracticeithinitialbudg holding agreement.Thiscoveredpharmac u icalsnl boratoryt stf mM h tojune1993. Whent eresponsibilityforthebudg tholdingp ojectra sferredt localRHAinJuly1993,theHe lthCen resign dmoreex ensiveco tract
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practicethatcounsellingservic swerenlyreadilyva l b etoh ho couldaffortpay,anth tmanyp tientsw reexclud df thisreaso .
•Purchaseofiniti lreferralsopriv tespecialistsf rchildrenwithr,nos andthroatproblems.T isalsoext ndedtsoprivateop rationsf r childrenontpublicwa tinglisf rtonsillectomy. Thosewithinthpracticeacceptedt atavingsw reoben fitp ent ratherthanoinc e sepr cticeinc m .How ver,t yrdis ppoint d thatastrictinterpretationt kebyhRHApre ludedimpor a ts rvice initiativeswhichmightpossiblybse naen f tingt epractice.T consequencefthRHApositionatt erhouldbdir tindir benefitstohepracticewat tsompra ti ionersf lthatne h yr theirpatientsw reg t ingmuchben f tfromthe rh dworki cr a ing savings.Onesuggestionwath tsavingscouldbu etoff rfrerred ced consultationfeesrchildren.W ilt isw spermittedi otherg ographic areas,thlocalRHAw snotke not isugge ionath yf l titwould financiallybenefitthepra tice. ProfessionalRolesandBeh viour WithintheHealthC ntrepracticeurs sh dlwayunusuallyig levelsofautonomynddir ctpa ie tcontactdm nfethcapi ti wasjustthenextst pi iproc ss.Thist ricalfee-for-s rviceub idy, whichrequiredthatallpatien ssedoctor,pl dstrictlim tot 'chargeable'rolefpracticenurs .Withthmovc pi ationpractice nurseswerefretoakmuchoctivepreventiveanded cationalr l . Thiswasseenaonefthmo tpositiveben f tsfcapitat dfu ding. Thecapitationap roachlsh ddirecteff ctsonthedoc r-p tient relationship.GPfeltthateconsultationsw relong rt nh yh db e previously.Althoughnclearreasonwasgivef rthinditeltt morecontacteantth tpatientsw rg t ingbetters rvice.T somedebatamongtheGPsbouthowmuchthepr j cth daffect d natureoftheiwork.O eGPss id: Idon'tthinkai[t ebudgetholding]hasm deuchdifferen .comtw rka domuchthesamekindofw rkatIienrt ntyyearsgo.Lifc lfa justgoeson...Idon'thinkt aerehasbe nradicaldiffere ceithw y practice. Itwaspointedoutbytheth rGPstt erehade ndeclinin numberoflab ratorytestsordered.Thprovisioninforma ionn individualprescribingandlaboratoryusage,reg l rer vi wme tin andtheestablishmentofin-housprotocolsf rr a mefcertaionditi n hadsignificanteffectoGPbehaviour.C ngesilaboratoryusage beenparticularlyimporta t(t s sordereddr ppyabo t25r ent)ut changesinprescribingbehaviouprovedmu hrediffic lttachiev .T
©BlackwcllPublishersLtd1996
wasattributedpartlytohefactracticl adylo erend
ofprescribingrates. PracticeManagementIssues Apercievedbenefitothbudg thol ingexp rim ntwasanincr as communicationbetweenhstaffme bers.T ysuggestedth rs increasedcollegialitywithinthpr ctice.W ilsdifficultete min howsubstantivethisw seregulare klym ti gsprov deda opportunityfallstafftbectivelyinformedboutnplayar theongoingbudgetholdinproj ct.However,th realscl ar frustrationsduetoincre sedimhatst ffneedev tm tings. Becauseofthecontractrequirementsadministr tivew rklo d increasedfarbeyonitialxpect tions.Mu hofthisadmini trative responsibilitywahandledbythproj ctman geraisuggested others affth thersupportw scriticaloucc sspr jec .Pra ti e staffalsolistedfundedadministrativeupportessentialr qu r mento anypracticeconsideringbudgetholding.Howev ,t eincr ase administrationwasnorestrictedthepracticm ger.Mo fst f experiencedincr asedpressureal adybu yworknvir nment. SecondaryCareRelationships Budgetholdingforsomecon arys rvic sandd miciliarnu s ng serviceswasonfthek yaimsinproj ctroposal.Ho ever,ih proveddifficulttachieve.Thpracticeh dfficulti sinestab i hingl ks withsecondarycarervic softhlo alCr wHe ltEn erprise(CHE). TheCHEhaddifficultyprovidingtnec ssaryc ttant sewhoul haveensureditprovisionregardthd taac mm rciallys nsitive information. Studieswereconduct dbyhprojectmanag rintop ti ntusfhealth servicesu hasoutpatientsndcommunityn rsi gar .Thpr c ice successfullyestablishedlinkwitDiabet sTreatm ntC ntrnd experimentaloutpatientclinicf rdiab t swruthithprac ce about18months.Rec rdwerelsok ptofttendancebythediab tic registeredwiththprac icethospital-bas doutp ti ntcl nics.C informationw scollectedbutansideredimpracticaltllo ateh costsfromthehospitalindividuprac iceatients.The efore,rbudg t couldnotbeestablishedantheli icswerdiscontinuft r18m n hs, therequestofDiabet sCentr . Negotiationswereconduct dithlo ald miciliarynu ingservic sf contractbudgetholding.Aspecialpr jewasestablishedfr m1Nove ber, 1994,involvingthepract ce,loc lCHEandommunitynursi getwork. Whilet erehasbe nnottemptooldudgi hn r als se,t ©BlackwcllPublishersLtd19%
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projectinvolv dthpracticeinrovidingclini alasm nag rs(GP practicenurste ms)oovers eea hp enteferr dbythra ticet communitynursi gnetwork.Thisignificantlyimprovedthlevelsf communicationbetweenhpracticea dtn rsings rvices,ke pie medicalstaffup-to-d tew ththeat n 'sc resi uationndfac l ting speedyresponseta ychangofcircumstanc s. Themajordifficultyexperiencedwasthfrag ent tionoffundi ghom basedcare.Thsourceffundsoh mbasedcarp ti ntswho dischargedfromhospitaliffe entt atrp tie swhoeref rred tonursingserviceshroughtheirgeneralpract tioner.Apat nti lig blef fundingromtheCHErnu singservicesf poxwe kfoll wa episodeofhos italcare.Shouldcarben ededfl g rriodth si longerfu d ddirectlybytheCHEuthroughau g th lt forCP-referrednu singservic s.Thpracticewaonlyabltinvolv patientsinthissecondcategoryproj ct.Tledts meis uof continuityfarea d,ino setwodiffere tnursingcaproviders beinginvolvedw thdifferentc i tsnnehous . Therewasdisappointmentithithpract cei htl ckfprogr ss extendingbudge holdingtoot erar asfsec ndarycare.Thiw logicalextensionofthecurr ntarrangeme sdofferingg atpot ntial forpatientbenefit.H wever,th ylt ai snopracticaloptionf r singlepractic .Practimembersfeltthatyd dnoh ve oughlev r e todealwithhospital-basedservic sf romainr s .Fi t,hla gsum ofmoneyandthecomplexneg tiationsinv lvedrequiredacc st managementa dcomm rcialexpertisethatwouldbdiffic laintain giventheirsize.Seco d,relativelymalldi trictpopul t onbaseand distancetoothersecondarys rvic smea th tt rwnr lalt rna ive secondarycareprovid rs(then a estalternativeublics gicals rvicitwo hoursdriveaway). ContractRelationships Therelationshipwi htpurchaserapp arsohavbec ml sc mfortable astheproj cth sprogre sed.Inearlystag sfpr jt cti e reportedw kingcl selyiththeDepartm ntofHealndt l h ReformsDirectorate,withanyd laysuemainlytla kfexp rienced expertise.Morelat lythpractichasse nrrelationshipwi h purchasingRHAasmoredifficult,ainlybecaofthest icinterpret tio oftheusfsavings,ainterpretat onnotcessarilysh redbyh rRHA . Thosewithinthepracticefelt teirexperi ncasc ntr buting developmentfxpertiseandundersta dingithRHAb ,artfro subsidyofomeadministrativoverheads,thRHAdidnotrecogniss contribution.
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PracticeManagem nt WhiletHea thC ntreh dccountingandperf rmancemeasurement systemspriortinvolve entnthbudgetholdingproject,hpr j tid placegreat remphasisonthesearea .Moratt ntioninowp ide maintenanceofthepati ntr gis er,utilisationp tt r sf co ultations,laboratoryandpharmaceuticals.Mu hofthinfo mationf r edtheb sis ofregularfeedbacktoindividualGPsntheirco ultingr tes,dtheirse oflaboratoryandpharmaceuticalesou ces,ndlsof edpartfthe reportingr quirementsofthcontract. IntheUK,fundholdingcl arlyi creasedtadministrativefin c al workloadfpractices.Thadministrativew rkloadf theNewZeal nd projectswafurtherincre sedbytlackfhis oryoapitation.Thismea t thatdevelopingandm intai ingb sicsystemsformana ingregisterw r particularlyu gentndov rridingpre-conditionfparticipation.E e whenthisasachieved,t restillremaint dministrative accountingsystemsnec ssary,be a efincome-te tedpati ts b idies,o maintainpriv tefee-ge eratedincomstreamtoensurep cticeinc m . Securityofincomeandcashfl w,therefore,w reonlypa tiallyguarante d byparticipatinginthep lotsch mendouldn tbco si eredsignificant incentive. BudgetholdingJorS co daryCare InNewZealandthereh sb nfocusoontrollingp imaryhealthco ts suchasthelaboratoryandpharmaceuticalu age,le semphasisf ron budgetholdingforsec n arycare.WhilwithintH a thC ntret erwas cleardesiretomanagebudg tf secondaryservices,thism twitho l limitedsuccessbecau eofthla kof'negotiatingclout' ysinglepractice andthereluctanceofsecondarys rvi strelinquishfuaontrol. Inlistingthepotentialchall ngesfacingbudgetholdingi hUK,W i r andFerris(1990)suggestthatev npr cticeths zeofH l hCen r mightnotbelargeen ughtsupporthc mplexcon ractingarra ements. Whilesizwasclearlyprobleminthicase,tinotnlfa tortxplain thedifficultiesexperiencedndev lopingthn c ssaryrelation h pswit secondarycareprovid rs.Thfeasibilityfsecondarya ebudgetholdingi NewZealandislikelytobl mitedyhsmalldisp rsedpopulation whichprecludebudgetholdingpra ticesfromhavint h iceofa ternative secondaryrvicepro iders.Th sc ntra tsw ththUKwh reies ima d that,atle stinmoredens lysettl dareas,uptthre -quarterfhospi l maybesubjecttocomp tition(Ap lebyal.,1994,.45)Thabs ncef equivalentcriticalm ssofb thpopulationandservicesinN wZ l ndwill makeitdifficultforpracticeor deoffnse ondaryprovidergai st another.However,thr lativelysucc ssfulinvolv m ntwithtdi trict





developamorecorpo atest uctureinrd rtachievhimsft ei membersand,insodoi gp rhaputtriskthindividualisma tonomy ofgeneralpractitionerssjealou lyguardedoverthl stfif yyears. NOTES
1IndependentPracticeAsso iatio s(IPA )arvoluntaryassociationfGPil c la.Th practicestudiedinthisc schoneg tiateowncon ractwithtRHA,btlo lIP hasnegotiatedcollectiven r ctfomosfthth rpra ti sitarea.Thh effectofabsorbingsomethoverheadsfbudg t ol i g,includisomef rmationsyst ms development,negotiatingandvencarryithriskfca itatiotall wme b rsonti ue onfee-for-servicesubsidyarrangements. REFERENCES Appleby,J.etal.(1994),'MonitoringManagedCompeti ion',iRobinsonnLGr(ed .) EvaluatingtheNHSReforms(King'Fu dInstitu e,London). Bain,J.(1992),'BudgetholdinginCalverton:OnYear'ritisM d calJour al,Vol.304,pp71-973. Baker,S.(1995),'SteadyhifCondnuesAwayFromOldyst m',NewZea andD ctor28pril95p 17. Barnett,P.(1993)ChristchurchSouthHealten re—ABudg HoldingT ia(M nis ryofHeal h, Wellington). Bell,J.andM.F y(1991),'TheedicaProf ssionCh gingAttitudesT wardve tisinand Competition',NewZealandMedicalJ ur al,Vol.104,p69—71. Boston,J.andPDalziel(1992)ThecentSoci ty?OxfordUniversityr sAu kla ). Bourn,M.andEzzamel(1986),'Costingudg tinithNationalHealthS rvice',Fin ci Accountability&Management,V l.2,N1(Spri g)p53-71. Davies,S.(1990),'HealthectorR form:ThQuesforGreat rAccoun ability',P blicctorV l.2, Na1,pp8-9. Day,P.ndRKlein(1991),'Var ationsinBudgetsofFu dhol ingract ce ',ritishMedi alJou al Vol.303,pp168-170. DepartmentofH alth—UK(1989),Ter sfS rviceforoctorinG neralPr c iceHMSOL don). Duncan,I.andA.Bollar(1992)CorporitizationPrivitiz tion:Lessonsf mNewZeal nd(Oxf r UniversityPres ,Auckland). Fougere,G.(1993),'StrugglingfC ntrol:ThStatndMedicalPr fessioniN wZ land' F.HaflertyndJMcKinla(eds.)ThCh ginge icalProfession(Ox ordUnive sitr , Oxford). Glennerster,H.(1994),'NewChall gesfoManagem nAccou ting:Issi althndS c al Services',Finan ialAccountability&Ma gement,V l.10,Na2(May)pp131-141. etal.(1992),i4FootholdforFundh lding,ResearchRepo tN .12Ki g'sI stitu e,L nd n). etaL(1994),*GPFundholding:WiC rorinningHand?',inR.obi sodJL Grand(eds.),EvaluatingtheNHSR forms(King'FundInstituteLon on). Glynn,J.etal.(1992)' PPracticeBudgets:AnEv luationoftheFina cialRisksndewar s' FinancialAccount bility&Man gement,V l.8,N2(Summ r)pp149-161. Ham,C.(1993),'HowgtheNHSReforms?'BritishM dicalJou nal,V l.306anuary). Hood,Q(1991),'APublicManagementforlSeasons?',blicAdministrationV l.6(Spri g) pp3-19. Kearns,R.andJBarnett(1992),'EnterthSuperm rket:Entr pre eurialM dicalP cticiN w Zealand',EnvironmentndPl ningQGove nmenta dPolicy,V61.10pp2 7-281. Kirk,R.(1994),AnOverviewofthPilotInitiati siPers alHealthC ront ac ingInt r lR p rt (MinistryofHealth,Wellington). KPMG-PeatMarwick(1995),Desc ipt vR v ewofSelectedPrimaryH al hC rIniti tivesMin strf Health,Wellington). Lapsley,I.(1991)'AccountingResearchintheNationaH althS rvic ',Fin ncialAcc unt bil ty&
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labelsonefthescat gories'c roassistance':and.offersmedic lpract eas anexamplea dsuggeststh tinactivitiesthmeane dforcar ,assistan e orhelp,productivityismpossibletmeasureandthereforeimpossiblet maximize.Startingfrotheex plefp licandfirofficersheargu sth thequestioniswheth rornoth yaronduty,rat erth nifeyar productive.Theirtaskiston ervenesh ulthedari ,butiwoulde betterifth ydidnothavetos .Thespeoplearp idinde end ntlyo theirproductivity. Gorz(1989)thenturnshisattentiontoactiviti swh chmeetne dlor"car , assistanceandhelp',suchathemedicalprofession.Hmaintainsth te efficiencyofsuchactivitiesralsodiffic ltqu nt fyathenumberand natureofdemandsforassistanceindependentofthecar r.Assuch,th quantityofpatientsseinotnec ss rilyanindicatorofeffi iency.Th sis complicatedbythefa tthaeserviceprovidedcannotbedefin d independentlyfromthp oplew see dsarebeingc efo . Gorz(1989)maintainedth tebas softrelatio hipbetw enthca er andthosewith'needs'mustbthebeliefthatcarisprovi edinth patient'sinteresrath rth nitin e estofthca r;and.ssuch,thiwork shouldbeperformedoutfasenseovocationrath rthdesiretmak money. 'Receivingremunerationfothhelpshrgiv sshouldn tbet e doctor'sbasicmotivation;suchm tiva onincompetitionwithastr c ly professionalmotivationwh chcouldoindeedmusttakprecedenceic s ofneed...thmoneyt yearnsh uldbam ansofexercisingtheir professionandn titsend.Someh w,ear ingth ilivi gs ouldn t,st speak,comeintothbargain'(Gorz.1989). TheNewZealandreformprocesshasbe nregardedasthmo tdra atic exampleofsyste icpublicsec orreform(Holmes,1992)andtharchety eo economicalrationality(Hood.1991).Therefore,t isarticlefocusonNew Zealandsprimex mploftheintroductionfmodelsofecon mi rationalityandaccountingcontrolintthepublicse or.Healthc re, particularlygeneralpracti e(GP)ischosenanexam lofwhatLip ky (1980)called'street-levelbureaucrats" andwh tGo z(198 )r fer dta 'careorassistanc '.Ontheba isofthLipsky'andGorz'an lysithere wouldappeartbesomeconflictbetweenthnaturofthNZealand reformsandthemotivationsandvaluesothosaffect d. Thefirstsectionofthearti ldesc ib sthdev lopmentofthN wZealand healthc resystem,p yingparticu arattentiontor leandpl eofGPs. Thisisfollowedbyasummaryftheref r sasr latingtGPandcase studyofGPresponsesthereforminona afNewZealand.Interview whichformthebas sftcasestudywerconductedbetwe n1993an1995. Basedonthcasestudy,iargu dth tGPdidre i ttheeconomic rationalityofthereformsthroughecr tionofIndependentPractic Associations(IPAs).Thiinv lvedtdelegationofcontractinga dfina ci l ©1997JohnWiley&S ns.Lid.
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underminingtheirdirect,fee-for-s rvice,relationsh pwithth icl en s,and givingtheStatlong-termstakeitovers ghtandc trolftheirw rk. Theresultoftstancem dicalp ofessionwaa3-ve rstruggle betweenthdoctorsandS t .Tstrugglwasresolv dwithapartial compromise.Allcitizensw uldhavfreesstpublichos italc r financedfromtaxation,whiletax-fin ncesubsidieswerm deav ilablt thosech osingusprivathos ital .Prim rycarewouldn tbedir y fundedbythStat .Instea ,v rietyofpatientsubsi ieswouldbepai coveringallormostfthc stfc nsultation,ful ysub idizi gprescribed pharmaceuticalsandgr d llyexten ingtosubsidizing,infullop t,a rangeoftherdiagnosticandtherapeuticse vices. Indefenceoftheirrightchargeafee-for-servithmedicalpr fe sion managedtoentrenchhighlev lofaut omydc n rol.Thiswam st obviousinprimarycare.Ge e alpractition rsjoyedthrightpra tise whereth ychos ,aforthpriceychos ,w lebeingablt drawonSt tesubsidiesf rthe rfeeanore ources,especially pharmaceuticals,usedintheirpracti eofmedi in .Apatien smobta areferralfromGPirst,thPsw reeff ctive yenfranchis dath gatekeeperstosec ndary-ca eservic sa dthservic softhhealth-c re providerssuchasphysiotherapists(Fouge .1993). NEWZEALANDH THREFORMS FundamentaltohNewZealandpublics ctorreformsw sconceptf accountabilitybasedonformalcontractualarra gementsdthdistin tio betweenoutputsandutcomes.Ea hg ver ndep rtm nth dchi f executiveappointedofixed-t rmcontrac .Eachhiefexecutivew sh ld directlyresponsiblefortheoutputsproducedbyth irdepartm nt(i. .t numberofclientsattended),responsibilityexpr sseditheirpe f rmance agreementndinthcontractbetwe nth irdepartm ntandtresp nsible minister.Thi i swerrespon iblefooutcomesproducedandt 'purchase'thenec ssaryoutputsand. TheprovisionofStatsubsidiesforvis tsthedoct randf pharmaceuticalsdidnotf tintthiscont act almo lfa coun abilitya washighlightedasnreaofconcernbytTreasury(NZTreasury.1987). Theoth rcausef rre suryc nc rnwath tGPsubsidi sw reop n- ended.Th rwasnolimitthacoulblaimasidepe dedoth numberofpatientsdoctos wandthrugsyprescr be .Ic textof afiscaldeficit,growinggovernmentbt,andthperceptionthNew Zealandstandardoflivi gw sdroppi g,attemptsrem dtchopen- endedarra gem nts. IntheJuly1990budg tMinist rofHeal hp bliclyan ounc dthe conceptfGPcontractsa doffe dPswhoulsignc ntractw the higherlev lofgovernmentfunding.Thf dingwassuchth tallpatie tw o visitedacontractedpracticereceivefrs rv s.Th1990contractcont s s c;l997JohnWiley&Sons.Ltd.
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sharplywiththecompulsorGPcontr ctintroduc dheUK.W ilher wassomeatte pttdefinedinflue chrolfpractinurse,th rw s norealattempttdefineGPbehavi urorhna urfge lpr c ice,as wasthecaseintUK.Thprincipalobligationw sarestr ctionopractic fees,compliancewithethicalc deandprov s oofddition linformatt theDepartm ntofH lth. Therewasnodoubtt e1990contracwasinte d ddirectlyimpa uponGPs.Theresponsewaimm diate,vocalandwary.TheMinist rof Healthst tedth thdidnoc ooseonsulwitht emedicalpr fes ioni thedevelopmentoftheGPcontractsbecausf'theira rsiontrestric ive charges'.Interviewsw thk yst ffindicath td dnoconsulwithe DepartmentofH lthmuceither.However,isdiffic lttcategorizeGPs awholestherewasr ngofresponse .Sompr ctic sc sttakeh contracts,seeingimmediatef nanci landccessben forp tie t .S werestronglyopposedthc nt acts,se iathr iutonomyd growingintrusionoftheS at .However,mostGPto kpr maticresp n andchosetwaitandseeiftheGovernm ntwoulbelectf ran t ert r beforemakingadecision.Thevocalr sist ncetcontractsa dh nge ingovernmentatthnextelectionsawanendtco tractschemeiMarch 1991. Thekeyimpactofth1990c ntra tatt mpw sseriouslyurth relationshipbetweethGPsandS t .Tsaw'State' shrea toheirautonomy. 'Wefearanamoeba-likeH lthDepartmentwithitsseud podia interferingv nmorewithourpr scribing,diagno cinvestigati ns andourbilitythelpurpatients'(M rshall,1992). Thosewithint eDepartm ntofH landTr suryle rntthatdi ec attempttocahGPbudgetswadangeroustr gy,asPh dman ged tothwarte1990propos ls.T eprobl mofca pingGPbudgetandf introducingcontractualaccoun abilitywasthereforeappr achedsone elementofthv rallrestructureofallthNewZealandh l hse vic . InDecember1990thegovernmentestablish dhealts torta kfor 'identifyandinvestigatethop onsf rdefini gtr lesfhgovernm nt, theprivatesector,andindividualsfunding,provisionandregulationof healthservices'.Thisr portwn veroffic allyrel as dtpublicb ti outlinedanumberofptionsf ruturehealthsys em,ba edothw rk alreadydoninear ierreviews(Scotta „1986;Gibbsl.,198 ).a d formedthbasisflatergovernmentstrat gypaper—YourHe lthndth PublicHealth,generallyknownastheGrendW itp per.Th swa releasedinJuly1991as'St tem ntofgov rnmentpolicforef fth NewZealandH lthCareSystem'(Upto ,1991).ThPa rannouncedt t allAreaHe lthBoardsweretobsplitintoaratpurch ser(Region l HealthAuthorities;R As)andprovider(Cr wnHealthEnt rprises;CHE ) organizations.AllState-ownedhospit lsbecamCHEsndwe erequiredt
©1997JohnWiley&S ns.Ltd.
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contract,oacompetitivebasis,withRHAforSt tfund .RHAswould receiveapopulation-basedfundingoolandw rres onsiblefopurch s ng healthservicesfordefinedgeographicalarea. Althought ep licyaperYo rHe lthandPublicHe lthm delittleor nodirecteferencetog n ralpractic ,intervi wsconduct dwiththaskfor e membersanddocu entsextractedfrotheirfil sin i atac nsiderable interestp imaryhealth.Referencesw rmadtostudi sofman ged competition,GPbudgetholdi gasdevel pedinthUK,andstr ngmphasi wasplacedonthintegr tionfpublicbud e sfothprim ryand secondarycare. "TheGovernmentplanstoin egrathefundi ga lpers alhe lth services,vis tstodoctors,prescriptions,otherc mmu itybas dservices, hospitalervicesandtoplaheres onsibilityf managinga lthisfundi g withtheRegionalH altAu horiti s.' Ineffect,thismeanttGPsubsidiesclaimwouldbcappeda dth tGP as'provider' groupwouldberequiretcontractwi hhRHAfopatient subsidiesratherthancl imingthedir ctlyfromtState.Thiswbrought aboutviatheHealthandDis biliti sServicesAc ,1993. Itisnoturprisingthatt e1991proposalsandsubsequ nt19 3legisl tion werealsoregard dithsusp cionaninomeca soutri htfe rbym ny GPs.Ittherefores emedreasonablt atyshouldturast t gth t hadservedth mwellinpast,i.e.t tofpres ntingacollectivefro t.T i cameintheforoftIndependentProfessionalAss ciati s( PA ). THEIPA—AGPRESPONSE InJune1992agroupbasedtthUniversityofAuckla dwe ejointly commissionedbytheNewZealandG neralPractitionersAssociatiodth HealthReformsDir cto a etadvisonheformationfpol cyf rprimary healthcareintheewenvironment.T yr commend dth t'providers' organizethemselvesintoc llectigroupsa ledIPAaneffectivew yt address:thfinancialndma agerialcomplexit eface ,tredupotential transactionndadministrativecos s,a dfacilitaterisksh ringbetweeth healthprovidersandtheRHAs(Uniservices.1992). TheHealthReformsDir ctorate,whoerr sp nsiblfodrivi gth reforms,hadnclearidofwprimaryhea thc ntractingwouldope at . TheformationofIPAswseenpositivelybythRef rmDir ct teas wayofpassingtheriskassociatedwithopen-endedGPbudgetont someoneelse.ThIPAsw uldalsignifica tlymplifytheproc sof negotiatingcontrac s.Ieffe t,thPAwouldactsg ntinthcontract negotiationbetweenm mberGPsandthRHA.Th refor ,thRHA's contractingc stsw uldbeminim latheyo ln dc ntracwi h fewIPAsascomparedthundredfGP . ©1997JohnWiley&S ns.Ltd.
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By1995therewerover40IPAsaroundc ntryndov5p rc ntf
GPswerepa tofthesgroups.Ho ver,beca ehIPAind endent andlocallybase ,itnol gerappropriatetm kenationalgene alizations; rather,c se-studyapproachisneededtunderstandhurndfun ti n ofparticularIPAs.Tharti lenowesentscas dyftdevelopm andfunctionofIPAbaseiChri tchurch,NewZe lan . OfalltheIPAsinNewZe land,tPeg susroupChristchurchstands out.ThePegasusIPAc meintoexistenceMarch1993ncorpo ated society.Currentlyabout90p rcentfthlocalGPsraig oup.All oftheth rIPAsaroundco tryrsignificantlysmallerthaPeg s s. Thesize,combinedwithtco perativeattitudftlo lRHA,h smea t thateChristchurchareah sbecomeexperimentalpilofot ountry. Whiletherisawid sp eadinter stformofbudg th ldingndcapitat on, otherareastendlo kPegasuahS uth rnRHAseh ww ll theywork. MotivationfGPsf rorming/joiningPegasus Intheinterviewsconducted,GPsshow danumberfdiffer ntm tivation forjoiningPegasus.Fir t.Peprovideds mf frotect oa inst theproposedc anges,particularlyinthlig tofperceivedanim sityfr State. •7thinkatPegasusisec rityblanketforl tfdocto sChristchurch whothoughtlikeus—Hellwhatig ingthappen?Pe as sase na group,doingsomethingthaanybodyc uldjoinnbesweptud rt ir skirts.' •IampartofPegasusbec useak enoGPshowinglidarity.Thii wayforGPstoactner th rthanbei gpickedff.T isisdangeec u thegovernmenthasis oricallybeemalevol ,n tsupp rtingGPs.' Second,GPsf ltthateywouldgeabett rcontr ctfromthRHAspar ofanIPAgroupthaeyc uldnegotiateasindividuals. •'Pegasushaveact dbufferforthindividualG .T yhamocl ts anegotiatorthando snindividu lGP.' •'BeingpartofanIPAm swerlessvuln rablethairwouldb y ourselves.Wg tthbe td alfromthRHAandlwithmor effectively.' Athirdreasonfog tti ginvolvedgroupslikPe asuwathis seenasneff ctivewayforGPtog imorcontrolv rthref rmpr cess. Thechangew sseenbym yaseinunavoid bl .Fromth tp r p ctiv therewasasimplc oice:eitherforGPstbinvolv dtheproc s :r,y wouldlosetheirhistoricalp w ,aut nomyandco roloverres urcest someoneappointedbythState.T isviewwexpressedafollow :
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•'Itseemstoushatifregoingbaureaucracywamuchbettfor it obecontrolledyGPsusetrunningalewa .th yirdparty.' GPinvolvementPegasus WithinPegasus,threediffe tlevelofinvolvementhavem g d.F rst, mostoftherank-and-fileemberswerhappyletsomeoneelsd lithth contractsa dthep litisoywerefre'g toi hbei gGP'.F thesepeople.Pegasushguaranteedmaintenancoftst tus-q ofee-f r- servicearrangementsdcontinu dcc ssthmse v cea dres u ce . GPsinthigrouponlyhavelimitednvolvementtPegasusact vitind projectsandteseememb rshipswayvoicha g . •'Manyoftheth rmembe shavbe nprotect dfrc angeyPegasus. Thesearsimilartohirdorfourthwavfundholde sitUK.eyhav experiencednochangands ePegasusprot ctionfromthS ta dt rha: •'Whatpeoplewantism s eryovertheiwde ti yandprotectth ir autonomy.Str ngelyen ugh,thema a edc rp thofPeg s sinvolvement hassecuredmoreutonomythat owhotuckitheSec i51 agreements.Thosep oplerm rc nt oll ddsubj ctthwhiofRHA middlemanagers.' Thesecondgr upconsistsfth eactivelyinvolv dattendingt Pegasusmeetingandinbeingparofthrojectunderway.egasusprovid thesepeoplewithaayformbctiv lyinvolvedimprovingt standardsofgene alpractice.Fth mPe sushab nctivech g agent,buttheserchang syhavc o eninvol d. •7wasinterestedb ingactivepartofPeg us,se mtikoodth tod .Itseemedlikaiiyjvfinflu ncing,mallegr ,hew yic practiceandforthebetter.' Thet irdgroupisco eofaboutsev nGPswholeade hift PegasusIPA.OneGPdescrib dthep oplea'n xtmountainclimb brigade';similartohefirst-wavbudg tholdersnUK.mid la dn lookingf rachallenge.Thesep oplrhighlycommittedtPe asusand havebecomethdri ingforcofc angprocess. •'Whatliasmadet edifferencnChristchurchco fs art/driven peoplewhoarededicat dtm kingthingsb lterdshisayg t rewardedfotheirskills.' Theseindividualswers enbyoth rGPatmoverndhak rsi city.Theyhavdpreviousinvolv m ntm dicalolitic ,rexpe ien ed indealingwiththepubl c,andrveryexp r encedtusofcomputer ©1997JohnWiley&S ns.Ltd.
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technology.Becausethep oplerre ctedasGPsinthcalar a,th irleadershiphabeenwidelyacceptedbythotherm mberGPs.Manyoft eseindividualsalreadyheldlevelofl gitimacyfroinitiatingndge eratingGP supportfoaco-operativeafter-hourssu gery.GPin v wedltthatnef themostpositivefeaturesfPegasuswath tiwasb ingr yotherGPs ratherthanbygroupofcivilser antsrbusinessmen. Thecontract Onthe2November.1993acontractwassignedbetweenhSouth rnRHA andthePegasusMedicalGro p.TheSouthernRHAagreedoayPe asusn afee-for-servicesbasi ,ffectivelyreplicatingthex stinggen ralm d cal subsidy(GMS)ansubsidyfeesche uleanPegasusagreedto'co- rdinate anddeliverprimaryhealthca eservicesiChristchurch'.P g sush deight tosubcontractthepr visionfthemed cals rvicestwh evert ycho e.T fund-holdingprojectsrepr sentedth lyvia ionfr mthistoricalf e- for-servicearrangement.P gasusr edtoa c ptsomelev lfi knego iatedinaspecificagreementfora hproj ct,althoughov rallguidelinesw r establishedfortherisk-sharingarrang ments. Thefund-holdingprojects Themajorfe ronthepa tfGPswasth tec ntractswi htheRHA wouldplacerestri tionsv rthGMSndthuseffectivelyappractice income.However,d cumentsr l asedbythS uth rnRHAiSeptember1994indicatedthatGMSwasnotthem jorr afconcern.Th ew s onlya1perc nta nualgrowthitheGMSchargesitSouth rnRe ionbutMinistryofHeal hforecastsshowedn8-9percentannualgrowth pharmaceuticalsndlaboratorytest .Th efore,thareasw ehighlightedbytheSouth rnRHAasimportantta gedledoPegasus'sinvolvementinnotionalbudgetholdingf rlabor orytes sandf rpharmaceuticals.A numberofthprojectsw realsoinitiat d:immunization,m ernityrvices, primarycarenursingandbettinteg at onwithhosp talou patientrv ces.Asyet.th rehasbe nnomovetplacP g susmemberGPncapitated fundingandthede-emphasisofGMSi dicatesth tt imaynotbthek issue. Laboratory Pegasusnegotiatedcontractw ththRHAprovidingformfbudget holdingf rlaboratorytests.IfheP gasusroupcouldp vethatt yved moneyolaboratoryc s sthewouldg tretains mefthvings spendopatientcare.AllPegasusm mbersw res ntl t rskingth mo thinkcarefullyabo tlaboratorytestsorderedndth tanvingsmade wouldc mebackforthgroupspendprimarycare.Me be sw realso invitedtojoinapilotgr upwhichaidparticularattentioneirl b ratory ■'019°7JohnWiley&Sons.Ltd
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usage.About30-40fthPegasusmembersrespondedt isinvit tionn attendednumberofeducationalme ti gsohp c.T yw ealsos lit intosmallerpeer-reviewg upstdisc st st-orderingbeh viour.T involvedmaintainedth tgoalwasotts vem neybuthi kr carefullyndodertestshatweregoingivu fulinfo m ion.Th laboratorieswerelsosk dtp intthderformsco tsfach differentt st.Thelett rfromP gasus,theprovisionfc tinf r ation,and detailedmonthlyreportswhatacGPspent,ltquitedram ticresul s. Althougheprojecthadnlybe ngoingf r9m nthsth ewa30perc t decreaseinlaboratoryus geithCanterburyr andtavingofv r onemilliondollars.Thinter stingfactorwastthesavingseren tju generatedbytheGPsinvolv dthpilotgr upbufr mm stftheP gasus members.Significantly,nyofthe ew rp oplehoh djoinedPegasus expresslytoavoidchange. Pharmaceuticals Asimilarcontr ctwasnegotiatedbetweenPeg susanhRHAcover pharmaceuticals.ThisprojectstartedinDec mber1994.Pega usm mbers wereinvitedbylett rtoa tendm etinghproject.Ab ut40GPs expressedaninte t.Th yweresplitintofoursmallergr ups,chchairedb aGPfacilitator,withpharmacistinvolved.Thegroupstonceon h discusstheirpr c ibingbehav ourndtprovide'peerreview'fo um.Data onindividualGPprescribingw sprovidedbyPegasusthGPfacilitatorso provokediscussionandt'getthGPst inkingaboutth rprescribi g'.T ree specificgroupsodrughaveb entar etedar r sentings g ificant chunkoft ep armaceuticalbudget:a tibiotics;sthmadrugsnd,gastro¬ enterologicalanti-ulcerdru s.Therisa osignificanteducatio al componentthispr jec .Pega usureg lar'educational'meetingsf thoseinv lv d,addressingthnatureandben fitsofvailabledrug . AlthoughePegasusprescribingprojectdidnoir c lyewardGPswho prescribedmoreconomically,thfactatPeg suset inedontrolv ry savingsmadewapowerfulince tive. GPsinvolvednthprojectdgpaid$100anurf rtheimein olv d attendingmeetingsa di peerr vi wm et gs.Th epaym ntsa dhcost ofadministeringtheprojectw rebyadi tgovernmentra t. Outpatients Theoutpatientproj ctinv lveshgastroenterologydr spirat rdepartmentsthelocalhospi al.GPswhowerep rtofthisrojectdf morecontrolv rwhathapp nedtt eirpati ntsat dingthosewo departments.TheGPcouldspecifywhi hconsultanta hpatie tshouldee andthetime-frameiwhicht yshouldbattended. Theotherproj cts,immunization,mater ityserv cesndp imarynursing, aref rsmallerinscale,conce nedmorwiththr ganizationfservicesra r '©1997JohnWiley&So s.Ltd.
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Onewe kofclaimsw res lectedanl tt rsw rewrittenollpa i tsha visitedthpracticeinthatwe k.P tientsw reh nskedfh yweres nbytheGPonatday.Whileclaimuditd veso eir ctinfl nceGPbehaviour,themajoreff ctswe enthepracticem agersa dp cticenurs s astheywereresponsibleforr cordingpati ntd tailsndsen ingi ub idy claims. Combinedwiththclaimau itwasg neralsen eofvis bilityrreview.A partofthecont actualobligations,GPswererequir dr cor identificationnumberofllftheirclaims.O edoctorsugg stedthatPegasuswacollectingd taneveryone'sprescriptions.Thiwacor ob ratedinanotherrevi wwh en ftPegasusofficersausingcomputer technologyodow loadprescribingdat .This,t getherw ththlab ratorydata,gavePe susthbilityona yse,pinpointandmon torindividual prescribing,labo atoryuseandsubsidyclaimsifthedesir .GPfeedback onmonthlylabexpenditurebecamregularf t rei1995.T ya so proposedtproducesimilarreportsf prescribingin1996. •But.whenyoudorderatestsomeonelswillknowwhaty uavd ea d youmaybeaskedtxplain.IthinktthereisdesireP gasustobv ry scrupulousinthewaytdGMS(generalmedicalsubsidy)nthi gshaveregulationsoraudits tinplacetmakesurthathappens.Do torsby- and-largearenhonestg oupbu ...Ithinkweallsusp ctedthatcertaindoctorsinChristchurchadratherlibe alpproachint irGMScl ims.Thatw sallverywellwheni ascomingutfomebot o lessp t.now itscomingutfso eoneels'sl c fthPegasuscake.' DISCUSSIONANDCO CLUSION Thisfinalsectionoftherticleaddressesthque tionfwhatha estudyshowsabouthGPshavemanagedthreforms;o ,sLip ky(1980)uti theircapacitytoresisto -downimpo edchange.Itseemscl arth tt eN wZealandgovernmentast e ptingtog i somecontrolv rGPs'behaviouryimplementingac ntractualodef accountabilitya dcappingthe rbudge aryexposu eforsubsidies.Th sagenda seemsconsistentwithwhatoccurreditUK.Bro dbentll.(1991)h ve arguedthattUKchangeswereclearlyintendedtoch ngec lonizeGPbehaviour.L ughlinelal.(1992)presentthUKh althreformssSt eintrusionintthemedicalautonomyftheGPsandbreakdownftherustthatexistedhithertobetw enhGPsandheState.Whilet eremayhavb nr l tionshipoftrustb tweenhGPsa dStatetsomepoint,since1935hN wZ alandh s orysb enm reofthe natureofnongoingskirm sh,g nerallywonbytheGPs.Thatt mpt1935torestrictGPautonomyndfreedowasppo edbthBMA;ttemptorequirecontractsi1990wasalsoesi tedbym stofthGP .H w ver,veryfewGPsseemedtobawarefthconsequencesfth1991p oposals <31997JohnWiley&So s.Ltd.
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WiththerequirementforGPstocont actdirec lywi hRHA, financialroleimpi g duponthprofessionallewanthreate ing way.Thissprocessthatc uldnotbmanagedpr cticurrev n apracticem nag rbuth dtoinv lvhGPsdire tly. Whileclearlyprovidings mepr tectionagainstthr atofSt te intrusion,hedevelopmentfIPAsalsoprovidedn wwaytman ge professional/financialtensio .Ratherthh vi gco tr tindividu llyw th theRHA.individualGPsco lddelegateth teIPxecutivansett backto'being-good-GPs'.N tnlyditheIPAuff rthemfrg v rn ent reforms,italsobuffe edthefroeconomic-rationality,ab orbing financialcontracting,andthefin cialma agementabudg ti gasso ia ed withthecontractualaccount bilitym de . Thetensionbetweetfinancialndhprof ssionalaslcl ar discussiononh wthePegasussav ngwerebu d.M yGPsf ltat theycouldnotchargeftreatmentft r i allyilpatients.How v r,s decisionmeantth eGPeffectivelylosminu hcases.Thcre tionf a'specialneedsben fitforpat en sw tht rmi alillnesses'm nthGP couldarefothoseinne dwithoutbeingc ncernedbotheirili ypay them. ThedownsideofPegasusab orbingth sfinanci l/professionalte i ,nd theresponsibilitiesassociatedw thbudgetaryne otiationdma agement, wastheresponsibilityneededbm nagedysomeone.Aindic tth discussion,the ewerasmallcoofvGPshowereilli gtt kn theresponsibility.Laughl na .(1994b)n tedthatda g rofny absorbinggr upithateywilldev lopcolon zingtendencies. •That'swhyIlikethideaofPegasus,t'b nsortrel tivelypowe ful group,itmightjusttonedownth gsab tsl gh y'gov r andgettoopoliticallymotiva edthemselves.' Thereisomeevidencefcolo izingp t tialinthisas .Si cnd 1994therehasbe nlittleffortyRHAini iatech gessearh t Pegasush dpickedupthrespon ibilitycha geGPbe aviourp rtof theirbudget-holdingprogramme.Involve entiPegasuss rt dtch nghe wayindividualGPsbehave.But,wh nt yerechallengedregarding changest ats idywereaboutpractisingbett rm dicine,s vi g moneywasonlasecondaryco cern.Thcha gesweju tifieditermsf professionalratio lityatherthaec nomic. Whetherfurthechangeswillalsobacc ptedsea ilyremainson. MorganandWillmott(1993)arguethkeyrolfaccountingisc eate visibility.Theuseofinformationtechn logya dccountingbP g s so recordanmonitorindividualGPpresc ibingisal eadypres nt.Atth momentthaapp arsbaccepted,uthisomevidencetrly savingsretheasi tdre istancemaygrowifth rongoingpr ssuref financialgains. ©1997JohnWiley&Sons,Ltd.
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ManagementAccountingResearch,1998,,55-70 Costingheal hcare:studyfthe introductionfcostandbudgetreports intoaGPssociation KerryJacobs* Thispaperdescrib sc studyoft edevelopm nto tanbudg treportsin groupofgeneralpractiti nersinN wZealand.Th rh vbeume usatt mpts tointroducemanagementacc untingt lsihospitals,wev rli tlattentios beenpaidtoherolfman gementaccountingi rimarycarsetting.Whil accountingisofterepres ntedth atmedicalautonomywasfoundt GPsdidnotperceiveacc untingthreat,butratherpro sofrrevi w andeducation.Onereaswhythaccountingcontrolserea p edst t playedanimportantbound ryfunctiocreatingdint i inthassoc ation. Theaccountingcontrolswe elssebyGPseingnsistei ht ir accountabilitytheirpe rsndher foreeywn tr sistedm nage al intrusion.©1998AcademicPre sLimited Keywords:budgeting;g neralpracticeNewZeala do ganizationsound ie . 1.Introduction Inrecenty arsthstructureandmanagementofhe l hcareorg izationsh s becomeasignificantis uma yountri s.Soa thorh vuggest dth traditionalu o omyofmedicprofessiona shbeeroded(sFri n,1984) andthathealthc reorga izationsvb comecorpo tized(St ecklR iser, 1992).Asaconsequencefthisshift,ho pitalsvab orbedvalu sf market-administratione hos;physic ansndnurselos gt eirp ofess on letho andthereh sbe nincreasei administrativecountingco t ol.W ilemuch oftheliteraturediscussingorporatizationfhe lthafocu dnUSA (Pollitt,1982;McKinlayandArches,1 5)literaturefr mCanada(F iet., 1987),Sweden(Heid nh imer,80;Coombes19 7),N rway(Risk ,, Australia(Wil s,1988)andtheUK(H metl.1990)indicateis internationaltre d.Withithosecountriesw hastate-fu dedhe ls rvic corporatemodelhasbeenintroducedp licytre ucesndcrea efficiency.Hood(1991)calledthistre'N wPublicManagement' np es nts reformsintheUK,N wZealandnAustraliaxa plesfcorpo atizationf *DepartmentofAccountingndBusi essMe hod,WilliamR bert onBuildi g,50G rgeSq ar , UniversityofEdinbu gh,H89JY,K. Accepted3November1997 10443 05/98/ 100 5+6525.0 /0/mg9700bb
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56K.Jacobs publicadministration.Giventhincrea ingdemandsforostcontainmentwithou compromisingqual tyofmedicacare,thr leofmanag enta c untingtechnolo¬ gieshasincreased(CoombesandGre n,1989),inc easet thaalsobese bythemedicalstaffasthr ttoeirautonomyanvalu s(Dent,1991). Thispaperism deuofthreemajorpart .Tfirstreviewsanu berofth studiesoftheusaccountingwithiheal hc reorganizations.Acletheme emergesfrothesestudiesfconflictbetwe nmedicalanad inistratives aff whereaccountingispresentedbotasif rc nflicandt olfogai ingpower. However,mostfthesestudiehavbeenloc tedinh spitalsandiin tcl ar whethertheristamconflicta dresistanctaccou tingfrommedic lst ff whoarenotloc tedih spitals.Thesecondsectionfthepa rdescribesan empiricalstudyoftheimplementationofmanag entaccou tingtechnolo iesi GeneralPractitioner( P)ssociationinNewZeal nd.Tht irdsectiodiscuss s thisstudy,utilisingtheworkofLlewellyn(1994)trefleconw yth realit l noresistancetoheaccountinginnovati nsdescrib d. Theresearchm thodologyunderlyingthipap risbaseow aLaughl n(1995) describedasmiddlr ngeapproachtorese rch.Amiddlerangeapproachllows dynamicrelationshipbetw enth oryandmpirics.Anytheoreticalpropositionis seenas'skel tal',providinglangu gefoanalys ngobservedeffects.Thempiri a observationsarese nthfle h;perhapsexpanding,p rh pchall nging,perhaps modifyingtheoriginaltheoret calm d l.Anytheor ticalpropositionisther fores en asbeing'in-process'ratherth nhypothe ico-deductivepro itionbe ngt s e . 2.Managementaccountingihe lthc r Whiletuseofmanagementaccountinginhe ltc reorganiza io shasreceived lotfattentionverthlas15years,isnewthing.Wicki gelai.(1983) reportscostingexperimen sthatw econdu t dasea ly1916anLapsl y(19 4) discussedthesystemicuofbu getinthNHS(UK)priorthe1970s.Howev r, withthegrow hofc rporatismandgene lpublicsectoreform,inter staccount¬ ingpublicsectororganizationshasal ogrow .Ho d(1995)suggestedt accountingwascentraltohes ifta yfromdistinctivpublic- ervicemanage¬ mentethosandshifttowardspriv tesectormod lsanpractices. Accountingwasakeyel mentinthnco c ptionofac untability,si ci reflectedhightrusinthma k tandbusinessmethod.andlowtr sinp blic servantsandprofessionals.wh seactivitiethereforene dedtobm rcl s ly costedandevalua dbyacco n ingtechniques.(Hood,1995,p.94.) Inhissummaryofthedevelopmentofresp n ibilityacc untinginthNHS(UK), Lapsley(1994)lsoarguedthateprocesofc rporatiz tionhadletgrowtin accountingpracti es.Neverthelessth spracticesw redecou l dfromthkey resourcedecisionswh chinvolv dthm dicalstaff,maintainingambiguityover thefinancialresponsibilityofthemedicals affanprotectingtheirrofessio al autonomy.However,Griffiths(1983)recommendedthatdoctorsbegiv nresponsi¬ bilityforbudgetsandeprovidwithinformati nntheresourceconsequences theirdecisions.Th srecommendationresultedinase iesofprojectinvolvingform ofbudgetingandcostingbei ginitiatediUKhospitals.Thesprojectswera
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attempttoextendbudg taryc ntrolsystems' lsph resfho italac ivity, includingtheme icalarena'(Lapsley,1994.341). Theextensionofaccou tingco trolthemedicar ns tef confrontationbetweeadminis rat rsa ddoct rs.Hu(1994)guedth t evolutionofmanagementithNHS(UK)h db struggletw nd c orsn managersforthcontrolfhe lthpolicygendai simplic ionsf resource allocations.Heprese tedthmanagementf r snaccoun ingsyst s attempttoshiftefronti rifav ufmanagement.D n(1991)s idat NHS(UK)wasasiteofconflictbetwe nclini ala dadmi istrativestaff.Hrgued thatmanagementcontrolstr t gieswk yr af confl ctdompe ition betweendoctorsandmanagers,atechnologysuchman gementccountings animportantparfsecuringman gementpow rwiththorganizatioa d reducingthepowerfmedi alsta f.Coomb s(1987)s dthatdev lopmenan implementationofanagementaccou tingsystemsw sf uronflictb t administratorsddoctorbutth teresistanceacc untingcont olw perfectlyno malr sponsetcha grathert nomkindfi evi ablebattl . Perhapst econflictassociatedwithaccountingc n rolsife turefthho ital environment.Mosfthaccountinglit rat reh sfocusedthspitalset in andthefactatsignificantnumberofhe l hrprofessionalsop a einde en¬ dentlyfromhospitals,i priv terac ic sori smallr nerships,seemtoha beenignored.Thissr miss,ath rei v denceatindepend ntm i alp acti¬ tionersmayhavediffer ntvaluestoth seloc t dh spitals(Mey rnTuck r, 1992).AccordingtHar is(1 77)thetensionbetweed ct rsandadmi istratorsi afeatureofthinternalstructureofh pit ls.Ith ninev bletac ounting willbeperceivedasthr atyh a thcareprofessionalsritht r atctu lly featureofthehospitalenvironment? Incountriess chasthUKandNewZealand,G ralPr ctit o ers( P )h v playedanim ortantgate-keepingolidetermini gwhollh vacc ssot r medicalserv es(Fougere,1993).Whilt yw reinit lligno dreformst t focusedonre tructuringh pi alervices(su hasthUKndNZ),somecommen¬ tatorsh vepresentedrimarycarefocush lthy t msthw yfo ard future(Malcolm,1989).CertainlyGPsarenowec ivingmoreattentionb thfr governmentsa dithliterature. Thereisomevidencethatreformch g shavst tedtimpacton professionalautonomyndindep dencefGPs.L ugh inetal(1992)argu dh t thechangestoGPc tractri ingfr mtheNationalHealthSe vi ea d CommunityareAct1990(UK)werethr atoGPa tonomy.Caln nd Williams(1995)rguedthatwithinthprimaryc resectomanagerialismwa manifestithintroductionffun holdi g.However,wmanagem ntaccoun ingisimplicatednthesech ng sawhetherGPsaccountingt reat i autonomyremainsnclear. 3.EvidencefromN wZealand Researchmethod Thispaperpres ntsca estudyofthintr duc ionfco ts,bu g tsa dvariance reportsintanIndepe dentP acticeAssociation(IPA)b s diChris church,New
58K.Jacobs Zealand.Thisisparticularlyinterestingb ca setheIPAw sexplicitlyr atedto managethecontractualrel tionshiprb undary(Llewellyn,1994)b weehoc l RegionalHealthAuthority(RHA)ndeGPpractices. Interviewsw reconductedv ra27-monthperiodbet enSept mber1993and December1995andinvolv dGPs,practicenur esndadministratorsdw rep t ofalargerevaluationoftheNewZ l ndh lthref rms.Fourpracticese interviewed,whichallb camein olvspartfthPeg susIPA.Oneoft practicesinthcases udyo lbcon ideredl rg ;Practice1aov r14,500 peopleontheirregularpatientlist.Practices2,3nd4w esmallom iumwith 2000-3000patientseach.Thsocio- conomiclo ati nfachpra ticealsov ned. Practice1and3werelocatedifflu ntr as,practice2waloc edim x dar a andpractice4wasloc tedidepriv dr asi elationtootherp rtsfty. Therewasnoattempttobtainrandomrst isticalsamplefpra tices,buth y weresel ct dtoprovidearangfdiff rentsiz ss io- conomiclocati s. Interviewsw reconduct di ea hpr cticewimedi alns pports ffand repeatvisitsw remadona6- o thb iu ilthe dfproject.Thres arch methodwasbaseonorkfMoustakas(1990),Br adbentdLaughlin(1 95) andRubinau i(1995).Initiallythei terviewswereformala dsomewhat difficultprocessandthc mmentsprovi edbyin erview esw rg rallygua ed. However,asthstudyprogressed,m asurft tdev lopendint r i w es weremuchorewillingtvolunt erc mm nts.Generallyeindividualach practicetooknheolfkeyinf rmantdfteprovi edmostfthinf r ¬ tion.Whilet ismayhavintroducednelem ntfbiastohstu y,thenotionf keyinformantrconversationalpa tners(Rubidin,1995)iw llrecog ized inthequalitativerese rchliterature.Onnumb rofccasionsiwaspo sible attendpracticeme ti gs.Theinte vi wsanm etingsw rep d,transcribedbyh interviewerandeturn dtohparticipantsfortheirc mmentsa ndments. Theintroductionfmanageme taccou tingpr cticesinthPegasusIPA providedanopportunitytstu ywhetherme icalractitionersp ra ingoutsidef hospitalstructureperceivedmanagementac ou tingsystemssnin rusioa d threatoth irautonomy.T eNewZe landhe lthf ms,GPcon ractndthe developmentandoperationfIPAsnow llr prese edisec arys urces. Whenpublishedsourc sareus ,th yh vbeclearlyr fer nced;how ver,mu h ofthematerialh sbeencollectedfr munpublishedso cesnper onalintervi ws. Attemptshaveb enmadeov rifyhdocu entsandintervi wcomm ntswh re possible. TheformationofIndepende tPracticAsso iati s TherelationshipbetweetS atandGPsiN wZe la dh verb n particularlygoodndisbestrepresen ederiesfski mishes,ge rallyw ny theGPs.In1930sfirstLabourovernmentNewZealando ghttcr ate ataxfundedhe lthcaresyst mwhicsreollitiz ns.Foll wingprot acted negotiationbetweeng neralpractitionersdhS t ,compromiser ¬ searchedwhergen alpractition rss uredhilevelofau omyr latively littlecontrolfromthS at(Fouge e,1993).Generapracti ioners rv c swot directlyfundedbytheS at ,uts ri sofee-f r-s rvicesubsid eswh chcov r d mostoftheirfee.Thesesubsidi sw rla rextendedincludr gpr c ibed, theestsu dandmanyotherpracticeco tssuchmploymentfn rs .
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Throughoutthe1950s,196and1970stherew resomat e ptstincr aseh
valueofthsubsidiesinli within lationandincr asedco ts.However,yl t 1980sthesubsidiesw rvirtuallyinsignificantandtherewseriousd cussions withintheMinistryofHealthaboutscrappingthemal ogether.T iswasrejected,
itwasfeltthatcuttingtheGPsubsidyltogetherwouldred cehaccessfpoor tomedicals rvi es.Th refore,in1990,therewasnttempttalt rthubsidy arrangementsndplaceGPocontractualrel tionshipw ththeS .GPere givenanopportunitytsigaf rmalcontractwiththeMi is erfHe thwhich wouldcapthefeest atheycouldchargep ientsbwouldgiveth mi h r subsidiesforeachp ti nttheytt nded.Whilefewpractitionersch set k contracts,seeingimmediatefinancialda c ssb nefitforp tients(M Ph rson,1990)mostwerestronglyopposedthc ntracts,seeingth mast eatoh ir autonomyandincome.Resistancethecontractproposalwcl arlyex ressedbytheNewZealandM dicalAssociation(NZMA),whichdviseditmembersagainst acceptingtheontractandbr ughtactiona ainsttheovernmentwhichques¬ tionedthlegalityfthecontract1(T t rsfieid,1990).hf ctthateLabourGovernmentlostthelectioni1990ffectivelyendedthc tractproposal.T proposedcontractdidogenerateanypoliticalsupportf mGPsndei forcedhebeliefthatGPscoulddefeatgovernmentpolicyth oughc ll ctivection.UpontakingpowerinDecember1990,thNationalGov rnmenta ouncedthat theyin endedtoconductanextensiver viewofallsp ctsofocialwel rerovi ion,withthein entionofincr asingtargetinga dreducingspe ding(C fide tialCabinetStrat gyCommi tee,CSC[90]10).InDecember1990h yesta lished taskforce'identifya dinvestigatetheoptionsrd f ningher l sf government,theprivatesec orandindividualsifu ing,provi iona dregulation ofhealthservices'(Upton,1991,Annex).Ohe15February1991thetaskforce presentedth irr porttoheg v rnment.Itheirporttheyd scr bedf urdiff rent waystorunhe lthsystem,llfwhichwereinflu ncedbyhUSHMOodels;involvedsomele lfco petitionandseparationb tweehfun rdhe provisionfhealthcareservices.Aft rsomedi cus iongovernments lectedo ofthefouroptionsanddevel pedintoapolicy.Theolicyaperwasreleasedt thepublicin1991(Upton,1991)andan ouncedthatthealthc restructures wouldbealteredtcreateanin r almarketstructure.U d rhxistingins itutio¬ nalarrangementsthrespo sibilityfortherovisionfseco darycare(anpublichealth)serviceswalocat dtregionalleveinstructuresk wnasAreaHe lthBoards.Upton(1991)announcedthatAreaHe l hB r swouldbdisbanded andreconstitutedintoseparateregionalpurchasing(RegionalH lthA th rities) andprovi er(Cr wnHealthEnterprises)organizations.U derthewstructure,healthservicepro iderswerenolo g rfund dd r ctlybythetate,utndir ctlythroughcontractswittheRHA .Iwaslsoearh tprivatendvoluntaryhospitalscouldc mpetef rfundingwiththeStateownedCHEs.TheRHAswouldhavefixbudget,ba edontheizea dcharact risticsofthe populationtheyserved.Un ikethA aHealthBo rds,theRHAsw renotelectedbutweregove nedyaappointedboar ,s lectedopr vi e'h alth,m nagement andbusi essexpertise'(Upton,1991,.32). 1KingvClark,NZHighCourtAuckland,28Sep1990;ThomasJM1335/90.
60K.Jacobs Asthepolicypaper(Upton,1991)focusedohestructuralarrangementsf secondarycareapublichealth,theimp icationsofthechangesf rge eralpractice weresomewhatbscured.On fthf r levantstatementswashecommentabou theintegrationofhealthfunding. TheGovernmentplanstoin egratethfundingf rllpersonalh althrvices— visitstodoctors,prescnptions,otherc mmunityba dervices,ho p talervices— andtoplacethresponsibilityf rma ag nglth sfund gwiththeR g o alHealthAuthorities(RHA ),whichillt nbinchargeofpurchasingtot lealthare servicesforthpeopleinth irregions;encourage(ing)b tt rco-ordinationihe managementoftotalhealthcarecrossge eralp actice,othercommunity-basedhealthservicesandhospitalservices...(U ton,1991,p41) Fromthisstatement,iwasevidthageneralpractitionerswereb i gcon¬ structedasindep n ents rvicepro dersa dwereexp ctedocon ractwithth RHAforpatientsubsidiesth yhap eviouslyclaimedd rec yf othegov rnment.Thenatureofthecontractualagr ementswasflexib endth rewasor s rictionon thetypeofagreementRHAcouldstablish. Oncethisstructurewasproposed,hMini t rfHealthes ablishednumb rfdifferentg oupstmplementthc anges.TH al hReformsDir ctoratewas chargedwithdr f ingpolicynlegislation,c mmunicatingeref rmsthepubl c anddevelopingthefr meworksandstructuresfhewealtharesy em.O areaofparticularconcernw sthpropo edc ntractualarrang mentsbetwe nGPs andtheRHAs.Aindicated,thisareawasun erd veloped(perh sint ntionally)i thegovernmentpolicydocum nt(Upton,1991).Th refore,i1992,heH althReformsDirectoratecom is ionedaconsultinggr upgived iceth sar a.Curiouslyen ghtheNewZ alandG n ralPr ctitionersAssoci tion(NZGPA)was alsoinvolvedncommissioningthw rkandther commendationsw repr se ted tob thbodies(UniServices,1992).Thek yrecomm ndationwasth tprimaryare providersshouldrganizethemselv sintocoll ctiveroupswh chycall dInd ¬ pendentPracticeAssociations(IPAs). TheconceptfthIPAwasw lcomedbyothfthsponsorsiaclear benefitsforGPandf rtheH althR formsDirec orate.TheDirectoratewt IPAasneffectivewaytotra sf ri ksfr mthRHAsothGP .Fr mGP perspective,membershipofanIPAsi plifiedthprocessfnegotiatingontr cts andplacedthemmstrongergotiatingp sitio ,itspre dthadministrativecos s ofacontractualrel tionshipwiththeRHAov rl gegroupdp ovided protectionfauni edfr t.Ma yfheGPssawcon ractswiththeRHA threatofinterferencetoh irm di alautonomydthoughtthwouldb'left alonetgetowiththjob'ifth ywereapanfgroup(Marshall,1992). Currentlyth rearpp oximately40IPAsa undthc ntryaove5 %fth GPsinNewZealandrepanofthesegroups(Malcolmdll,1996). Withint eChristchurchar aover90%fGPs(approximately200)arep nf acollectivecontractnegotiatedbythloc lIPA,Pegasus.Te asusM dical Group,nefthlargestIPAiNewZealand,camentoexistenceM rch1993 asnincorporateds ciety.Itsublishedobjectiv sw rch r table;topr vi equ ity patientcare,toenableloc lGPstplaymorctiveri r idingarf th r patientsndtosp ndymoneythesav drovi ingadditionalser icesf r patients(PegasuublicityFlyer,Spr ng1996).By996Pegasush dmadesuffici nt
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savingstobebletofferfrs rvicessu hah a ingte tf children,mammogra¬ physcanningandmokingcessatioschemes. Onthe2November1993tPegasusMedicalGroupsignedth irfi tcontract withtheSouthernRegionalHealthAuthorityw oagreedpemnfee-for- servicesbasiswh lePegasusagre dto'co-ordinatedeliverprimaryh al har servicesinChristchurch'.Pegasusderightosubcontractthep ovisionf medicalservices.Mostfthloc lGPs gnedaco tractwithPe sus,b oming subcontractorsfothepr visionfp maryhe lthservicesitha e .Tcontract betweenP gasusandindivid alGPreproducedthefee-for-services bsidi sb tt meantthGPsgaveupt eirrightos ndubsidyclaimsd rectltoeRHA. AswiththeGPfundholdinginitiativetUK,therewerd ff r tlev lsf involvementithIPAs.M fthGPswhorememb rsofPega usweren t interestednpoliticsrdealingwiththeRHAndsawth irmembershipswayof avoidingchange.ThesGPswouldvconstitutedapproximately70%fth membership.BotMalcolmandP well(1996)andJ cobs(1997)h vesugge ted thatGPss wtheIPAsaformofprotectionndbufferaga nstthu certaintyinvolvedwiththcontractingarrangements.Approximately25%feGPat joinedPegasusdibecamectivelyinvol d,a tendingregulartingsasome evenbecameinvolvedinco mitteedr viewstruc uresw hinPegasus.Thore activistGParguedthatt yh dbecomeinv lv dnPe susto: 1.improvethecaravailablefoth irpatients;2.improvegeneralpracticest ndards;a d 3.shiftt ebalanceopow rfr mse ondaryhealthcaretprim rya . Thet irdgroupw thinPegas st emo tinflue ced rectiona d policiesfthgroup.Twasasmallgroupfindividualswhoerefundamental theformationofthIPAndoccupiedthk yleadershippositions.numberf thesepeopleweralreadyw llkn wniloc lcirclesf roth rproj ctsth yh initiatedanforh irinvolv mentme icalpolitics(suchasthees st nceo 1990GPcontract).Thisg oupregardedthreformsschall ngene tablish d theIPAasproactiveesponsetht reatth irutonomya dinc me. In1994theRHAreleasedapositionp perwhichindicatedt atres rictingGP incomewasnottheirprimaryc ncernsthpr dictedth tGPsubsidieswe growingata eflessthat1%p ryear.H ver,th yd dintendot r t pharmaceuticalndlaboratorycos sthepredictedth tt seco sw uldgr w 8-9%peryea .Thetotalexpenditurepharmaceuticalswassohigh rth n theexpenditureonsubsidisingGPsf 2. Inordertocapthp armaceuticalndlaboratoryt stbudgetthRHAinvi ed Pegasustoenteri otw'fundholding'projectsas ociatedwithlab torys san forpharmaceuticals.Budgetw reestabli hedonthb sisf1992/93spending withanego iatedgr wthfac ortec gnizet en tionalveragegr wthi spending. IfPegasusmembersco ldspendlethanebudgetl v lth ywouldgretain 70%ofthesavingsosp nd'impr vementfealthservices'.ThRHAretained therightofapprovalnh wa ysa ingsweretobspent.U d rthini ial agreementthRHAcarri dllofthriskf ra yov rspending. 2In1994thecostsforpharmaceuticalsw reSI 0illionwhilel boratoryc stswerejuv rS20m llion andGPsubsidiesju toverS30million.
62K.Jacobs Therolefaccounting MembershipofPegasul dthintroductionfn wformvisib lityandreview forGPs,basednaccountingme surement.Ov rperiodof3y s,GPwere madeawarofthecostftheconsumabl stheyuseda dwers bjecttmont ly budgetaryreportsdetailinghowmuchtheysp ntonlab ratotestsanpharmaceu¬ ticals.Whilem nyoft eGPsth ughtt ateRHAwouldat e pttcontroltheir behaviour,t ech ngeiniti ti scamnotfrothepur singauthoritiesbfrom Pegasus.Initiallym nyofthec angeswerrestrictedtasm ll'project'g upbu overtimeh ywerextendedthentiremembership. Costawareness.OncPegasusignedthe'fu dholding'agreem ntwiththRHA, attentionwaspaidtohowspendingolab ra oryte tsandp rmaceuticalscoulb reducedamongPeg susmembers.Labor toryt stbecathfirst rg ty werese nasbeinge si rar atoreducsp ndi ginandlecomplexthan pharmaceuticals.Thewt omaj rlaboratoriesinthChristchurcha eth t processedtestforGP .IndividualGwerefretrequ stawidr ngoftests fromeitherfthelaboratori s.Thbudgetholdingagreem ntwithRHAmeant thatifPegasuscouldunder-spendonpr vi uyeabysa i gm neyolabor tory costs,theywouldgettretainsomeofthesavingstspe donpa i tc r . Thelaboratoryinitiativeinvolvedthcre tionofum erfpeer-reviewgroups, whichmetanddiscussete torderingbehaviouanindiv dualt tus gepatter s. IndividualGPsweregi nthopportu itytvoluntanlypar icipateinthesegrou s undertheleadershipofherGPs.Thprimaryempha isoftheproj ctgroupswas GPs'educationandtheeliminationofunnecess rytes i g. Asonly40fthe20memberGPw reinvolv dthpeer-revi wgr up ,th focusneededtobextendedtcr atageneralcostawaren ssam gllPeg su members.Researchindicat sth tdoctorsof enhavlittlknowledgfthc s theestthatt eyorder(L ngelal.,1983;Fowkes,1985).Howev r,thprovisi nf costinformationcansignificantlyalterthqua titya dtypeotestsheyord r (EisenbergandWilliams,1981;Coheeta .,1982;H ytal.1982;Longetal., 1983).Thiswaalsofoundtobetr einhiscase. Thesecondstagofthlaboratoryinitiativex endedtheeducat onemphasitoall Pegasusmember ;makingth mawareofthcostsftlaborato ytesthey orderedandencouragingth mtoorderfewertests.IndividualPegasmembers werecontactedbytheIPAandwereasketoreducetheirusoflaboratori sw e possible.Theyweretoldthatsavingswouldbere ainedythIPAandusto benefitpatients.Thelaboratoriesweralsocont ctedbyPeg susandweasket printthecostsofeachdifferentt stonhrd rforms,makingthfinancial implicationsofrequesti gaparticulartestobvi ste eryGP. I'msurethefocusonco tflabresulth sinfluencedmequitstrongly.Know ng thaticostsroughly$20todaswabndkno inthalivefu c ionte tco ts $21-22makesyouthinkw etherisreallynecessary.SoIwouldsa'vprobabl reduced.Idon'tthi kthatwasahighuserofthoseingsint efirstplacbuI havereducedth mconsider bly.(DS) TheresponseofthGPinterviewedhisinitiativewasu prisinglypo ti e. EventheGPsw owerereluc anttobec meactiv lyinvolvedPegasusaccept d theneedtoreduceth irlaborat rytes i ganw lcomedbotheducational
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informationabouttheeffectivenessofdiff ntki dst sti ga dfinan al informationaboutthecostsofests.W thin9m nthsherewaover30%dr p inlaboratoryusageands gnificantfin ci lsavings.Wh letpr jectdids significantamounofm ney(over$750,000by1995)itwasge eralls eas educationinitiativebyheGPsvolv d. Thegoalwasn ttsavemoneybut inkrec r fullando lyrd rtestsh t weregoingtiveus fulinformat onath rhju tickiallbox sntlab formwithoutth nkingomuch.(DrL) In1994apharmaceuticalsiniti tivew slsolaunch d.Peg sumemb rw r invitedtopar icipateha maceuticalsedu ationr j t,approxim tely40GPs agreedtobec meinvolv d.Thparticipantsw rea hpl ede rgr up, chairedbyonGP.Tpeergroupsm treg laras ssscoulddis uss theiruseofdiffer ntp armaceuticalsndco pa eprescribingbehaviour.Amosf theavailableinformationonpharmac uticalsw sdocu e tsp odu edbyt pharmaceuticalcompaniest roj tw sse nbyGPinvolvedasimp rtan sourcefindependentformationnthdiff rerugsys d.Italspr vi d GPsanopportunitytle rnfr mtherddevelopb spractiseguidelineso themselves. Theobjectiveistmakeusinkoraboutwharedoing.inincentiv hasbeenthatifwerca efulnhatdoi gt ys vingsmade willbereturnedtohePegasusassociation,hichindir ctlyofou .SIi k, particularlywiththepres ribing,t atsmallg oupsrrunn ngple havefoundthemv ryelpful,quiteeducationa .(DL) Followingtheestablishmentfproj cg upsllPe a umemb rwers nt adviceonprescribingbehaviourdd ugusag .T swel occompani dy moregeneralr sea chdocum ntsoparticularco ditionsdpref r edtre tm ts. Theprescribingt ingismo eeducational.Morlikinfo m tiontreatme tsand themedicationousefors yrinarytractinfectio s,wh thc sandwhapeople aredoing.(DrS) Reportingandvarianceanalysis.Upu l1995lftheP g suiniti tivwer voluntaryandGPscouldhoosewhethrn tt ea tedbinv lved. However,during1995amo thlyreportingpr c ssainitiat dthi volvedllf thePegasusmembersandcreatedn wl v lofisibilitynco rol. Butwhenyoudorderatestsom onel ewillkn whatyouh vna d maybeaskedtoexpl in.(DrC) Thereportinginitiativebeganec usonfthP asusl ad sh ds ro interesticomputertechnology(des ribedaompu erwhizbyanotheGP).B downloadinginform tionfroHealthB efitsLtd.hwbletanaly eindivi ual GPspending.Initiallythiswaintendedofacilit tetp er-revi wgroupsass c ¬ atedwiththelaboratoryntl t rpha mac uticalsproject,ho eviso n becameapparentth tre or ingcouldxtendedin l dlmemb rs.
64K.Jacobs HealthB nefitsLtd.(previouslypanotheDepartm te lth)c ds centralcl a nghousefopaymenttopharmacistsa dlaborat ri .The efort ey hadccurateinformationntheprescnbingantest ngbeh viour.AllP g s memberswerprovidedithnumbe dlabo atorytestfor sanw reldht i laboratoryus gewouldbem nitored.IndividualGPsrec ivem nthlyr p t showingacategorizedbreakd wnofh wmuchth yw respending.This comparedtheaver gsp ndingofthePeg susGP .Ther ortb c regularfeaturerom1995.Aspa tftheirc n ractualoblig tionsGPw rea s requiredtor coranid ntificationnumberoallfth iprescriptionsdby1996 pharmaceuticalreportsweralsointroducedandw tea hGPpresc ib ds comparedtaPegasusveragndn tion laverage. Theintroductionfmonthlyrepor i geprese tedtcr ationfan wlev lo visibilityforGPprescnbingandlab atoryusage.Howev r,thoin ol edd d seethc ang sasthr atot iraut nomy,bec useth ngeswerinitiat dy otherGPsraththanadministratorsot est te. Ithinki 'samutualassociation—il kenoldfashion dguilrcollec vefli mindedpeoplealg ttingtogetheransayingletsdthiwell!Thereinoh vy handsayingthatwehavgottthi klikeis,ordothat.(DE) Theysendoutreportsamonthlba issh wingy ucostsco paredwithot r GPsandcomparedthenu berofpatie tsy uhavsee .Ijustogsourmind thatestscostm neyandsiquitegood.(DrL)
fO
H.Thosethatwerinterviewedarguedatc ang swerleadingobett rme ical practiceandlthoughsavingmoneyw saissue,theostimp rt np t abilitytocomparey uspendingtotherGPs. BasicallyitnvolvesmsubmittingwhaIdtot erpeopl 'sscrutiny.ham d uslookatwhatedandtquestionheass mewayfdoi gthing .(DrE) Asfarsprescribinggoes,c tisn'talwaytthfro fmind.Buthenitw s interestingoseethatIwaitch aperhalfoftgroup,mtanexpensiv prescriber.Thelig tersidoftaverag ,wh chmaky ufeelg o .(DR) OneofthGPsinterviewedwac iticalofthmo thlyr portingsystem.Butthat wasnotbecausehiactivitieswerb ingmon tored,utbecausethsyst mo ld notdisti guishbetweenwhathentatspracticandwhatsps eci l clinicwhichheoperated. Thereportsaruseful,b tnothm ch,becat yn'tseemoeparateou whatIdoinmyclinic,wh cisquiteheavynt st ng,frowhatIdhere.a waitingforthenexntc ma ditheyhaven'tg trigbyn xonIwill ringupagaindcomplain.(DrS) Whiletherwassomeini ialdoubtwhetherthelackfdirectfinanc alincentiv s wouldprovideindividualGPssufficientmotivatiotchangee rbehav our,s didnotappeartbeproblem.AlthoughGPsdidn tirecdybe efit,t eyappear tovaluehefacttht eydidhavsomcon rolo erthfundsthr ug associationandthatt esavingswouldul im telybenefith rpatient .
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Itisamazing,app re tlyh vbeenav gllofthismo eynlab r torstufand prescnbingwhi hIa n'tawareofevet yi godndn wg tllfthe fundsbackorotherthings,w ichisice.(DR) Beyondthebudgets TheUniServices(1992)r portsugg stedthaGPmi hbecomfundedyt RHAstopurcha esecondaryservicfromho pit lsandtherproviders.Malc lm (1993)alsopresentedthdevelopmentfIPAsinN wZe la dco lective versionoftheUKfundholdingini iativ s.However,d t ,Pega usI Asn t reallyapurch serb trovid rnismorlikecommunityfundh lderstUK ratherthanst ndardorl-pu chasingfund ol e s.Peg suhini i dw minorprojectsinattempttdev lophli ksbetw nri arydseconda services.Anoutpatientp oj cwstar dhichinvolthgastroenterologya d respiratorydepartmentstlocalh spital.Thobjectiveft isproj cwgive GPsmorecont oloverpatientswhomth yrefer edoutpatients r ic s. werealsogiventhbilityosp cifhichconsultantirpatientsawd time-framenwhichhepati ntouldbs e .Toutpatie tsr j cdidn t involvethe'purchasing' fsecondaryrvic srholdi gbudg tf patie tc r . However,anumberftheGPsintervi w dndothc mmentatorssafundh ld¬ ingandthepurchasingofse ondaryrvicessw yfor aru . Well,generalpracticeismovingtowa dsfBntish-typyst m.Pati nt registration,capitationfundholdinggeneralpractit o ersb dg ton¬ tractsforhi ,t atandeoth r.Imsurei llnw y(DL) ManyIPAsrenowcontemplatingt kingbudg tsf rsecondaryare..hei littleappreciationthatIPAscouldb er ls l ti nwaiting-listroblem. Waitinglistsh velmostdi appearednm nyGPfund-h ldingract c sBrit in. (Malcolm,1996) Discussion Whileithasbeenrgu dinmuchoftlit rat ret atccountingcontrolsr threatoGPautonomy,eevidenceinhiscasedsupp rttonclusion. TheGPst atwereintervi wedsawthin roductionfaccountingsyst msn extensionofthemedicalducationprocessa ds ggestedt tm n hlyr por s madethemorawaroft irwnbe av our,nd,sr sultetterGP .T accountingsystemwasn temanagerialthr atbuonp rfe reviewproc ss.MostfthGPinterviewedseemedtbu ep rvi wand comfortablewithalevefscrutinybeca si mfr therGPr tthan administratorsobure ucra s.Whenitws ggestedth tP gasucouldruy managers,bureaucratsoccoun ants,thic us ds meo cern. WellifabusinessmanwasrunningPegasusIwouldn'tev ryh ppy.Thdo 't havethsamekindofuchnhingst atge ralpractitionerhod ctors. Thesamet inghappe sinospitalys m—I'vt lk donu berf specialistsandthey'veaip oplecomingiwhoren'tmedicaldo 'g a ph complexityrdon'tgraspthephiloso hyandtphilo o hyusuallit t patientcomesfirst.Mon yiseco daryis u .(DrS)
66K.Jacobs Thefactt atheprocesswascontrolledbyGPswhoereconcernedwith 'protectingthsta usofGPs','improvingthequalityofmedic lpractise'an'c ng forpatients',seemedextr lyimportant.So ehowchangeinit at dbyoth rGPs wasnotseenasintrusiveoathreattGPaut nomywhilech ngethhadbeen initiatedbymanagers(seeJacobs,1995)orthe rli ra temptsbythgovernm ntt initiatechangeresultedivo alresistan e.Changesingovernmentrusubsidies havecausedtleasoneGPtstoppractising(ThePre s,1996).How v r,todat , Pegasushamadenoatt mptstoforcGPstostd ingany hiagainstthewill. Thebudgetsandcostvisibili yinitiatedbyPegasuwerese nbyGPsaswayto directlyben fittheirpatients.Indivi ualpatientswouldnbedeprivedbecauseGP werestillfretopr scribth'best'drugothe'best'te tswhenth ythoug tt ati wasnecess ry.However,patie tsw uldbenefitfroma ysavingsGPsm dea Pegasuscouldusethesavingstoprovideadditionalservice .Thisseemedtoprovide sufficientmotivationforGPstchangetheirprescribingpatt rnsandlabor orytes usage. To summarize,GPsdidn tseethenewaccountingsys emsaintru iv managerialsim,asthreattotheirautonomyorasdangetpatientwelfar . However,thesechangeswerwelcomedaspanofGPeducationandp erreview processinthebeliefthattchangeswouldpositivelybenefthstatusofprimary careandthehealthofpa ients.Tunderstandw ythrespo setoaccountinginth GPassociationstudiedwasodifferenttohresp nstowardsaccountingdescnbed inhospitalbasedstudies,isnece arytorefl coh worganizationalboundanes areconstructedandmaintained. Llewellyn(1994)chartsathree-st pdevelopm ntofrganizationalthe ry.Classi¬ calmanagementtheoryconceptualizedorganiza ionsas'closedsystem'wherea commonsetofgoalswerachievedthrou ht eprincipl sofinternaldesig .Such organizationswerepresenteda'detached'andr lativ ly'impermeable'toenviron¬ mentalinfluenc s.Op nsystemstheoryrecognizedtheimportanfinterac ions betweenthorganizationandsocietyandsuggesteth tesurvivaloftheorganiza¬ tiondependedupon'appropriate'relationshipsw hthenvironment.Bounda y maintenancearguesthatt eboundariesbetweenthorganizationandthenviron¬ mentarnotjustrelationshipstobemanaged,butarwhconstitutesaorganiza¬ tion.Boundanesdistinguishbetweewhatisandwhatinotthorganizatioa ds , bytheprocessofexclusi nand/orinclusion,organizationalide t yscreatedand maintained.Theseboundanescatakmanydifferentfor s;thphysical/produc¬ tive,financial,psychological,legalandt mporal.Llewellyn(1994)sugges edtha financialaccountingisimplicatedintheprocessofboundarymainte anceandinthe managementofmeaningbetweenthorganizationandsociety.Manageme tc¬ countingalsoplaysanimportantbound ryrole:thisistactsbindingstructures, producinganreproducingintern lu itywithintheorganization(Llewellyn,1994, p.14)Byreducingorabsorbinguncertaintyandbycreatinghistor ,accounti g sustainstheimageoftheorganizationasnent y.Accounti gaalsottocreate moralorder: Systemsofaccountabilityalsembodymoralorde :acomplexsysteofreciproc l rightsandresponsibilities.Thepractiseofaccountabilityinstitutionalizestheno i ofaccountability;itinstitutionalizesther ghtofs mepe pletholdo herst accountfortheiractions.(RobertsandScapens,1985,p.448)
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Llewellyn(1994)observedthattcostingsystemofaJap nesemanufa turing conglomeratewasextendedtoredu ethautonomyofindependentsubcontractors andtobindthosefirminamanagerialrel ionshipofsurveillanceandcontrol. Theaccountingsystemembodi dthe'rights'ofthmanagem nttoholdthe subcontractorstoaccoun . Thenatureandoper tionfthPegasusI Acontr stsstronglywiththtypical structureofmosthospitals.Fir t,Pegasuwspecif c lycr atedathreshold betweenmemb rGPsandthRHA.Peg susw sintendedtocr atalegitim cy withtheauthoritiesandtoallowindivid alGPstocontinuerunningtheirmedical practicesunaffe ted.Howev r,aspartth tlegitimacyprocessPegasushadtob seentobext ndi gfinancialcontr ltmemberGPs.Thiserv dtwopurposes:i satisfiedthereform rsth twantedto'transfernsk'fromheRHAtheGPand protectedGPsfromthethreatt alocalRHAwouldimplementth iown systemsofcontrol. WithinthePegasusI Atheaccountingsystemplayedanimporta tb nding structure.Pegasusdidnohaveclearphysic lors at alboun ari s.Members ipwa constitutedthr ughafinancial/cont actualrelationship.Thereforethfinanci la d contractualarrangementstookaenhan edimporta ceasitcrea dbinding structuresforthePegas sandhelpedtdistinguishbetw enthosw ower membersandthosewhowerenot.Trefustobpartothaccountingsystemw s torefusetbpartofPegasus.'Tbep rtofanorganizationistbesubjecttothat organization'ssystemofaccount bili y',(RobertandScap n ,1985,p.14)theref re tobepartfasystemofaccountabilityistbep rtofanorganization. Asindicated,systemsofaccountabilityal oinvokem ralorderandgi esome peopletherighttoholdherstaccount(Robe tsandScap n ,1985).Bya ce ting thecontractnegotiatedbyPegasus,individualGPsbecamesubjecttoasy temof accountabilitywhichgavethePegasusaut oritiestherig tto'holdthemtaccount'. Theintroductionfcostinformationandmonthlyrep rtsw sacc ptedasnormal extensionofthiobliga io .Howev r,wit inhospitalsaccountabilityisnconfli tas dualstructuresofacco n bilityhaveemerg d(Scott,1982).Medi lstaffare requiredtoacco ntttheirmedi alpee sforth iclinic la tivi i sandtothe hospitalmanagementf rtheiruofres urces.Anyattempttex dthmanage¬ mentaccountabilitytoincludlini ala tivit esisa urallygo gtbese na threattoindividualautonomyantohepeerorprofessionalaccountabili ystru ture (Jacobs,1995;Prest n,19 2).Thitensioniswhatl eatthheofclinical resistancetoaccountingcontrol. Conclusion Thispaperbeg nydescrib gtheint restmanagementaccount ngihealthc r organizations.Mosfthestudi stdateh vbeenfocu eonh spi alsettings. Thispaperpresentsastudyofacco ntinginNewZeal ndGPassoci tionandasks thequestion—domedicalprofessionalswharindepend ntothehospitalsystem havedifferentattitudetow dsaccountingsystemsthanthoworki gwit in hospitals? AcasestudyoftheoperationfthePega usI Awaspresentedwiparticul r attentionbei gp idtoheirusofmanagementaccounting.Thm stcurious
68K.Jacobs featureofthiscaswaecttGPeillingac epn wvisibility withalossofsomeutonomy.Theaccountingsyst sern temanag rial threatbutasparofrocesse rreviewndeducation. Accountingsystemsplayedimportantbound ryfun tiwithinthPega s association.First,theyprov dedcle rth esh lddis inguishingbe w ent ho weremembersandthoshorn t.Sec nd,ea countingsyst msservt bindthemembersogetheriacommonpurpos .T rftIPAwa shareint econtr ctualagreementdbsubjecthaccoun ingsyste .A such,allmembers'shared'inthsavingst atresult dfro elabor oryandth prescribingojects,althoughllsavingsw repentop t ntse ic s. Thereisan edfourth rresearchi toh waccountingfunctionsorganizati ns thataredominat dbymedicalprof ssionals.Thisaperque t ntassump ion thataccountingisnevit blythreaomedicalaut n my.T spaperlsoindic tes thataccountingcanhavenimport trolnre tingnddefi itorganizatio¬ nalboundaries.Thereforethconceptfwh tco stitutaorga iz tionmust challengedandexte ded. Acknowledgements:nearli rversiofth sp p rapr sentedaN wPublicSector: HealthCareReformsS minar,UniversityofEdinbu g ,Sept mb r1996.Thauthor gratefullyacknowledgeshelpfulcommentsfrothp rticipatconferencea df SueLlewellyn,Falcon rMit hellandIrviLapsl y. References Broadbent,J.andLaughlin,R ,1995.Developi gempiricalresear h:xam leinformedby ahabermasianappro ch,Un-publishedworki gr,Essexiv sity. Calnan,M.dWilliams,S.,1995Challengestoprofessionalauto omyheUnit d Kingdom?Theperceptionsofg n ralpractitioners,InternationalJour afH l hS rv s, 25( ),219-241. Cohen,D.,Jones,PLitte bergB.a dNeuhaus r,1982.D ec stinform uon availabilityreducephysiciante tusage?MedicalCar ,20( a ch),86-292. Coombes,R.andGreen,K.,1989.W rkorganizatioa dp oductch ngeintservic sector:thecaseofUKNa ionalHealthServi ,inW d,.( d )Thransform tion Work?,London,UnwinHyman. Coombes,R.,1987.Acc untingf rthecontrolfdo t rs:managementinf rm tiosyste s inhospitals,AccountingOrganizatio sndSo iety,12(4),389-404. Dent,M.,1991.Autonomya dthemedicalprofession:medicalau itndanag me t control,inSmith,C.,Nigh s,DandWill ott,H(eds.)h te-Collarork,Lond Macmillan. Eisenberg,J.a dWilliams,S.,1981.Costcontainmenta dch gingphy ici 'sractice behaviour,JournalAmericanMedi lAss c tio ,246(19),2 95-2201. Fougere,G.,1993.Strug lingforc ntrol:hestatea dtmedicaprofessi niNew Zealand,inHafferty,F.ndMcKi y,J.(eds )TheCha gingMedicalProfe sion,Oxford, OxfordUnive sityPress. Fowkes,.,1985.Doctor'skn wledgefthec stsmedicalare,MedicaEduc i n1 , 113-117. Freidson,E.,1984.Thechangingnatureofprof ssionalc ntrol,An u lRevi wSoci logy, 10,-20. Fried,B.,Deber,RandLeatt,P.,1987Corporatizat onanddepriv tionfheal hs rvicesin Canada.InternationalJour alfHe l hServices,17(4),567-584. Griffiths,R.,1983.NHSManagementInquiryReport(thGriffithsReport),Lo d nDHSS. Ham,C.,Robinson,.andBenzeval,M ,1990.H lthCheck:healthr formsi internatio¬ nalcontext,London,Ki gsFu dInstitute.
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APPENDIX 2
THE PEGASUS IPA
2.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IPA
The historical tension between GPs and the State made many GPs reluctant to accept
the Section 51 agreements while the overheads and risks associated with developing
their own contracts made this option 'too expensive' for most practices. Within the
Christchurch area most GPs chose to become part of a collective contract negotiated
on their behalf by the local IPA, Pegasus, which allowed them to continue on fee-for-
service subsidy arrangements. The Pegasus Medical Group was a large Independent
Practice Association (IPA) which came into existence in March 1993 as an
incorporated society. Currently about 90% of the local GPs are part of this group.
Only GPs were allowed to join Pegasus unlike some other IPAs which were seen as
'primary health groups' rather than GP associations. This did cause some friction with
the practice nurses.
Many of the practice nurses want to join Pegasus but we are not allowed to
and I think that is poor. It is putting a bit of ill feeling between the nurses and
doctors at the moment. We were working as colleagues and suddenly they
have got this big battering ram that we are not allowed to be part of. The
problem is that the doctors are looking after their own back at the moment
and the practice nurses have come second best (Practice Nurse, Practice Five,
March 1995).
All of the other IPAs around the country are significantly smaller than Pegasus. The
size, combined with the co-operative attitude of the local RHA has meant that the
Christchurch area has effectively become the experimental pilot for the country. While
there is a widespread interest in forms of budget holding and capitation, other areas
tend to look to Pegasus and the Southern RHA to see how well they work.
The Southern RHA has taken a pretty hands-off approach in relation to
Pegasus. Often Pegasus ends up calling the shots. But it has suited them as
the RHA has ended up with money in their pocket too. Because of their
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cohesion Pegasus is leading the way in the country. Everyone else watches
and follows them (Dialogue Partner One, June 1996).
Although there was no direct link between the After Hours Collective and Pegasus,
many of the people involved were the same. In fact, the office of Pegasus was based
at the After Hours Clinic before moving to their own site in 1995. The After Hours
Clinic was seen as a successful venture by those involved in creating a sense of co¬
operation in the local area. Many of the local GPs saw membership in Pegasus as a
logical extension of their involvement in the Clinic, which explains the unusually high
level ofmembership.
2.2 REASONS FOR JOINING
In the interviews, GPs outlined two general reasons why they joined Pegasus. First,
Pegasus provided some form of protection against the proposed changes:
I think that Pegasus is a security blanket for a lot of doctors in Christchurch
who thought like us — Hell what is going to happen. Pegasus was seen as a
group, doing something that anybody could join and be swept up under the
skirts (GP, Practice Two, March 1995).
I am part of Pegasus because I am keen on GPs showing solidarity. This is a
way for GPs to act as one rather than being picked off. This is a danger
because the government has historically been malevolent, not supporting GPs
(GP, Practice Three, November 1993).
Second, GPs felt that they would get a better contract from the RHA as part of an
IPA group than as individuals.
Pegasus have acted as a buffer for the individual GP. They have more clout as
a negotiator than does an individual GP (GP, Practice One, October 1993).
Being part of an IPA means we are less vulnerable than we would be by
ourselves. We get the best deal from the RHA and deal with the RHA more
effectively (GP, Practice Five, October 1993).
A third reason for getting involved in groups like Pegasus was that this was seen as an
effective way for GPs to gain more control over the reform process. The change was
seen by many as being unavoidable. From that perspective there was a simple choice,
either GPs got involved in the process or they would lose their historical power,
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autonomy and control over resources to someone appointed by the State. This view
was expressed best in an interview with Dr Tom Marshall published in the New
Zealand Doctor. He was one of the key individuals opposing the 1990 contract
proposal and was also key in the development of the IPA concept.
It seems to us that if there is going to be a bureaucracy (accounting for
spending in the primary health sector) it was much better for it to be
controlled by GPs used to running in a lean way, than any third party (Baker,
1995, p. 17).
2.3 CONTRACTUAL DEVELOPMENTS
On the 2 November 1993 a contract was signed between the Southern Regional
Health Authority (SRHA) and the Pegasus Medical Group. The contract was for just
over two and a half years and could not be terminated before 1 July 1995. Provision
was made for an annual negotiation of fee services and conditions. Strict conditions
of commercial sensitivity were placed over all of the information in the contract. The
Southern Regional Health Authority agreed to pay Pegasus on a fee-for-services
basis, effectively replicating the existing GMS and subsidy fee schedule and Pegasus
agreed to "co-ordinate and deliver primary health care services in Christchurch".
Pegasus had the right to subcontract the provision of the medical services to whoever
they chose. The fund-holding projects represented the only deviation from the fee-
for-service basis. Pegasus agreed to accept some level of risk negotiated in a specific
agreement for each project, although overall guidelines were established for these
risk-sharing arrangements.
• The fund-holding budget was based on historical figures (1992/1993) with a
negotiated growth factor added.
• These budgets would not be reduced unless:
a) The original budget was set too high because of an error
b) The expenditure of the Pegasus member GPs were higher than the national
average.
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• The share of the savings from the budget holding will be negotiated for each
agreement. In initial agreements where the SRHA is carrying all of the risk the
share will be assumed to be 70/30 in Pegasus' favour.
• The savings made by Pegasus will be shared with their members as they agree —
these will be spent on the improvement of Health Services and the SRHA retains
the right of approval on the expenditure of savings.
• The SRHA is also obliged to invest its share of savings into Primary Health Care in
the local area. However, they are prohibited from purchasing services that are in
competition with the Pegasus group or its member GPs.
Many GPs were uncomfortable about the contracting consequences of the 1993 Act
and were daunted by the size and complexity and 'risks' associated with the Section 51
notices.
The Pegasus group has now contracted with the RHA. All of our claims are
now sent to the Pegasus group. The executive have got some radical ideas
about what they want to do with any savings made. On the 1 July the
Government decentralised the health funding. GPs fell under Section 51 of
the Health and Disabilities Act. This was very detailed and all GPs became a
party to this. Pegasus restated the S51 material in 16 pages. Those who
signed the Pegasus contract did not have to try and comply with Section 51.
This was a strong incentive to sign with the Pegasus group. Both Pegasus and
the medical association (NZMA) analysed Section 51 and made reports. They
negotiated with the Government and removed some of the more obnoxious
clauses (GP, Practice One, October 1993).
By contrast the collective contract offered by Pegasus was seen as being a lot simpler
and much less of a threat for individual GPs and GP practices. Signing the collective
contract was also a condition for continued membership as part of Pegasus.
Effectively GPs gave up their right to send subsidy claims to the RHA and became a
subcontractor to Pegasus for the provision of primary health services. From the GP's
perspective the contract offered to them by Pegasus rolled over the historical funding
levels but removed them directly from the influence of the State and the RHA.
What people want is mastery over their own destiny and to protect their
autonomy. Strangely enough the managed care path of Pegasus involvement
236
has secured more autonomy that those who stuck with the Section 51
agreements. Those people are more controlled and subject to the whim of
RHA middle managers (Dialogue Partner One, June 1995).
The major fear on the part of GPs was that the contracts with the RHA would place
restrictions over the GMS and thus effectively cap practice income. However,
documents released by the SRHA in September 1994 indicated that the GMS was not
the major area of concern. There was only 1% annual growth in the GMS charges in
the Southern Region but Ministry of Health forecasts showed an 8-9% annual growth
in pharmaceuticals and laboratory tests. Therefore, these areas were highlighted by
the SRHA as an important target and led to Pegasus' involvement in notional budget
holding for laboratory tests and for pharmaceuticals. A number of other projects were
also initiated on immunisation, maternity services, primary care nursing and better
integration with hospital outpatient services. As yet there has been no move to place
Pegasus member GPs on capitated funding and the de-emphasis of GMS indicates that
this may not be the key issue.
Within Pegasus three different groups emerged: fust, the rank-and-file members who
are happy to let someone else deal with the contracts and the politics so they are free
to 'get on with being a GP'. For these people Pegasus has guaranteed maintenance of
the status-quo fee-for-service arrangements and continued access to the same services
and resources. GPs in this group only have a limited involvement in the Pegasus
activities and projects and tend to see membership as a way to avoid change. This
approach was taken by the doctors at Practice 3 and 4.
The second group consists of those actively involved in attending the Pegasus
meetings and in being part of the projects underway. Pegasus provided these people a
way for them to be actively involved in improving the standards of General Practice.
For them Pegasus has been an active change agent, but this was change that the GPs
had chosen to become a part of. Some of the doctors from Practice 1 and Practice 4
chose to take this more active stance.
The third group is the core of about seven GPs who are the leadership of the Pegasus
IPA. One GP described these people as the 'next mountain to climb brigade', similar
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to the first wave budget holders in the UK; middle aged and looking for a challenge.
These people are highly committed to Pegasus and have become the driving force of
the change process. None of these people were willing to be interviewed for this
study.
What has made the difference in Christchurch is the core of smart/driven
people who are dedicated to making things better and see this as a way to get
rewarded for their skills (Dialogue Partner Two, June 1995).
These GPs are seen by others as the movers and shakers in the city. They have had
previous involvement in medical politics, are experienced in dealing with the public
and are very experienced in the use of computer technology. Because these people
are respected as GPs in the local area their leadership has been widely accepted by the
other member GPs. Many of these individuals already held a level of legitimacy from
initiating and generating GP support for a co-operative After Hours Surgery. GPs
interviewed felt that one of the most positive features of Pegasus was that it was
being run by other GPs rather than from a group of civil servants or businessmen.
(Interview transcript, GP Practice Three, June 1995)
Q If you had, say, an accountant who is in there on the Pegasus executive that
would be different?
A Well if a businessman had political sway in the area I wouldn't be very happy.
Q Because they are not necessarily doing what is good for general practice?
A They don't have the same kind of touch on things that a general practitioner
has or a doctor has. The same thing happens in the hospital system, I've
talked to a number of specialists and they've said that people coming in who
aren't medical don't grasp the complexity or don't grasp the philosophy and the
philosophy usually is that the patient comes first. Money is a secondary issue.
While membership at the most basic level did lead to a few administration changes,
the changes introduced through Pegasus were mainly voluntary. GPs who were
reluctant to be involved found it reasonably easy to pass-off the new administrative
responsibilities to the practice manager/receptionists or to the practice nurses.
Practices were required to direct their claims through Pegasus rather than to HBL.
Collection of patient records and sending the claims to the correct authority was
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generally dealt with by the receptionists / practice managers. Therefore this had little
or no effect on the GPs.
2.4 GP VISIBILITY
Pegasus introduced a process of claim audit for all of their members. The process
involved the selection of a number of practices to review. One week of GMS claims
were selected and letters were written to all patients that visited the practice in that
week. Patients were then asked if they were seen by the GP on that day. GPs
interviewed suggested that if their patients received a letter they would probably ring
up the practice to check. Because of this they felt that the validity of the audit
process was questionable. While claim audit did have some direct influence of GP
behaviour, the major effects were on the practice managers and practice nurses. As
already indicated, the practice managers / receptionists were primarily responsible for
recording patient details and sending in subsidy claims. Within some practices the
claim audit process has led to a review of practice nurse activity to ensure that the
patient had seen a doctor and therefore the subsidy claim was valid. One practice has
started charging patients directly for the nurses' services rather than claiming the
subsidy (Practice One).
Combined with the claim audit was a general sense of visibility or review. As part of
the contractual obligations GPs were required to record an identification number of all
of their claims. One doctor suggested that Pegasus was collecting data on everyone's
prescriptions. This was corroborated in another interview where one of the Pegasus
officers was using computer technology to download prescribing data from the HBL
database in Wanganui. This, together with the laboratory data, gave Pegasus the
ability to analyse, pinpoint and to monitor individual prescribing, laboratory use and
subsidy claims if they so desired. GP feedback on monthly lab expenditure became a
regular feature in 1995. They also proposed to produce similar reports for prescribing
in 1996.
But when you do order a test someone else will know what you have done
and you may be asked to explain.
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I think that there is a desire in Pegasus to be very scrupulous in the way they
do GMS and things, like the claim, and have regulations or audits set in place
to make sure that happens. Doctors by-and-large are an honest group but . . .
I think we all suspected that certain doctors in Christchurch had a rather
liberal approach in their GMS claims. That was all very well when it was
coming out of some bottomless pit, but now it is coming out of someone else's
slice of the Pegasus cake (GP, Practice Two, March 1995).
From the GP perspective the major impact of the Pegasus group has been in the area
of 'fundholding' or more correctly special projects. The special projects had direct
effects on the wider group who have chosen to take an active role within Pegasus,
including a number of the GPs under study and indirect effects on many of the more
passive members. The three primary areas for attention were laboratory tests,
pharmaceutical usage and outpatient management.
2.5 SPECIAL PROJECTS
2.5.1 Laboratory
Pegasus negotiated a contract with the RHA providing a form of budgetholding for
laboratory tests. If the Pegasus group could prove that they saved money on
laboratory costs they would get to retain some of the savings to spend on patient care.
All Pegasus members were sent a letter asking them to think carefully about
laboratory tests ordered and that any savings made would come back for the group to
spend on primary care. Members were also invited to join a pilot group which paid
particular attention to their laboratory usage. About 30-40 of the Pegasus members
responded to this invitation and attended a number of educational meetings on the
topic. They were also split into smaller peer-review groups to discuss test ordering
behaviour. Those involved maintained that the goal was not to save money but to
think more carefully and only order tests that were going to give useful information.
The laboratories were also asked to print on the order forms the costs of each
different test. The letter from Pegasus, the provision of cost information and detailed
monthly reports on what each GP spent led to quite dramatic results. Although the
project had only been going for 9 months there was a 30% decrease in laboratory
usage in the Canterbury area and a net saving of over one million dollars. The
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interesting factor was that the savings were not just generated by the GPs involved in
the pilot group but from most of the Pegasus members.
2.5.2 Pharmaceuticals
A similar contract was negotiated between Pegasus and the RHA to cover
pharmaceuticals. This project started in December 1994. Pegasus members were
invited by letter to attend a meeting on the project. About 40 GPs expressed an
interest. They were broken down into four smaller groups, each chaired by a GP
facilitator and with a pharmacist involved. The groups meet once a month to discuss
their prescribing behaviour and to provide a 'peer review' forum. Data on individual
GP prescribing was provided by Pegasus to the GP facilitators to provoke discussion
and to 'get the GPs thinking about their prescribing'. Three specific groups of drugs
have be targeted as representing a significant chunk of the pharmaceutical budget:
antibiotics, asthma drugs and gastroenterological anti-ulcer drugs. There is also a
significant educational component of this project. Pegasus ran regular 'educational'
meetings for those involved addressing the nature and benefits of available drugs.
Although the Pegasus prescribing project did not directly reward GPs who prescribed
more economically, the fact that Pegasus retained control over any savings made was
a powerful incentive.
(Interview transcript, GP Practice One, March 1995)
Q: Last interview you mentioned the PreMeC prescribing analysis and said that it
was very good but that there were no real incentives to change your practice.
Has this project started to give you incentives to change?
A: Yes, definitely! Basically, it is the fact that the Pegasus group has got a
contract with the RHA so we get to retain control of some of the savings
made. That is the incentive and it is quite powerful. Without that you are
only doing it for the good of the general person, it is a bit vague.
GPs involved in the project did get paid $100 an hour for the time involved in
attending meetings and in peer review meetings. These payments and the costs of
administering the project were met by a direct Government grant. On the 19 August
1994 the Government announced a $20 million funding package to assist with the
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development of new health services. Currently only a small proportion of this fund
has been taken up, however Pegasus was one group that did apply for a grant to run
and administer the pharmaceutical project and, to date, they have been given the
largest grant of anyone who applied.
2.5.3 Outpatients
The outpatient project involves the gastroenterology and respiratory departments at
the local hospital. GPs who are involved in this project had far more control over
what happened to their patients. The GP could specify which consultant their patients
saw and the tune-frame in which the patient should be seen.
The other projects, immunisation, maternity services and primary care nursing, are far
smaller in scale, concerned more with the reorganisation of service rather than saving
funds. However, the immunisation project caused a strong reaction among practice
nurse staff. This was because the management and provision of immunisation services
was conducted by practice nurses and the Pegasus project was seen as impinging on
their work responsibilities.
2.6 SAVINGS
At the Pegasus AGM in 1995 it was announced that there were already significant
savings from the projects, particularly from the laboratory budget holding. After
running costs there was over $750,000 in the bank and this was not just from the
project group but from right across the board.
The existence of savings opened the question of what it was going to be spent on.
Because of the contract between Pegasus and the RHA it is necessary that any savings
be spent on 'the improvement of Health Services'. The SRHA also retained the right
of approval on the expenditure of savings. An initial suggestion was the creation and
funding of a Chair of General Practice at the local medical school. Although there
was strong support for this proposal there was some resistance from the RHA who
were concerned that such a use of funds would not "relate directly to patient welfare".
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There was also some tension between Pegasus and the University over who would
control the funds1.
Two other suggestions were also put forward. First, that they fund a gastroscopy
service that GPs could have open access too. Second, that a terminally ill benefit be
established, which will fully subsidise the cost of GP visits to people who are
terminally ill where GPs are caring for them in the patient's own home.
When you have a terminal patient it often means you are visiting 2, 3 or 4
times a week and as the situation stands at the moment, either we don't charge
them or the bill gets very high very quickly, so there is a proposal to put in a
benefit. Pegasus funds are to be spent on that to enable good care and a fair
reimbursement for us (GP, Practice One, June 1995).
To date Pegasus has announced free Mammography screening to prevent breast
cancer (NZ Doctor 10 Nov 1995, p. 5) and a "special needs benefit for patients with
terminal illness". This looked very much like the terminally ill fund proposed earlier.
The New Zealand Doctor article also described free hearing checks for children under
five, free urea breath testing and a hardship fund.
1 This chair was established in 1996.
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APPENDIX 3
THE PREFERRED MEDICINES CENTRE
(PREMEC)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This appendix describes the development and operation of the Preferred Medicines
Centre (PreMeC). PreMeC was a collective GP response to the 1991/1993 reforms.
However, this was not a response to the change in funding but to the increased concern
about the costs of GP prescribing and the associated threat of Government control of GP
prescribing.
3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PREMEC
PreMeC was a non-profit incorporated society established in 1991 by General
Practitioners and pharmacists to educate GP prescribing behaviour. It began in 1988 as a
research project set up in the Nelson area to study whether an analysis of actual GP
prescribing patterns could be used to improve the quality of prescribing. The outcome
was that the Nelson area had approximately 25% lower dollar value in their prescribing
without, apparently, affecting the health of patients. The then Minister of Health got
interested in the project and set up a national entity attached to the Wellington School of
Medicine and funded by the Ministry of Health. In 1993 this organisation became an
incorporated society known an PreMeC and the responsibility for funding was delegated
from the Ministry to the individual RHAs.
Essentially PreMeC represented the medical profession's response to resource
restrictions and an attempt to focus the process on the 'practice of better medicine'
rather than the cutting of costs. One of the doctors involved in establishing PreMeC
outlined three reasons why they took the initiative in the area of prescription analysis and
pharmacist facilitation services:
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• It would pre-empt a restrictive drug list being produced by non-GPs.
• It would prove that the medical profession could 'manage then" own house'.
• GP practice would improve as GPs worked with a small number of drugs they knew
well.
(Interview PreMeC Founder, August 1994).
The official mission statement was:
The Preferred Medicines Centre exists to promote and enhance pharmaceutical
management and prescribing efficiency, based on principles of efficacy, safety and
economy, taking account of data from primary health care providers and
consumers (PreMeC Annual Report July 1993-June 1994, p. 1).
In 1995 PreMeC was independent from the Ministry of Health and the RHAs but was
principally funded by the RHAs. Individual GPs register to become part of PreMeC's
prescription analysis programme. In 1995 86% of GPs nationally had joined. PreMeC's
had two major activities, the GP prescription analysis programme and pharmacist
facilitation services. For prescription analysis, PreMeC obtained and analysed the
prescribing data from the HBL computer in Wanganui. Individual prescribing behaviour
was reported to each GP along with comparative group averages. PreMeC employed
part-time pharmacist facilitators around the country who then met with individual GPs to
discuss their prescribing behaviour as detailed in the reports. Over half of all New
Zealand GPs had been involved in this process.
PreMeC also employed a number of full time pharmacist facilitators. These were mainly
in the North Island and tended to be attached to particular IPA groups. The full time
facilitators established an ongoing process of education for member GPs and assisted in
the development of therapeutic / best practice guidelines.
Other PreMeC activities included research into prescribing trends, the publication of
educational bulletins, which were distributed to all GPs and pharmacists on topics
relating to prescribing and an interactive case study programme. In each case study GPs
were sent a hypothetical case to analyse. The results from all the different GPs were
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collated and sent to top GPs and specialists for their comments. A summary was
provided to all interested GPs. The object of the case studies was to identify and
quantify practitioner and regional variation and to generate a consensus about what
constitutes best medical practice. A survey of the use made by GPs of the case studies
conducted by PreMeC found that 38% of practices used the case studies as a basis for
peer review.
3.3 INFLUENCE OF PREMEC
Although PreMeC claimed to have a significant effect on GP prescribing behaviour and,
in some cases, generated significant savings, maintaining ongoing support from the
RHAs appeared to pose difficulties. According to the manager their educational
approach is not always understood or well supported by the RHAs which "only
understand financial incentives and carrots like money-in-the-pocket or new equipment
for the practices". (Interview PreMeC Manager, August 1994)
The information provided by PreMeC was seen to actively complement a peer-review
arrangements within the practices studied and to provide useful educational material.
Most of the GPs interviewed had been involved in a PreMeC prescription analysis and
discussed their prescribing behaviour with one of the PreMeC pharmacists. Many of the
GPs also actively participated in the hypothetical case studies. One of the GPs
commented that the process was interesting but was already aware of his prescribing and
was reluctant to prescribe more expensive drugs unless there were clear medical benefits.
Sometimes I get pressured by the patients (and the salesmen) to prescribe the
more expensive drugs. I would generally prefer to prescribe a cheaper drug if it
is as effective (GP, Practice Three, May 1994).
One of the other GPs who was involved in the prescription analysis programme also
commented that the exercise was informative but a bit pointless because there was little
real incentive to change what he was doing.
They conduct prescription analysis which is interesting but has little impact on my
prescribing behaviour. Prescription analysis provides details of a GP's prescribing
costs over a four week time period and a comparison to the prescribing levels of
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other GPs. But there is no incentive to be a more economic prescriber. Maybe
if we had a budget for pharmaceuticals it would make a difference, but currently I
can see no reason why I should not give my patients the best available (GP,
Practice One, May 1994).
Within the Northern Region full-time Pharmacist Facilitator positions were established
attached to particular IPAs. These pharmacists developed ongoing relationships with
GPs and groups of GPs, assisting them to develop their own 'therapeutic guidelines'.
3.4 FUTURE OF PREMEC
By the beginning of 1995 there were indications that some of the RHAs (particularly
Southern) were reluctant to provide ongoing financial support for PreMeC. In the
Christchurch area Pegasus picked up the focus on prescription analysis and improving
GP prescribing behaviour. Pegasus developed the technological access to monitor
individual GP prescribing and to run their own prescription analysis systems providing






This appendix describes the three different school-funding grants and how these
changed under the New Zealand education reforms.
4.2 OPERATIONAL GRANT
Under the pre-reform structure most of the funding for primary schools went to the
local education boards who had the discretion to allocate funds on the basis of need.
A significant amount of the direct funding for secondary schools went to either the
Secondary Schools' Council or the Department of Education and what did go directly
to the school was pre-allocated along set budget lines.
The direct funding of school operations began in 1989 and a national formula was
established to determine how much each school would receive. A slight re¬
adjustment was made to the formula in 1990, increasing the total allocation of funds
by 1%. The operations grant consisted of two major components, a base or fixed
component to help smaller schools which did not have many students and a 'per pupil'
rate which was set at four different levels to reflect the respective costs of different
educational levels.
Operational grants remained unchanged until 1994 when the government announced
an additional $20 million increase. The stated objective of this increase was to
recognise:
The additional requirements of implementing the new curriculum and the
qualifications initiatives (NZQA) applying to senior secondary students
(Ministry of Education Circular 1994/25).
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At the same time there was a re-adjustment of the allocation formula, resulting in a
drop in the fixed base grant and increase in the per pupil rates. This effectively meant
that large schools received more and smaller schools received less.
From May 1993 the direct funding increased to include the "salary grant for
management". Under the existing staffing formula schools were entitled to a certain
number of senior positions known as PRs or positions of responsibility. The grant
covered all teachers designated as principal, associate principal, deputy principal,
assistant principal, senior master, senior mistress and heads of department (PR3 and
PR4). (Education Amendment Act 1992, Sec 9IE)
The move to direct funding has been a central policy in the reform process (Taskforce
to Review Education Administration, 1988, p. 49). The most significant impact of
this policy was the direct financial responsibility expected from the school.
4.3 STAFFING GRANT
Like the operating grant, school staffing entitlements were based on the student roll.
At the end of each year the Ministry told each school their guaranteed minimum
staffing for the next year based on the expected roll. If there was a significant drop in
the expected roll, the school would lose a number of teaching staff.
Prior to 1990 the numbers of teaching positions available nationally and the scales of
entitlement were published in the Education (Salaries and Staffing) Regulations 1957.
The entitlements under the 1957 Regulations were maintained under the Education
Act 1989 Sec 91 (C). The Education Amendment 1990 Sec 22 (C) adjusted the 1989
Act and gave the Secretary of the Ministry of Education the ability to vary the number
of teachers employed nationally and the formula to determine school entitlements.
In 1991 there was a national adjustment of school staffing entitlements in what came
to be known as "the mother of all budgets". The formula for non-contact teacher
hours was adjusted resulting in a loss of approximately 300 Secondary teaching
positions around the country. The effect on Primary Schools wasn't significant.
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In 1992 Section 91 of the 1989 Education Act was repealed under the Education
Amendment Act Sec 91 (M) and the Governor-General was given the power to alter
staffing and entitlement through the Orders in Council. Orders in Council have
legislative status and therefore eliminated the vulnerability of the Ministry of
Education to challenge. After 1993, Orders came out annually detailing the staff
entitlements for the next year. Under the Orders, staffing levels and staffing
entitlements remained constant until the beginning of 1996.
In November 1994 the government established a Ministerial Reference Group (MRG)
to develop a model for school resource entitlement. A central part of that process
was their review of the existing school staff entitlements. In March 1995 the MRG
released the new staffing levels. The MRG recommendations did not appear to affect
the secondary schools as significantly as the primary schools. There was an
improvement in the staffing allocations for the senior school with year 11 going from
1:25 to 1:23 and years 12 and 13 from 1:20 to 1:18 and 1:17 respectively. It was
only the secondary schools with over 600 total students or a large senior school that
consistently benefited. However, there were some real changes for the primary
schools. The larger primary schools (over 100) received additional teaching staff
while the smaller ones (below 100) tended to lose staff.
Combined with the MRG adjustment to the staffing ratios was another effort to
encourage schools to take responsibility for the payment of teaching salaries. While
bulk funding of teachers' salaries was clearly envisioned in the Picot Report (1988)
this was not implemented, generally because of strong teacher resistance. In order to
'ease in the implementation' the government introduced a 3-year trial of bulk funding.
The MRG reviewed this trial and recommended that 'direct funding' of teachers'
salaries be introduced as an option. This option was resisted by the teaching unions
represented on the MRG and by individual teachers and some principals interviewed.
4.4 SPECIAL GRANTS
A number of schools are entitled to additional or special funding. The most
significant of these grants was called the Equity Fund. This grant was provided to
250
schools that had students with cultural and social learning disadvantages'. In 1994
the Equity Fund was reviewed by the Ministry of Education and renamed Targeted
Funding for Educational Achievement (TFEA). Previously schools had qualified for
funding by writing to the Ministry and making a case for the needs of their school.
Staff at the Ministry argued that allocation of the TFEA funds should be based on the
needs of the area not the persuasiveness of the principal. A number of factors were
selected by the Ministry of Education that related to poor socio-economic status and
consequential lower educational achievement. Schools were placed in one of ten
different bands based on the socio-economic data for their local area. Funding grants
were made to schools in the bottom three bands, staggered so those who were
classified in the bottom band got the most.
In 1995 the Ministerial Resource Group proposed a new form of funding called the
Secondary Tertiary Alignment Resource (STAR). A pool of $15 million was made
available for State secondary schools to purchase or provide their students tertiary
level programmes which have higher costs than conventional programmes. This was a




NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENTS 1978-1996
Year Elected Party Prime Minister
1978 National Robert Muldoon
1981 National Robert Muldoon
1984 Labour David Lange
1987 Labour David Lange / Geoff Palmer
1990 National Jim Bolger
1993 National Jim Bolger
1996 National / NZ First Jim Bolger
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